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PREFACE
Any history of the relations between Native Americans and 
European colonists written by a White historian is fraught 
with the potential of being what Calvin Martin has called 
"historiographic colonialism."1 Since this is a study of the 
genocide of Native Americans, it necessarily focuses on the 
indigenous people as victims; however, I have tried to portray 
something of the lives of the native peoples during this 
period of colonization as they were never merely "acted upon" 
by the European settlers but also acted in ways which were 
important to the outcome. In so doing, I fully accept Michael 
Dorris's statement that "whoever attempts to write Native 
American history must admit in advance to fallibility."2
Another problem in writing about Native Americans is more 
basic: What is the proper term to use to identify the
indigenous inhabitants of the Americas erroneously labelled 
"Indians" almost five hundred years ago? I believe that a 
people should be able to choose its own name, and, at present, 
both "Indian" and "Native American" seem to be equally 
acceptable to the descendants of the original native peoples 
of the United States. I have chosen to follow the example of
1 Martin, "The Metaphysics of Writing Indian-White 
History," 33.
2 Dorris, "Indians on the Shelf," 104.
iv
Robert Berkhofer, who in The White Man's Indian opted to use 
"Native American" when referring "to the actual peoples 
designated by the term Indian" and "Indians" when referring to 
the "White image of these persons." In addition, Berkhofer 
followed the policy of The Handbook of North American Indians 
in capitalizing the first letter of racial groups (White, 
Black, and Red) ; I have done likewise.3 In a matter of style, 
I have modernized the spelling in the quotations taken from 
colonial sources.
Choosing Virginia as the case study is not meant to imply 
that Virginia's treatment of Native Americans was unique; on 
the contrary, it was probably typical. Further studies on the 
other colonies must be done, however, to prove or disprove 
this claim.
3 Berkhofer, The White Man's Indian, xvi-xvii.
v
ABSTRACT
This study explores the issue of genocide as it pertains 
to the drastic demographic decline suffered by the indigenous 
peoples of English North America during the process of 
colonization. Seventeenth-century Virginia is used as a case 
study.
Genocide is a relatively new word, invented in 1944 by 
Raphael Lemkin. In 1948, the United Nations passed a 
Convention on Genocide, and since that time several scholars 
have studied the phenomenon and developed their own 
definitions and typologies. In Chapter 2 there is a detailed 
analysis of the views of these scholars which leads to the 
following definition of genocide: Genocide is the destruction
of a group of human beings who are defined as a group by the 
perpetrator, who acts with purpose and in an organized manner, 
and who also determines that the group is alien to the 
perpetrator's society.
Chapter 3 shows how the Europeans involved in the 
colonization of the Americas considered the native peoples to 
be alien and inhuman. This view made it easier for the 
colonizers to destroy the natives when they seemed to 
interfere with the colonizers' goals to obtain the natives 
land and resources.
Chapter 4 provides a chronological account of the 
colonization of Virginia from 1607 to 1676, which shows how 
the colonists greed for land and their debased image of the 
native peoples caused the destruction of the natives—  
physically, culturally, and spiritually.
THE SCOURGE OF "DISCOVERY":
CASE STUDY OF THE GENOCIDE OF NATIVE AMERICANS 
IN ENGLISH NORTH AMERICA
INTRODUCTION
The word ’’genocide" is less than fifty years old; 
however, the practice of genocide spans human history.1 As 
the sociologist Jack Nusan Porter has stated, the term has 
defied conclusive definition by scholars. "Genocide is not a 
value-free term," Porter writes. "It is loaded with political 
and emotional bias."2 Denoting the intentional infliction of 
mass destruction on a people, genocide is perhaps the ultimate 
crime against humanity. The terrible implications of the word 
"genocide" make its use susceptible to two opposing 
tendencies, both of which make difficult the rational study of 
the phenomenon. One of these tendencies is that overuse of 
the word, particularly in political rhetoric, can trivialize 
the concept.3 The second tendency is that denial or 
justification of genocide is the standard response to the 
crime, which serves to prolong the suffering of the victim 
group, renders the achievement of individual and social 
justice impossible, and makes more likely the recurrence of 
genocide is the future. As two prominent scholars of 
genocide, historian Frank Chalk and sociologist Kurt
1 Kuper, Genocide, 11; Porter, Genocide and Human Rights.
4.
2 Porter, Genocide and Human Rights, iii, 3; Chalk and 
Jonassohn, The History and Sociology of Genocide. 27.
3 Porter, Genocide and Human Rights. 3, 9.
2
3Jonassohn, have pointed out, "Throughout most of recorded 
time, it was the victors who wrote the history of the 
conquests," thus facilitating the perversion of truth by the 
denial of genocide.4
Considering the role of genocide in the demise of the 
indigenous inhabitants of English North America in the wake of 
colonization illustrates well the problems with the definition 
and application of the term. The European settlers and their 
descendants have remained in power in this land since their 
initial victorious confrontations with the indigenous peoples. 
Not only have the Euro-Americans controlled the nation's 
politics and economics through the centuries, but they have 
controlled as well the telling of all history, not only of the 
conquests. To compound the problems of finding reliable 
history, until very recently, Chalk and Jonassohn have 
written, "only the rulers made news." Fortunately, some 
historians have now turned their attention to the role of the 
people who never held the reins of power.5
When these people are given voice, the result often 
challenges the heretofore accepted views of the majority, thus 
exciting controversy. To charge that Euro-Americans carried 
out genocide in the process of settling what is now the United 
States is to dispute some of the most basic beliefs 
underpinning the nation— the ideals of personal liberty,
4 Chalk and Jonassohn, The History and Sociology of 
Genocide. 7.
5 Ibid., 8.
4individual rights, progress, and democracy. In this case, as 
in every case, the charge of genocide demands careful 
substantiation, not only because of the seriousness of the 
accusation but also to avoid dismissal of the charge as mere 
political rhetoric. While the injudicious use of the term 
serves in the long run to undermine its impact, the public 
recognition of genocide when it has occurred is fundamental to 
the hope of building a more humane world. Past genocides must 
be understood and condemned if future genocides are to be 
prevented.6 "If previous examples of genocide are consigned 
to oblivion," Roger Smith, professor of government, writes, 
"the problem of prevention . . . will lack urgency."7
There is no question that the indigenous peoples of all 
the Americas suffered a demographic disaster in the wake of 
the European discovery of their homelands. Russell Thornton, 
an expert in the demographic history of Native Americans, 
estimates that more than five million native inhabitants lived 
in what is now the United States in 1492; by 1800, the number 
had declined to 600,000; and by the last decade of the 
nineteenth century, the nadir of population loss, the number 
had dwindled to 250,000.8 There is also no question that the 
drastic decline in numbers occurred because of contact with 
European settlers and that these settlers acted destructively
6 Smith, "Genocide and Denial," 3.
7 Ibid., 24.
8 Thornton, American Indian Holocaust and Survival. 43.
5towards the native peoples. Whether genocide was a factor in
the precipitous loss of native life is important to determine.
As Christopher Vecsey, professor of religion and Native
American studies, has written:
"A moral examination of our American policies is 
anything but outdated. On the contrary, vigilance is 
essential. . . . [W]e historians must not cease to
tell the stories, no matter how lurid, of our 
American-Indian relations. . . . Cynicism and
sophistication must not cause our moral outrage to 
falter. The stories of Indian-White contact reveal to 
us the stain on our national wealth, spirit, and 
character, and helps us as well to envision ourselves 
darkly, and thus more fully.”9
This paper is an exploration of the crime of genocide 
and its applicability to the tragic loss of life among Native 
Americans which occurred as Europeans invaded their lands. In 
recent years, several scholars from various disciplines have 
expanded on both the work of the originator of the term 
"genocide” and the United Nations, which passed the Convention 
on Genocide in 1948. They have proposed several definitions 
and typologies for what has proved to be a difficult and 
complex concept. Since it is necessary to establish a 
thorough understanding of what constitutes genocide before 
passing judgment on the colonizers of North America, Chapter 
II of this paper will present a lengthy review of these 
definitions. A synthesis of these definitions will show that 
genocide was a decided factor in the policy and practices of 
European settlers towards Native Americans. Chapter III will 
demonstrate how the European image of the native inhabitants
9 Vecsey, "Envision Ourselves Darkly," 121-22.
6contributed to the practice of genocide. In order to explore 
more fully how genocide occurred, Chapter IV will present a 
case study of the relations between the native peoples and the 
settlers in the first English colony in North America, 
Virginia, from 1607 to 1677. The Conclusion will summarize 
how the events in Virginia constituted a genocidal process and 
will discuss the impact in the contemporary United States of 
the denial of the genocide of Native Americans.
CHAPTER II 
THEORIES OF GENOCIDE
Definitions and Controversies
Despite the efforts of scholars and others, "genocide” 
continues to elude precise definition. One reason that 
scholars have found it so difficult to agree on a definition 
is the history of the word itself. Raphael Lemkin, a Polish 
jurist, invented the word "genocide" in 1944, before worldwide 
knowledge of the full horror of the Nazi genocides. Although 
he said that he wanted to define "an old practice in its 
modern development,"1 his description of the word derived in 
large measure from what he knew at the time was going on in 
Nazi Germany. When the full dimensions of the Nazi genocides 
confronted the world, the tendency developed to associate 
"genocide" with their immensity, calculated cruelty, totality, 
and sinister bureaucratization and technology of killing. 
This Nazi standard can impede the historian's ability to 
assess possible genocides in the past when humankind lacked 
the modern world's capabilities to exact quick death on huge 
numbers of people. Yet historians must not allow the Nazi 
genocides to overwhelm other cases in which a smaller number
1 Lemkin, Axis Rule In Occupied Europe. 79.
7
8of deaths took place in less spectacular ways.
Although the word "genocide" is now most frequently 
associated with the Nazis' destruction of the Jews, Lemkin 
actually gave the word broad definition. Combining the Greek 
word for "race" or "tribe," genos, with the Latin suffix for 
killing," -cide. Lemkin formed the word "genocide" and wrote 
that "by genocide, we mean the destruction of a nation or an 
ethnic group" by an "oppressor nation." Furthermore, 
"genocide is directed against the national group as an entity, 
and the actions involved are directed against individuals, not 
in their individual capacity, but as members of the national 
group." Significantly, Lemkin explicitly stated that mass 
killing is not the only form of genocide. In fact, genocide 
does not necessarily entail "the immediate destruction" of the 
nation or ethnic group, rather it can be a systematic plan of
action carried out to destroy "essential foundations of the
life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the 
groups themselves."2
Lemkin delineated the following ways in which the 
perpetrator's plan of action can consist of coordinated 
attacks on "different aspects of life" of the victim group:
1. The perpetrator can destroy the political life of
the victim group by taking over its government or by
relegating it to colonial status.
2. The perpetrator can destroy the social life of the
2 Ibid., 79, 80.
9victim group by undermining the ties which unify the group's 
society and by imprisoning or murdering those group members 
who provide moral leadership.
3. The perpetrator can destroy the cultural life of 
the victim group by preventing its cultural practices, by 
destroying its cultural institutions, and by controlling its 
educational system.
4. The perpetrator can destroy the economic life of 
the victim group by expropriating its natural resources and 
other sources of wealth and by controlling trade and 
employment.
5. The perpetrator can destroy the religious life of 
the victim group by forbidding religious practices.
6. The perpetrator can destroy the moral life of the 
victim group by promoting activities, such as excessive 
alcohol consumption and pornography.
7. The perpetrator can use biological means to destroy 
the victim group by enforced birth control and sterilization.
8. The perpetrator can directly destroy the physical 
existence of the victim group by mass murder or enforced 
starvation.3
The result of these attacks would be the end of the 
ethnic or national group's existence as an entity even if 
individuals within the group survive. As Israel Charny, 
psychologist and Executive Director of the Institute of the
3 Ibid., xi-xii, 82-85.
10
International Conference on the Holocaust and Genocide in 
Jerusalem, has pointed out, Lemkin "emphasized the elimination 
of the continuity of a people even more than the fact of mass 
murder itself." Thus, in its original use, genocide did not 
necessarily imply mass death. Lemkin specifically recognized 
the destruction of a group's culture without the physical 
annihilation of the group's members as a form of genocide. 
After World War II, the term "ethnocide" came into being to 
cover this concept.4
While allowing for a broad range of ways which can 
result in a group's demise, Lemkin narrowly defined the 
perpetrators and the victims of genocide. The perpetrator had 
to be a nation and the victims had to be a national or ethnic 
group. In addition, Lemkin stipulated the necessity for the 
perpetrator to have the intention to destroy the victim group. 
Scholars and diplomats who have pursued the study of genocide 
have reevaluated each of the factors in Lemkin's definition 
with varying results.
Reacting to the horror of the Holocaust, the United 
Nations confronted the issue of genocide during the first 
years of its operation. The ensuing debates did more to 
demonstrate the political controversies the term can incite 
than to illuminate concrete ways the United Nations could act 
to prevent genocide in the future. On December 11, 1946, the 
General Assembly declared that genocide is a crime under
4 Charny, "The Study of Genocide," 2; Chalk and 
Jonassohn, The History and Sociology of Genocide, 9.
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international law to be condemned by the civilized world and 
mandated the United Nation's Economic and Social Council to 
develop a full resolution on the subject.5 The Council 
attempted to construct a working definition of genocide, a 
plan for appropriate international action when genocide 
occurs, and a possible course of prevention. This proved to 
be no easy task as the various political concerns of member 
nations dominated the debate over proposed resolutions. 
Particularly contentious was a proposal in the original draft 
submitted by a committee of the Economic and Social Council 
which included "political groups” in the list of potential 
victims of genocide. Also provocative in this draft was the 
inclusion of "cultural genocide," defined as a "deliberate act 
committed with the intent of destroying the language, religion 
or culture of a national, racial, or religious group."6 Both 
of these provisions were deleted by vote of the General 
Assembly.7
Finally, on December 9, 1948, the General Assembly
approved a compromise "Convention on Genocide." This 
Convention states that "at all periods of history genocide has 
inflicted great losses on humanity" and "in order to, liberate 
mankind from such an odious scourge, international cooperation 
is required." The Convention proceeds to define genocide as
5 Yearbook of the United Nations 1948-49. 959.
6 Yearbook of the United Nations 1947-48. 597.
7 Yearbook of the United Nations 1948-49. 954.
12
follows:
Any act committed with the intent to destroy, in whole 
or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious 
group, as such: (a) killing members of the group; (b) 
causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of 
the group; (c) deliberately inflicting on the group 
conditions of life calculated to bring about its 
physical destruction in whole or in part; (d)imposing 
measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
and (e) forcibly transferring children of the group to 
another group.
In addition, the Convention provides that national rulers, 
other public officials, and private individuals who are 
responsible for acts of genocide are liable for punishment. 
Unlike Lemkin, the United Nations did not specify that the 
perpetrator had to be a nation state.8
The major deficiency in the United Nations definition 
is the limit on the kinds of groups which can be victims. 
Groups based on political affiliation, sexual preference, and 
economic status are all omitted, which means, for instance, 
that if a state systematically eliminated all homosexuals, all 
Communists, or all beggars, the United Nations could not 
consider it genocide. Including the necessity for the 
perpetrator to have "the intent to destroy" the victim group 
poses problems of proof. Rarely does a perpetrator admit to 
the intention to destroy a group even when the end result of 
its actions is precisely that. Furthermore, the Convention 
rules out liability in cases where a perpetrator group, in 
pursuing another goal, causes the elimination of the victim 
group in the process. These limitations proved that while
8 Ibid., 959.
13
expediency required the members of the United Nations to 
condemn the Nazi genocides, self-interest motivated them to 
preserve their own "rights" to maintain internal order without 
facing a charge of genocide themselves.
In the years since the United Nations Convention, 
scholars have grappled with its weakness, and most have argued 
for broadening the scope of its definition of genocide.9 Most 
of the scholars agree that, in its essence, genocide is the 
organized destruction of a group as a group. The debate 
hinges on what other criteria should apply, with five major 
factors in dispute: the constitution of victim groups, the
nature of the perpetrator, the intention of the perpetrator, 
the methodology of destruction, and the permissible conduct of 
the victim group. What follows is an analysis of how several 
scholars have defined genocide and addressed these five 
factors.
Sociologist Leo Kuper has decided to use the United 
Nations definition in his writings about genocide despite his 
disagreement with part of it. He has done so because he 
believes that the internationally-recognized United Nations 
Convention provides the most practical means to devise 
effective preventive measures. Believing that "political and 
economic groups" should be included in the categorization of 
victims, Kuper calls these cases "related atrocities." Kuper 
also has developed a new classification called "genocidal
9 Charny, "The Study of Genocide," 3.
14
massacres" which he defines as "the annihilation of a section 
of a group— men, women and children, as for example in the 
wiping out of whole villages."10 The use of these terms, 
however, can obfuscate the issue of what constitutes genocide. 
By conceding one of the key issues— the limitation of possible 
victim groups, Kuper reinforces the idea that political and 
economic groups are less worthy of protection. The term 
"genocidal massacres" is confusing because it uses the word 
"genocide," yet assigns a new meaning to it and raises the 
question of whether debates on what constitutes genocide will 
wrongly hinge on the number of victims rather than on what is 
done to them. Focus on the number of victims can also hinder 
the historian's analysis of past events when the number of 
victims may have been relatively small solely due to 
technological reasons.
In identifying types of genocide, Kuper sets forth two 
major categories: (1) domestic genocides, which result from
"internal divisions within a society" and (2) genocides which 
occur during international war. He then delineates four 
subgroups of domestic genocides: (1) genocides against
indigenous peoples; (2) genocides against hostage groups, such 
as the Nazi genocides; (3) genocides following upon 
decolonization, where two or more heretofore dominated groups 
emerge in their own power struggle; and (4) genocides which 
occur as the result of a struggle between ethnic, racial, or
10 Kuper, Genocide. 39, 10.
15
religious groups. In these types of genocide, the perpetrator 
need not be a nation-state nor even the dominant group in a 
society.11 Particularly in his discussion of genocides 
following decolonization and genocides arising out of 
animosity between racial, ethnic, and religious groups, Kuper 
raises the specter of minority and oppressed groups 
retaliating by committing genocide themselves.12
While rejecting Jean Paul Sartre's charge that genocide 
of indigenous peoples is endemic to colonization, Kuper has 
accepted that "the course of colonization has been marked too 
often by genocide," including in North and South America. 
Throughout history, "hunting and gathering peoples have often 
been the victims of genocidal attacks." Whether during 
colonization or a nation's expansion, the advancing state 
deems that these hunters and gatherers stand in the way of 
economic development and the progress of civilization, and 
therein lies the rationale to eliminate them. Should the 
perpetrator group need to rely on the indigenous people for 
labor, however, then such a need serves as a "functional 
restraint" against genocide.13
In discussing the reasons indigenous peoples are 
frequently subjected to genocidal attacks, Kuper faces the 
problem of making the perpetrator's intent to destroy the
11 Chalk and Jonassohn, The History and Sociology of 
Genocide, 17.
12 Kuper, Genocide. 57-83 passim.
13 Kuper, Genocide. 15, 40, 50, 46.
16
victims a prerequisite of genocide. Typically, the nation­
state which eliminates indigenous peoples in the process of 
territorial expansion or economic development excuses its 
actions by claiming that it never intended the deaths of the 
natives but only sought control of the resources where they 
lived. Without specifically resolving the question of intent, 
Kuper has conceded that "material interests are an important 
factor in genocide. Their role is most marked in the 
genocides of colonization, in the sacrifice of indigenous 
groups to economic development."14
Israel W. Charny has proposed what he calls a 
"humanistic definition of genocide" which is unique in that it 
resolves the question of intent by removing it as a criterion. 
He also expands the categories of possible target groups. 
Genocide, according to Charny, is "the wanton murder of human 
beings on the basis of any identify whatsoever that they 
share— national, ethnic, racial, religious, political, 
geographical, ideological" (emphasis added).15 By substi­
tuting "wanton" for deliberate intention, he correctly allows 
for situations in which the perpetrators act without regard 
for the ultimate consequences so that the deaths of the 
victims occur even though it is not the stated objective. 
Charny's definition is strict enough to prevent genocide from 
being used too loosely, while at the same time, it demands
14 Kuper, The Prevention of Genocide. 151, 197.
15 Charny, "The Study of Genocide," 4.
17
adherence to a basic respect for human rights. As historian 
Richard G. Hovannisian has pointed out, the world is 
"dominated by so-called national interests" which determine 
state action more so than the desire for truth and justice."16 
It is necessary to place parameters on acceptable conduct in 
order to prevent human destruction as an "unintended" 
corollary of another plan. Using Charny's criterion, a state 
could be charged with genocide if it destroyed indigenous 
peoples not for the sake of destroying them but in order to 
obtain their land or otherwise advance its economic develop­
ment. Charny does not establish any criterion for the nature 
of the perpetrator. He does, however, restrict the genocidal 
acts to murder, apparently rejecting the broader range of 
destructive actions set forth by Lemkin and the United 
Nations.
The historical sociologist Helen Fein emphasizes that 
the way a perpetrator group perceives its victims is a 
critical factor in genocide. In all genocides, the 
perpetrator considers the victim group to be "outsiders," 
whose very existence is "alien" and anathema to the ruling 
society.17 The victim group becomes the "other," and in stark 
terms Fein has declared that "genocide is the annihilation of 
the other." Taking into account all the factors which 
contribute to genocide, Fein first defined the term as:
16 Hovannisian, "The Armenian Genocide," 102.
17 Fein, Accounting for Genocide. 6.
18
the calculated murder of a segment or all of a group 
defined outside of the universe of obligation of the 
perpetrator by a government, elite, staff or crowd 
representing the perpetrator in response to a crisis 
or opportunity perceived to be caused or impeded by 
the victim. The universe of obligation is the range 
of people to whom the common conscience extends.
She later expanded this definition by recognizing, as stated
in the United Nations Convention, that interference with a
group's ability to reproduce and raise its children can also
constitute genocide.18 Fein has concluded that:
Genocide is sustained purposeful action by a 
perpetrator to physically destroy a collectivity 
directly or indirectly, through interdiction of the 
biological and social reproduction of group members, 
sustained regardless of the surrender or lack of 
threat offered by the victim.19
Like Kuper, Fein does not choose to alter the United 
Nations^ Convention; she believes as he does that it provides 
the best chance for worldwide efforts to stop genocide. Since 
she believes that the United Nations' omission of political 
groups from the list of possible victims is wrong, however, 
Fein has adopted another term, "ideological slaughters," to 
apply to state-authorized mass killings of a group identified 
by its political beliefs.20 This approach raises the same 
problems as Kuper's adoption of "related atrocities" in that 
a separate term implies that the elimination of a political 
group is less significant than the elimination of a religious
18 Fein, "Scenarios of Genocide," 5, 4; Chalk and 
Jonassohn, The History and Sociology of Genocide. 16.
19 Fein, "Genocide: A Sociological Perspective," 24.
20 Chalk and Jonassohn, The History and Sociology of 
Genocide, 16.
19
one. Fein believes that despite agreement by most scholars 
that genocide is "primarily a crime of state," certain 
genocides can occur without state authorization, especially in 
situations involving colonization, decolonization, and civil 
wars.21
Fein's analysis of situations which can lead to 
genocide results in her four-part typology. The first type is 
developmental genocide which is rooted in the desire of the 
perpetrator for economic gain. Fein subdivides developmental 
genocides into two kinds: (1) "utilitarian" genocides occur
when the perpetrator eliminates people who "[stand] in the way 
of economic exploitation of resources"; and (2) "latent" 
genocides take place when the victim group is decimated by 
diseases brought by invading settlers. Fein believes that the 
fate of indigenous peoples who have faced colonization or 
national expansion by European settlers in the Americas, 
Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa may be the archetype 
of developmental genocides.22
The concept of latent genocide raises the issue of 
intention as a criterion for genocide. As Fein defines the 
term, latent genocides would not usually be considered 
intentional because the invading settlers did not plan to kill 
the native people by exposing them to new diseases. Fein, 
however, imposes into the debate a different understanding of
21 Fein, "Genocide: A Sociological Perspective," 12.
22 Fein, "Scenarios of Genocide," 8.
20
the term "intent11 by juxtaposing it with the idea of "motive." 
Intent, Fein states, is "purposeful action" and someone can be 
said to act intentionally if "there are foreseeable ends or 
consequences" which may be different from the motive for the 
act. Fein cites the work of two men who have studied the 
Cambodian genocide in the 1970s, David Hawk and Hurst Hannum, 
who have argued that the United Nations Convention's 
requirement of intent "requires only that the various 
destructive acts— killings, causing mental and physical harm 
. . . have a purposeful or deliberate character as opposed to 
an accidental or unintentional character."23
The adoption of this definition of "intent" serves the 
cause of justice far better than the more traditional notion 
because it does not allow for the absolution of a group from 
the crime of genocide on the notion that the actions which 
resulted in the annihilation of many people were carried out 
for another purpose. The problem raised by the intent of the 
nation-state in determining whether or not it carried out 
genocide against indigenous people during colonization or 
national expansion is thus resolved: The determining factor
is not whether the nation-state's purpose was to kill the 
natives but whether its actions were "deliberate" or 
"purposeful" rather than "accidental." For instance, if the 
agents of the nation-state deliberately seized the land and 
took over natural resources which belonged to the native
23 Fein, "Genocide: A Sociological Perspective," 10, 15-
20.
21
peoples and the result was the inability of the natives to 
sustain themselves, then the nation-state can be guilty of 
genocide even if its motive was solely to obtain these 
resources.
Fein's three other types of genocide are based on 
political or ideological concerns, as follows: (1) despotic
genocide takes place in a polarized society when one of the 
groups decides to eliminate another group which it perceives 
as its opposition; (2) retributive genocide takes place when 
a ruling class determines to eliminate a subject class which 
has threatened its authority; and (3) ideological genocide 
takes place when the state creates a mythical image of an 
"outsider” or "enemy" group which it must destroy.24
In writing about the Armenian genocide, Fein has 
addressed the issue of violent actions by the victims carried 
out in an attempt to repel the perpetrators of genocide. She 
believes that such actions do not negate the genocide but can 
make it easier for the perpetrators to justify the genocide by 
claiming it was necessary to meet the threat posed by the 
victims' acts.25
Jack Nusan Porter argues against giving genocide too 
broad a meaning because he fears this will lead to a weakening 
of the concept. He does believe, however, that the victim
24 Fein, "Scenarios of Genocide," 10-18; Chalk and 
Jonassohn, The History and Sociology of Genocide. 15.
25 Fein, Accounting for Genocide. 12, 15, 17; Chalk and
Jonassohn, The History and Sociology of Genocide. 16.
22
groups designated in the United Nations Convention are too 
restrictive. Unlike Fein and Kuper who establish new terms to 
cover other groups, Porter expands the list within his 
definition of genocide and thus avoids the pitfall of making 
the targeting of these other groups seem less significant. As 
he has defined it: "Genocide is the deliberate destruction, in 
whole or in part, by a government or its agents, of a racial, 
sexual, religious, tribal, ethnic, or political minority." 
Porter also recognizes that genocide can encompass more than 
the direct mass killing of the group by concluding that 
"[genocide] can involve not only mass murder, but also 
starvation, forced deportation, and political, economic, and 
biological subjugation.”26
Two of the three "major components" of genocide which 
Porter identifies— technology and bureaucracy/organization—  
apply only to genocides of the twentieth century and beyond as 
they concern the modern technological capability to inflict 
mass death and the bureaucracy necessary to organize such 
actions. The third component— ideology— is relevant to the 
study of genocides throughout history, including the 
consideration of genocides against indigenous peoples. It is 
ideology which always has made the victim group "the other," 
placing the persons within the group "outside the pale of 
human existence," and giving legitimacy to the perpetrators 
desire to eradicate them. Porter has written that "words such
26 Porter, Genocide and Human Rights. 12.
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as 'savages' are commonly used, especially during war or 
colonization, to reduce the victims to the level of non- 
humans, thus making it easier to annihilate them."27
Porter identifies three situations in which genocides 
have historically occurred: (1) during a war or in the
aftermath of a defeat in war; (2) during internal and external 
colonization; and (3) during inter-tribal conflicts. During 
wartime, civilian populations can become military targets. 
War can also "provide both the pretext and the opportunity to 
commit genocide" by creating an atmosphere in which state 
propaganda can flourish against a targeted group deemed alien 
to state interests. During internal colonization and 
imperialism (or "external colonization") , "genocide can become 
a military and political tool in subjugating the land and its 
people." Porter believes that this kind of genocide can occur 
either directly, when the colonizers carry out mass killings 
of native peoples, or indirectly, when the colonizers transfer 
diseases to natives who succumb because they lack 
immunization. This latter case is similar to Helen Fein's 
concept of "latent" genocides, which removes the typical 
requirement of "intent" from the definition of genocide. In 
Porter's case, however, he implies that the transfer of 
disease would amount to genocide only if immunizations existed 
but were not made available to the native population.28
27 Ibid., 12.
28 Ibid., 15-16.
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Porter acknowledges that whether "intent" should be 
requisite to genocide is a controversial issue, but in using 
the phrase "deliberate destruction" in his own definition, he 
indicates his belief that it is. Since Porter does not 
discuss the meaning of intent as Fein has done, he probably 
has the more traditional view that the perpetrator must 
actually have wanted the destruction. Porter has concluded 
that "numerous Indian tribes have disappeared or are in the 
process of disappearing because of conquest and colonization," 
and he has labelled as genocide the killing of Native 
Americans in the United States. By failing to specify whether 
he is applying the term generally or in particular instances 
and by offering no specific analysis of this genocide, Porter 
weakens his case.29
Irving Louis Horowitz, another sociologist, has put 
forward a relatively brief definition of genocide which 
eliminates some of the strictures that others have placed on 
the concept. According to Horowitz, genocide is "a structural 
and systematic destruction of innocent people by a state 
bureaucratic apparatus." While Horowitz specifies that the 
perpetrator of genocide must be a state, he uses only the word 
"people" in defining the victim, thus ignoring altogether the 
restrictions placed on the victim groups in the United Nations 
Convention. It is not the type of people selected as victims 
which determines genocide but rather that the state gives them
29 Ibid. , 11, 12, 16.
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as identity, almost always labelling them as "alien” or 
"enemy." Under Horowitz's terms, all people are treated as 
equally worthy of life; and a perpetrator group would be 
guilty of genocide if they tried to destroy all Communists, 
homosexuals, or poor people, just as they would be guilty 
under the United Nations Convention for exterminating Chinese, 
Hindus, or people of mixed race.30
Horowitz's one caveat— that the victims be "innocent"—  
raises some troubling issues, particularly since he does not 
elaborate on what he means. As Helen Fein argues, a people 
should be able to resist, even by violent means, attempts by 
the perpetrator to destroy them, and such resistance should 
not mitigate the crime of genocide. Furthermore, a group may 
engage in activities which have harmful effects on the 
perpetrator but which certainly do not justify a genocide. 
Still another problem is that Horowitz does not say who 
determines whether the victims are "innocent" and on what 
basis can this determination be made. A perpetrator will 
always be able to find its victims guilty of something which 
justifies their destruction. Horowitz leaves open the method 
of destruction, which seemingly can incorporate a wide range 
of means, particularly since he has stated that "genocide 
represents a systematic effort over time to liquidate" the 
target group (emphasis added). While he does not directly 
make intent to destroy a requirement for genocide, it is
30 Horowitz, Taking Lives. 18-19, 10.
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implied in the words "systematic destruction," although this 
could be the "purposeful action” definition of intent as 
advocated by Fein.31
Although Horowitz directs most of his attention to 
twentieth-century genocides and has geared his definition to 
the modern age, he has determined that "the conduct of classic 
colonialism was invariably linked with genocide. It is the 
hypocritical heritage of European nations that they proclaimed 
concepts of democracy and liberty for their own populations 
while systematically destroying others." He does not provide 
specific historical examples of colonial genocides, leaving 
unresolved what specific conduct he regards as genocidal and 
why. Horowitz does point out, however, that the irony of 
colonization is that Europeans, who were the true outsiders in 
the colonized land, quickly determined that it was the native 
peoples who were the aliens.32
Yehuda Bauer, a professor of Holocaust studies, 
confronts directly the issue of the uniqueness of the Nazi 
genocide of European Jews in the context of other genocides. 
Reflecting the concerns of many people that applying the term 
"genocide" to all the kinds of group destruction formulated by 
Lemkin and others weakens the impact of the Holocaust, Bauer 
has determined that there is a dichotomy in their definition.
31 Ibid., 17, 18-19; Chalk and Jonassohn, The History and 
Sociology of Genocide. 16; Fein, Accounting for Genocide. 12, 
15, 17; Fein, "Genocide: A Sociological Perspective," 10, 15- 
20.
32 Horowitz, Taking Lives. 18-19.
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He proposes that "Holocaust" should be used to mean the state-
sponsored, total physical extermination of a victim group,
while the term "genocide" should apply to the other kinds of
destructive actions propounded by Lemkin and others. Bauer
defines genocide specifically as:
the planned destruction . . . of a racial, national, 
or ethnic group as such, by the following means: (a)
selective mass murder of elites or parts of the 
population; (b) elimination of national (racial, 
ethnic) culture and religious life with the intent of 
'denationalization'; (c) enslavement, with the same 
intent; (d) destruction of national (racial, ethnic) 
economic life, with the same intent; and (e) 
biological decimation through the kidnapping of 
children or the prevention of normal family life, with 
the same intent.
Thus, the goal of genocide is the destruction of the victim
group as a group and does not necessarily involve the planned
killing of all of its members. Nor does Bauer specify that
the perpetrator of genocide must be a state. In contrast, a
Holocaust, Bauer says, is the "state-sponsored and planned,
physical annihilation, for ideological or pseudo-religious
reasons, of all the members of a national, ethnic, or racial
group." To date, Bauer believes only the Nazi genocide of the
Jews can qualify as a Holocaust.33
Unlike most scholars of genocide, Bauer believes that 
there are only four categories of victim groups: racial,
tribal, national, or ethnic. He does not support adding 
political groups to the possible types of victims,and he wants
33 Bauer, "The Place of the Holocaust In Contemporary 
History," 204-05, 213, 206, 214; Chalk and Jonassohn, The
History and Sociology of Genocide. 20; Bauer, "The Place of 
the Holocaust in Contemporary History," 205.
28
to limit the United Nations Convention by removing religious 
groups from its list. His rationale— that membership in these 
kinds of groups is voluntary— is specious. To claim that it 
would not be genocide for a state to single out for extinction 
Catholics or Communists, for example, because the people 
within these groups could disassociate is both cruel and 
unrealistic.34 Without elaborating, Bauer has stated that 
"the policies of American settlers towards many Native 
American tribes" resulted in genocide, and he believes that 
"the fate of the Ache Indians in Paraguay or of the Pierce-Nez 
Indians in the American Northwest at the end of the last 
century" came close to the Holocaust.35
Although he does not address the issue of intent and 
motivation as Fein does, Bauer's views fit her argument. He 
believes that "what made the Holocaust unique is . . . the
motivation of the murderers" and the motivation was to 
annihilate all Jews solely for ideological reasons. In 
genocides, Bauer sees political motivations which result in 
the destruction of people: For example, in the Armenian case,
Bauer believes, the Turks were motivated by the desire to 
establish a Pan-Turkish empire and not by a desire to 
eliminate the Armenians, but they believed that the Armenians 
might stand in their way. While Bauer does not do so, this
34 Bauer, "The Place of the Holocaust in Contemporary 
History," 212.
35 Ibid., 213; Bauer, "Essay: On the Place of the
Holocaust in History," 217.
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idea of political motivation can readily be extended to the 
destruction of native peoples who stood in the way of 
colonization or national expansion. In distinguishing the 
Holocaust from genocide in this way# however, Bauer appears to 
make the peculiar judgment that it is worse to destroy people 
for ideological reasons than it is for political or any other 
reasons. To the contrary, all rationales for genocide can be 
equally pernicious. The desire for economic gain which fueled 
many of the genocides of colonization and national expansion 
is certainly more coldly calculating than ideological beliefs 
which can inflame genocidal situations.36
Political scientist Robert Melson has focussed on the 
historical processes that have led to genocide rather than on 
a definition of the term. By studying the Armenian and Jewish 
examples, he has developed a theory of genocide which he 
suggests may be applicable to other state-sponsored, domestic 
genocides, past and future. Melson believes that in these 
cases, the victim group is a minority within the state which 
the majority has tolerated but also scorned. In spite of its 
demeaned status, the victim group achieves some success, 
economically, culturally, politically, or socially, but this 
success leads to increased tensions with the majority society 
which feels threatened by minority accomplishments. The 
majority then determine that the minority group has links, 
which"may be real or imagined, to an outside enemy. When the
36 Bauer, "Essay: On the Place of the Holocaust in
History," 213-15.
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state experiences serious military defeats and/or political 
misfortunes, it determines that the minority group is to blame 
and therefore must be eliminated. As Melson writes, "Once the 
state has become convinced that a minority is alien and that 
it is a deadly threat to its existence, by administrative fiat 
or by legalistic means it geographically segregates the 
targeted group and disintegrates it from the social 
structure." Like Porter, Melson believes that a state of 
general war makes it easier for genocide to take place. 
Melson also believes that a simpler genocidal process is 
possible when the perpetrator has always regarded the victim 
group as outsiders. Such situations have occurred whenever "a 
settler regime confronts a technologically less advanced or 
'primitive' people, where from the first, the targeted groups 
are seen as existing outside the social and moral order of the 
perpetrators." In such cases, the genocidal process is short- 
circuited because the state does not need the intervening 
steps to justify its decision to destroy the victim group. 37 
In Melson's scenarios, the perpetrator must be the 
state and the victims are any minority group which the state 
identifies as outsiders. In cases of settler regimes 
targeting indigenous peoples, the state may not necessarily 
have numerical superiority over the minority group. Melson 
indicates that the state does make a deliberate decision to 
eliminate the minority and therefore seems to believe that
37 Melson, "Provocation or Nationalism," 79-81.
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both motive and intent are present in a genocide. Melson's 
study of process is limited, however, and he does not rule out 
the possibility of other kinds of genocide. The delineation 
of process is useful to the historian and to those concerned 
with the prevention of future genocides as it provides 
guideposts by which to determine if a genocide took place in 
the past or if one may be in the making.
According to sociologist Vahakn N. Dadrian:
Genocide is the successful attempt by a dominant 
group, vested with formal authority and/or with 
preponderant access to the overall resources of power, 
to reduce by coercion or lethal violence the number of 
a minority group whose ultimate extermination is held 
desirable and useful and whose respective 
vulnerability is a major factor contributing to the 
decision of genocide.
Diverging from the United Nations Convention, Dadrian places
no restrictions on who can constitute the victim group except
that it be a minority. The perpetrator does not necessarily
have to be the state but must be the dominant group in the
society. He identifies the following three factors as
essential to determining whether genocide has occurred: (1)
the intent of the perpetrator; (2) the methodology used
against the victims; and (3) the number of resulting
casualties in the victim group. While he allows a range of
possibilities within the first two factors, intent and
methodology, Dadrian considers that the third factor, the
number of casualties, may be "the most critical in terms of
determining whether a particular act . . . has a genocidal
character." Counting the number of victims is a dangerous
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standard, however, because it allows the definition of 
genocide to focus on "how many deaths" rather than on the act 
of destruction. It also does not recognize that historical 
events may have been genocide even if the numbers of dead were 
much less than in modern genocides because the technology to 
inflict mass death quickly did not exist. He also considers 
that the response of the victim group to the acts of the 
perpetrator can affect the type and scope of the genocide.38
In his typology of genocide, summarized below, Dadrian 
identifies five categories which show a broad application of 
his definition and a wide range of methods— from assimilation 
to murder—  by which a perpetrator can cause a group's demise.
1) Cultural genocide can occur when the perpetrator 
does not feel immediately threatened by the victim group and 
can see a benefit to assimilating the group rather than 
eliminating it. Through threats of violence, the perpetrator 
forces the victim to assimilate. When the victim yields 
without a struggle, a "non-violent" genocide occurs. In some 
instances, the perpetrator can resort to occasional massacres 
to intimidate the victim group into compliance. The result of 
cultural genocide is the disappearance of the group as a 
group. This recognition that seemingly non-violent
assimilation can be genocide because the perpetrator succeeds 
only by using the threat of violence to force the victim group 
to comply with the measures that destroy it adds a powerful
38 Dadrian, "A Typology of Genocide," 201, 203, 204.
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argument to the necessity to incorporate these acts into any 
definition of genocide. The perpetrator would surely have to 
rely on threatened force to carry out the removal of children, 
servitude, cultural decimation, and all such means of group 
destruction and would likely resort to mass killings if these 
means did not successfully terminate a group's existence. To 
exclude such cases from genocide would punish the victim group 
for trying to save the lives of the individuals within it.39
2) Latent genocide occurs when the "unintended 
consequence" of certain acts of the perpetrator is the 
destruction of the victim group. For instance, the 
perpetrator may intend to remove a group from its land, but 
the resulting "dislocation" of the group may cause its demise. 
In order for the dominant group to be guilty of genocide in 
this kind of case, Dadrian believes it must persist in the 
activity and "refrain from obviating the adverse, unintended 
consequences." Thus, while direct intent to eliminate the 
victim does not exist, the perpetrator knowingly persists in 
actions which destroy the victim anyway. This is similar to 
Fein's qualification of intent as opposed to motive. The 
action which causes the victims' demise is purposeful, 
although the underlying motive for the action is something 
other than the elimination of the group.40
3) Retributive genocide takes place when massacres are
39 Ibid., 205.
40 Ibid., 206.
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carried out against only a segment of the minority group for 
the purpose of intimidation or to extinguish suspected 
"trouble spots." This kind of genocide may also be a way for 
the dominant group to "test" the feasibility of carrying out 
a more complete genocide.41
4) Utilitarian genocide, like retributive genocide, is 
limited in terms of targeted victims and objectives. It 
occurs when the perpetrator massacres a minority group in 
order to gain something, such as economic resources.42
5) Optimal genocide, which is what was carried out 
against the Armenians and the Jews, is a sustained, 
destructive process in which the goal of the perpetrator is 
"the total obliteration of the victim group."43
Dadrian believes that in several instances the 
indigenous peoples of North America were victims of genocide 
at the hands of White settlers. As a prime example of latent 
genocide, Dadrian cites "the depredations of removal, 
reservations, allotment, and ultimate detribalization" which 
the dominant White society inflicted on Native Americans. 
Pointing to the Cherokee removal from Georgia as 
representative of utilitarian genocide, he has written that 
this action was "symbolic of the pattern of perpetration 
inflicted upon the American Indian by Whites in North
41 Ibid., 207.
42 Ibid. , 209.
43 Ibid., 210.
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America." According to Dadrian, however, optimal genocide, as 
he defines it, did not occur. In making this judgment, 
however, Dadrian seemingly overlooks two points of historical 
significance: First, modern technology makes possible the
quick and relatively easy infliction of mass death on a scale 
unprecedented in earlier times. Societies which engaged in 
genocidal practices in prior eras should be held accountable 
not by the standards of modern technology but by what they had 
the capability to carry out in their times. Second, the 
perpetrator may find that a "sustained, destructive process" 
of any of Dadrian's other types of genocide— latent, 
utilitarian, cultural, and retributive— may be optimally 
successful in "the total obliteration of the victim group" and 
easier to carry out than conducting large scale and sustained 
mass murders. Upon analysis, Dadrian's typology is actually 
in four parts, each of which can be optimal in its results. 
In studying the genocide of Native Americans, Dadrian should 
consider their near-total obliteration and how each type of 
genocide contributed to it before concluding that no optimal 
genocide took place. Furthermore, Dadrian compounds his error 
by stating his belief that in the United States the dominant 
society's creed of democratic pluralism and human rights and 
its desire to see itself as a "melting pot" made assimilation 
rather than physical annihilation the goal. Thus, according 
to Dadrian, the United States' Native American policy adhered 
more to coercion, removal, and "assimilative disintegration" 
than to deadly violence. Rather, the United States disposed
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of Native Americans as it saw fit in order to achieve its 
goals of national expansion and the establishment of White, 
western culture.44
Roger Smith, a political scientist, has delved into the 
issue of intent in considering the meaning of genocide, which 
he has defined as "almost always a premeditated act calculated 
to achieve the ends of its perpetrators through mass murder." 
In some instances, however, the perpetrator may carry out 
actions which have "genocidal consequences" even though there 
is no "conscious decision" to exterminate the victims. If the 
perpetrator becomes aware of the actual fatal consequences of 
its acts yet continues the activities anyway, then the 
unintended outcome changes to a knowing and willful result. 
"The distinction," Smith has written, "between premeditated 
and unpremeditated genocide is not decisive, for sooner or 
later the genocidal is transformed into genocide." Genocidal 
consequences frequently occurred during colonization when 
"violence, disease, and relentless pressure" served to 
eliminate native peoples.45
Based on the premise that "genocide is a rational 
instrument to achieve an end," Smith has constructed a 
typology based on the motivation for the genocide— motivations 
which he believes have varied "to a large extent by historical
44 Ibid., 201, 206, 209; Dadrian, "The Victimization of 
the American Indian," 528, 535.
45 Smith, "Human Destructiveness and Politics," 23.
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period."46 His five categories are as follows:
1) Retributive genocides rarely occur without 
additional motivations. Their purpose is to punish a victim 
group whom the perpetrator has dehumanized and made a 
scapegoat.47
2) Institutional genocides, most prevalent in ancient 
and medieval times, occur when mass murder is a by-product of 
military conquest.48
3) Utilitarian genocides, based on the perpetrator 
group's desire for economic gain, figure prominently in 
periods of "colonial domination and exploitation" of the 
native inhabitants and periods of intra-national expansion 
into the territory of indigenous peoples. In sharp terms, 
Smith has concluded that the "basic proposition contained in 
utilitarian genocide is that some persons must die so that 
others can live well." In expropriating the land and 
resources for itself, the perpetrator group, motivated by 
"ethnocentrism and simple greed," destroys the indigenous 
peoples which stand in its way.49
4) Monopolistic genocides, the most common domestic 
genocides of the twentieth century, usually take place in 
plural societies. The perpetrator group eliminates the victim
46 Ibid., 24.
47 Ibid., 24.
48 Ibid., 24.
49 Ibid., 25.
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group out of a desire to monopolize power.50
5) Ideological genocides, which also have primarily 
occurred in the twentieth century, are usually total. The 
perpetrator group seeks to impose its own view of a pure 
society by eliminating any group which is alien to this 
ideal.51
Smith does not accede to the restrictions imposed on 
the definition of victim groups in the United Nations 
Convention. Rather, he points out that the reasons victims 
have been selected for genocide have changed through the ages. 
By so doing, he underscores the problem with judging genocide 
only by twentieth-century standards. Not only have the modi 
operandi of genocide changed, but the rationales for targeting 
victims for genocide have changed as well. According to 
Smith, prior to modern history, most people who fell victim to 
genocides did so because of where they were, not because of 
who they were. They were killed because they happened to be 
"on a conqueror's line of march" and so were victims of 
institutional genocides. When the era of colonial domination 
began in the fifteenth century, those who became victims of 
utilitarian genocides did so because of both who they were and 
what they had. Demeaning and dehumanizing the native 
inhabitants who were of a different race and usually less 
technologically advanced gave the colonizers "justification"
50 Ibid., 25-26.
51 Ibid., 26; Chalk and Jonassohn, The History and 
Sociology of Genocide. 22.
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for the seizure of land and resources and for the elimination 
of those indigenous peoples who stood in their way. It is in 
the twentieth century that victims of genocide have been 
singled out solely on the basis of who they are.52 These 
historical distinctions of victims do not mitigate any of the 
acts of genocide: It is equally serious for a perpetrator to
destroy a group because it wants what the group possesses as 
it is for the perpetrator to destroy a group solely on the 
basis of its identity.
In their joint work, Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn 
have developed a restrictive definition of genocide, although 
they provide a new perspective on the constitution of victim 
groups. According to these two scholars: "Genocide is a form
of one-sided mass killing in which a state or other authority 
intends to destroy a group, as that group and membership in it 
are defined by the perpetrator." Allowing the perpetrator of 
genocide, which Chalk and Jonassohn stipulate must be the 
state or other authority, to select its victim group based on 
its own perceptions of that group realistically acknowledges 
that perpetrators of genocide frequently assign mythical 
characteristics to its targeted victims. No matter what real 
or imagined parameters establish the victim groups, the 
perpetrators always dehumanize them and place them "outside 
the web of mutual obligations." This open-ended method of 
describing the possible victims of genocide is noteworthy
52 Smith, "Human Destructiveness and Politics," 31; Chalk 
and Jonassohn, The History and Sociology of Genocide, 22.
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because it treats as equally serious the destruction of any 
grouping of people.53
In contrast to Lemkin who believed that genocide could 
include methods other than outright killing, Chalk and 
Jonassohn limit the application of the term "genocide" to 
those cases in which mass killing is the method of 
extermination. Given the many other effective methods to 
destroy a group, this limitation to mass killing is short­
sighted. Chalk and Jonassohn specifically reject the idea of 
cultural genocide preferring the term "ethnocide" to cover the 
destruction of a group's culture.54
Another limiting factor which Chalk and Jonassohn 
impose on the definition of genocide is the requirement that 
the killing be "one-sided." They have done so to indicate 
that the victims can have no reciprocal intention to eliminate 
the perpetrator and cannot possess any "organized military 
machinery that might be opposed to ... . the perpetrators."
Furthermore, one-sidedness excludes from genocide both 
military and civilian casualties of war. Chalk and Jonassohn, 
however, do not completely preclude resistance to the genocide 
on the part of the victim group. They allow that a genocide 
can occur even if "an objectively powerless group resists" 
because "the very hopelessness of the resistance "underscores
53 Chalk and Jonassohn, The History and Sociology of
Genocide. 23, 10, 28.
54 Ibid., 23.
41
the one-sidedness of these mass killings.55 Chalk and 
Jonassohn err in making one-sidedness a criterion for 
genocide. To say that genocide cannot occur if the victim 
group effectively resists or rebels is unfair to the victims 
because it implies that passivity is the only acceptable 
response. Furthermore, it undermines efforts to prevent 
genocide by seeming to caution against one of the means to 
stop its occurrence. As James Morris has stated in an essay 
on the Tasmanians, the group which carries out genocide often 
uses as an excuse any acts of rebellion by the targeted 
victim.56 According to Chalk and Jonassohn, the perpetrator 
in these cases could be cleared of the crime of genocide even 
if they resort to mass killings to prevent the alleged 
rebellion. Genocides can also occur in wartime if one or both 
sides determine to eliminate the total society of the other 
and pursue civilian as well as military targets. In a more 
far-reaching approach, Helen Fein eliminates the criterion of 
one-sidedness altogether and allows for the rebellion of 
victim groups and for f,bilateral genocidal killing arising 
during a civil war.”57
Chalk and Jonassohn insist that the intent to 
annihilate the victim group is a necessary component of 
genocide. Cases in which mass deaths result from the actions
55 Ibid., 23-24, 16.
56 Morris, "The Final Solution, Down Under," 213.
57 Chalk and Jonassohn, The History and Sociology of 
Genocide. 16; See also note 24, above.
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of a state or other authority which does not intend to destroy 
the entire victim group, such as limited massacres and the 
unplanned spread of disease, may be terrible, but, according 
to Chalk and Jonassohn, they are not equal to genocide. They 
apparently have struggled with this issue, and they engage in 
a somewhat convoluted discussion of the problem of requiring 
intent. They concede that intent is difficult to determine 
since it is rarely acknowledged by the perpetrator, and they 
allow for some leeway in deciding whether intent exists. For 
instance, they believe that it is possible to discern intent 
from the perpetrator's ideology or "by analyzing the inherent 
logic of the situation and the processes occurring in this 
environment.” Furthermore, Chalk and Jonassohn believe that 
intent "is not always explicit in the awareness of the 
actors." They admittedly are troubled by those cases in which 
the means which an authority group uses to reach a goal which 
in itself is not genocide inevitably lead to the mass 
extermination of the victim group anyway. In trying to come 
to terms with these situations, they have tentatively 
concluded that "an action is 'intended' even when it is 
carried out for different purposes but the perpetrator is 
likely to know that genocide is the inevitable or probable by­
product of a planned action."58 This is similar to Fein's 
definition of intention as "purposeful action."
To cover the variety of cases which meet some but not
58 Chalk and Jonassohn, The History and Sociology of
Genocide. 23, 26, 42-3.
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all the requirements of their definition of genocide, Chalk 
and Jonassohn adopt the term "genocidal massacres," which 
include mass killings without the intention of total group 
extinction, the deliberate destruction of a group through 
means other than mass killings, and the use of killings to 
terrorize a group into submitting to ethnocide. Genocidal 
massacres also cover acts in which the result of colonial 
expansion, although unintended by the colonizers, was the 
deliberate extermination of the indigenous people.59 Using 
this term to cover so many possibilities is confusing. 
Furthermore, in this last instance "deliberate" and 
"unintended" appear to be contradictory unless Chalk and 
Jonassohn are using "intent" in the way that Fein uses 
"motive." If this is so, it is not clear why Chalk and 
Jonassohn have assigned the term "genocidal massacres" rather 
than "genocide." The deliberate extermination of indigenous 
peoples in the wake of colonial expansion fits well Chalk and 
Jonassohn's category of genocide described earlier in which 
the perpetrator's actions may be motivated by something other 
than the demise of the victims but it is obvious that the 
actions will result in victims' destruction.
Chalk and Jonassohn have devised a typology, based on 
the motives of the perpetrator, under which genocides are 
carried out for one or more of the following four reasons: 
"(1) to eliminate a real or potential threat; (2) to spread
59 Ibid., 26; Chalk and Jonassohn, "The History and
Sociology of Genocidal Killings," 40.
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terror among real or potential enemies; (3) to acquire 
economic wealth; and (4) to implement a belief, a theory, or 
an ideology." The first three reasons underlay the genocides 
that were committed by states seeking to build and maintain 
empires. In particular, the third reason, "to acquire and 
keep economic wealth, usually in the form of land," drove the 
Europeans who colonized the New World to exterminate the 
native inhabitants.60
Among all these scholars, two central concerns dominate 
their examinations of the nature of genocide. One is a desire 
to define the term in such a way that it can apply to a 
variety of situations where groups are destroyed as a result 
of organized action by a perpetrator. The other related 
concern is the belief that it is necessary to assign the term- 
-albeit carefully— to applicable cases wherever and whenever 
they occur. Recognizing, as Chalk and Jonassohn phrase it, 
that until recently "collective denial" of genocides, past and 
present, has been the rule, these scholars understand that 
allowing genocides to go unrecognized and unacknowledged is, 
in effect, to reward the perpetrators. Non-recognition of 
genocide also continues the injustice for the victims and 
their survivors and leads to public indifference, which, in 
turn, undermines the effort to prevent future genocides.61
60 Chalk and Jonassohn, The History and Sociology of
Genocide, 29, 30, 36.
61 Ibid., 27; Smith, "Genocide and Denial," 2, 24.
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Proposed Resolution
Before proposing a definition of genocide which 
synthesizes the above analysis of the viewpoints of Lemkin, 
the United Nations, and the various scholars, the five 
disputed factors require resolution:
1) With regard to the nature of the perpetrator, many 
of the scholars see the necessity for the state to sanction in 
some way the genocidal actions. Fein correctly cautions 
against making this a requisite part of genocide. Genocides 
can occur among groups acting outside of state control: for 
instance, in cases which arise out of ethnic divisiveness. 
The more important requirement is that the actions which 
result in the genocide are organized rather than random.
2) As to the nature of the victim, with the exception 
of Yehuda Bauer, each scholar who addressed legitimate 
identifying characteristics of victim groups believes that the 
United Nations Convention, specifying that these groups be 
defined by nationality, ethnicity, race, or religion, is too 
restrictive. To place any limitations on the nature of a 
group which can be the victim of genocide is wrongly 
judgmental, both because it seemingly makes certain human 
beings worthier than others and because it ignores the ability 
of a perpetrator to target victims based on irrational 
ideology. What is important as a component of genocide is 
that the victims are targeted for destruction not as 
individuals but because of their membership in a group. The 
individuals, as Charny states, can be any human beings, and
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the group of which they are allegedly a part, as Chalk and 
Jonassohn declare, is defined by the perpetrator based on any 
criteria it chooses. As all scholars of genocide agree, the 
one overriding characteristic of the victim group which allows 
the genocide to take place is that, to the perpetrator, the 
victims are "aliens," existing outside the ethos of the 
perpetrator's society.
3) As to the question of whether the perpetrator must 
have the intention to destroy the victim group, the majority 
opinion is that this is a necessary criterion for genocide, 
although there are varying ways of defining intent. Fein's 
adoption of "purposeful action" as the meaning of intent and 
her separation of "intent" from "motive" resolves the many 
problems associated with making the intention of the 
perpetrator a part of the determination of genocide. To avoid 
confusion, however, the term "purposeful action" should be 
substituted for the word "intent." The criterion for genocide 
should be whether the action which results in the genocide was 
deliberate rather than accidental, whether or not the 
underlying motive for the action was the destruction of the 
victim.
4) To determine what methodology of destruction is 
necessary for genocide to occur, the question centers on 
whether genocide should be limited to cases of mass killing or 
should it encompass the destruction of a group's existence 
through a variety of other actions. Since in genocide a group 
and not individuals are the targets of destruction and that
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there are many ways to terminate a group's existence, it is 
logical to recognize that genocide should include the 
deliberate infliction of mass death and all other actions 
which are carried out by the direct or implied threat of force 
and which result in a group's demise.
5) As to the last point of controversy— whether a 
genocide must be one-sided— it is wrong to require passivity 
on the part of the victim, and wrong to say that genocides 
cannot occur during war. One-sidedness should be removed as 
a criterion.
The resolution of these disputed factors leads to the 
following definition of genocide: Genocide is the destruction
of a group of human beings who are defined as a group by the 
perpetrator, who acts with purpose and in an organized manner, 
and who also determines that the group is alien to the 
perpetrator's society. To elaborate, the perpetrator targets 
the group as a group, rather than the individuals within it. 
Furthermore, it is the group which is destroyed, not 
necessarily the persons within it, and the destruction may be 
carried out by force or the threat of force. The perpetrator 
may carry out a plan of action for the deliberate purpose of 
eliminating the group. Genocide can also occur, however, when 
the perpetrator may be motivated by some other goal but acts 
in a way which obviously will result in the destruction of the 
group or which shows a reckless disregard of the consequences. 
Resistance or rebellion against the genocide and the 
perpetrators on the part of the victim group does not mitigate
the actions of the perpetrator. The identity of the 
perpetrator is not a factor in genocide, although it is 
frequently a nation state.
The Genocide of Native Americans 
Applying this concept of genocide to what happened 
generally to the Native Americans in the wake of European 
"discovery” and settlement, the issue necessarily moves beyond 
whether Columbus was an Adolf Eichmann, as New York Times' 
writer Karl Meyer facetiously phrased it. Russell Thornton 
has written:
For [Native Americans] the arrival of the Europeans 
marked the beginning of a long holocaust, although it 
came not in ovens, as it did for the Jew. The fires 
that consumed North American Indians were the fevers 
brought on by newly encountered diseases, the flashes 
of settlers' and soldiers' guns, the ravages of 
"firewater," the flames of villages and fields burned 
by the scorched-earth policy of vengeful Euro- 
Americans. The effects of this holocaust of North 
American Indians, like that of the Jews, was millions 
of deaths, in fact, the holocaust of the North 
American tribes was, in a way, even more destructive 
than that of the Jews, since many American Indian 
peoples became extinct."62
Thornton has identified four causes of the "demographic
collapse" of the Native Americans: "disease, including
alcoholism; warfare and genocide; geographical removal and
relocation; and the destruction of ways of life." Of these,
Thornton believes that European diseases caused the greatest
number of deaths, while genocide was "probably . . . somewhere
62 Karl E. Meyer, "Columbus Was Not Eichmann," New York
Times. 27 June 1991, 28(A); Thornton, American Indian
Holocaust and Survival, xv-xvi.
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in the middle to lower part of the ranking of the causes of 
Indian depopulation." He does not elaborate on what he 
considers genocidal acts, although he infers that they were 
massacres carried out against men, women, and children. For 
certain tribes, including the Powhatans, Thornton has found 
that the effects of war and genocide were devastating. As an 
example, Thornton writes that after the 1622 uprising of the 
Powhatan tribes, the English colonists conducted a campaign of 
"deliberate and systematic destruction" of the Powhatans.63
Using the broader definition of genocide given above 
leads to a reconfiguration of Thornton's four causes because, 
under certain conditions, geographic removal and relocation 
and the destruction of ways of life can constitute genocide. 
For instance, Thornton writes that relocation and removal 
frequently resulted in increased mortality because of 
accompanying military actions, a greater susceptibility to 
disease, starvation, and poor conditions. Sometimes the 
destruction of the ways of life of the tribal group led to a 
rise in the death rate within the group.64 Death by 
starvation when caused by White settlers or soldiers who 
intentionally prevented access to food supplies qualifies as 
genocide. If the Euro-American authorities and their agents 
or settlers forced the relocation of a group of native people 
under conditions which were so poor as to be likely to cause
63 Thornton, American Indian Holocaust and Survival, xvi, 
44, 47, 48, 49, 69-70.
64 Ibid., 50-51.
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sickness and death and this is what happened, then here too a 
genocide occurred. While the strictly inadvertent spread of 
disease correctly belongs outside the realm of genocide, 
failure to take known preventive measures to halt the spread 
of disease, fostering alcoholism, and permitting conditions in 
which diseases flourish, as well as the willful infliction of 
disease, all support the charge of genocide. Genocide, 
therefore, can be present in each of Thornton's causes, and 
was a more significant factor in the demise of Native 
Americans than he has allowed.
In general, two crucial factors underlay the policies 
and practices of the English colonists and the United States 
government towards Native Americans: the Euro-Americans' greed 
for land and other economic resources and their belief in 
White supremacy and its counterpart, the dehumanization of the 
people they called "Indians.” As Roger Smith has phrased it, 
Native Americans were victimized based on what they had as 
well as who they were.65 These factors led to a range of 
actions which can sustain a charge of genocide. At times, 
there were mass killings specifically aimed at annihilation of 
native people. More often, there were actions carried out 
ostensibly for other purposes but in such a way as to show a 
reckless disregard of the suffering and death which were bound 
to occur. At other times, programs to assimilate the Native 
Americans, such as religious conversion and the removal of
65 Smith, "Human Destructiveness and Politics," 31.
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children from their tribes to be reared and educated by White 
people, meant the intentional destruction of the natives' way 
of life. When these programs were carried out by force or the 
implied or direct threat of force, a charge of genocide is 
possible. In some instances, native life dwindled both 
physically and culturally, succumbing to the relentless 
pressure of Euro^Americans who did not care that native life 
was destroyed.
All these actions which resulted in the demise of 
Native Americans occurred because Euro-Americans always placed 
the native peoples, in Helen Fein's words, "outside of the 
universe of obligation."66 Thus, Euro-Americans considered 
Native Americans undeserving of any rights and readily 
discardable. When Euro-Americans attempted to assimilate 
Native Americans, they believed that they had to first strip 
the natives of "Indianness." As General Richard Henry Pratt 
(1840 to 1924), a leading advocate of assimilation through 
education, declared, his cause was based on the dictum: "Kill 
the Indian and save the man."67 Only the "functional 
restraints," which Leo Kuper wrote about, could interrupt the 
programs of destruction.68 These functional restraints were 
mainly of three types: (1) the need for native labor, an
economically-based restraint; (2) the desire for native trade
66 Fein, "Scenarios of Genocide," 5.
67 Dadrian, "The Victimization of the American Indian,"
530.
68 Kuper, Genocide. 46.
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or tribute, also economically-based; and (3) the attempt to 
use certain tribes as protection from others or to carry out 
warfare against "enemy'1 tribes, based on the need for 
security. When these restraints were removed, either because 
their intended purpose failed, as when the native inhabitants 
proved unworkable as a labor supply, or because other concerns 
became paramount, such as when fear caused all natives, 
"friendly" and "enemy," to be seen as one, then destructive 
practices became unbridled. In writing about the Tasmanians, 
James Morris described "the classic settler-native syndrome," 
which is applicable also to what happened between settlers and 
native peoples in what is now the United States. As Morris 
stated, English settlers in Tasmania concluded "that life in 
Tasmania would be much happier if there were no Tasmanians," 
just as English settlers in North America decided that their 
life in North America would be better if there were no 
"Indians."69 In the eyes of Euro-Americans, Native Americans 
were at best an expendable people to be used when possible and 
discarded if not.
69 Morris, "The Final Solution, Down Under," 213.
CHAPTER III
IMAGE AND EXPECTATIONS
Recurrent in theories of genocide is the finding that, 
preceding the destruction, a group which carries out a 
genocide always identifies its victims as aliens existing 
outside the realm of the common ethos. In Helen Fein's 
succinct phrasing, "genocide is the annihilation of the 
other."1 To review the historical relationship between Whites 
and the native peoples of the Americas is to find that a 
fundamental cornerstone of that relationship has been the 
White view of the Native Americans' "otherness." As the 
Native American writer Michael Dorris has written, there has 
been a "long-standing tendency of European or Euro-American 
thinkers to regard Indians as so 'Other,' so fundamentally and 
profoundly different, that they fail to extend to native 
peoples certain traits commonly regarded as human."2
Not only did the White people view the native peoples 
as aliens, but they also saw them as deficient. Whites, 
therefore, subjugated the "Indians" as they saw fit, 
appropriating their land, labor, and souls.3 Expanding the
1 Fein, "Scenarios of Genocide," 5.
2 Dorris, "Indians on the Shelf," 101.
3 Berkhofer, The White Man's Indian. 113.
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implications of the Euro-Americans' image of native peoples, 
historian Richard Drinnon has written that White behavior 
towards the native peoples has been premised on the principle 
of the "negation of the other."4 Accordingly, the "Indians" 
had no inherent rights to their existence. Whites would allow 
them to survive only if they would forego their "Indianness" 
and adopt White ways.5
Image and intentions are closely intertwined: each can
influence the other. The need to justify motivations and
intentions can serve to perpetuate a faulty image, even in the
face of empirical evidence to the contrary.6 As historian
Gary Nash has written:
Understanding the English image of the Indian . . .
gives meaning to English relations with the Indian and 
to English policies directed at controlling, 
"civilizing" and exterminating him. Images of the 
Indian were indicators of attitudes towards him. 
Attitudes, in turn, were closely linked to intentions 
and desire. . , . Thus, images of the Indians in
colonial America are of both explanatory and causative 
importance.7
Seeing the Native Americans as deficient others gave rise in 
Euro-Americans to the belief that they had the right to do 
what they wished with the natives' land and resources and with 
the native peoples themselves. At the same time, the 
motivation of the colonizers to make good in the New World by
4 Drinnon, "The Metaphysics of Dancing Tribes," 108.
5 Berkhofer, The White Man's Indian. 119.
6 Ibid., 118.
7 Nash, "The Image of the Indian in the Southern Colonial 
Mind," 197-98.
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planting and trading, which required the expropriation of the 
natives' resources and labor, was made easier to carry out by 
this image, thus giving the image its own raison d'etre.
The label of "Indian" itself underscores the bias of 
the European colonizers. First, it is a misnomer based on the 
mistaken assumption by Columbus and his followers that they 
had landed in the Indies rather than the Caribbean. Second, 
the Europeans subsumed under this one name a large number of 
diverse peoples living in separate national or tribal 
groupings. The native peoples of the Americas never saw 
themselves as one; rather, the Europeans imposed an arbitrary 
and false unity,8 seeing all "Indians" as a "separate and 
single other."9 Refusing to acknowledge diversity and 
individuality, the Europeans persisted in using "Indian" even 
after they realized that they were not in the Indies after 
all. This aggregation of many peoples into one "they" who 
stand diametrically opposed to the "we" is a common attribute 
of prejudice. It is convenient to view an enemy as a single 
alien group rather than as many individuals with
distinguishing qualities.10
From accounts of explorers and colonizers from Columbus 
to Thomas Hariot, the English colonists who embarked for
8 Berkhofer, The White Man's Indian. 3; Dadrian, "The 
Victimization of the American Indian," 517.
9 Berkhofer, The White Man's Indian, xv.
10 Berkhofer, The White Man's Indian, xv; Dadrian, "The 
Victimization of the American Indian," 517.
56
Jamestown in 1607 had ample opportunity to learn about the 
native peoples they would encounter. Both the novelty of a 
new "land" and the desire to promote colonization gave rise to 
a considerable literature. Before setting foot in Virginia, 
the English colonists had formed in their minds and image of 
Native Americans which would influence their behavior toward 
them.
The image, however, was not a clear one. Rather, as 
Nash says, the English had developed a "split image" of 
America's natives.11 Several representations by explorers 
depicted the natives as savages, beasts, an inhuman species 
who engaged in outrageous acts of cruelty and brutality such 
as cannibalism. For instance, reports from the expeditions of 
Martin Frobisher in the 1570s described the natives as brutal, 
sly, and only half-human.12 Other reports portrayed the 
natives as more childlike in their primitiveness, and docile, 
friendly, and helpful to the foreigners who arrived on their 
shores. Columbus himself wrote of the generosity and naivete 
of the natives in San Salvador.13
Looming large in the English perception of the natives 
was their knowledge of the Spanish experience in conquering 
the natives of Latin America. Influenced by the writings of 
the priest Bartholome de las Casas, which had been translated
11 Nash, "The Image of the Indian in the Southern Colonial 
Mind," 199.
12 Ibid. , 200.
13 Ibid., 201.
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into English in 1583 and which castigated the Spanish for 
their cruelty to the natives, the English, too, were critical 
of Spanish ruthlessness. Portraying the Spanish in this light 
was useful propaganda for the English in their geopolitical 
and religious rivalry with Spain and was a tool for English 
entrepreneurs who pushed for colonization on the grounds that 
England needed to save the New World from Spanish domination. 
The younger Richard Hakluyt, who together with his uncle was 
a prime promoter of colonization in the Americas, seized on 
the vilification of the Spanish to support his cause. In his 
"Discourse of Western Planting," written in 1584, Hakluyt 
accused the Spanish colonizers of barbarously slaughtering 
millions of "peaceable, lowly, mild, and gentle" natives, 
including women, children, and the elderly.14
The failure of the Roanoke colony in the 1580s, 
partially caused by the friction between the native peoples 
and the settlers, did nothing to enhance the image of the 
natives as childlike and friendly. Instead, the English 
became more inclined to the image of brutal savages.15 To 
make matters worse, well before arriving in Jamestown, the 
English received a warning that at least some of the native 
inhabitants would not welcome them there. On an exploratory 
voyage from Roanoke to the James River in 1585-86, Captain
14 Taylor, The Original Writings and Correspondence of the 
Two Richard Hakluvts. 257-260.
15 Morgan, American Slavery. American Freedom. 44; Nash, 
"The Image of the Indian in the Southern Colonial Mind," 211.
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Ralph Lane received a warning from a tribe that was enemies of
the Powhatans about a powerful king in the area who "would be
loathe to suffer any strangers to enter into his country, and
. . . able to make a great many of men into the field, which
. . . would fight very well."16 Thus, as they set sail for
Virginia, the English could not have expected that smooth
relationships with the indigenous peoples lay ahead.
Maintaining a dual image of the natives helped to encourage
colonization by holding out hope that the natives would
willingly submit to the colonizers' superior ways while at the
same time laying the groundwork to justify the use of force.
An English minister, Robert Gray, writing a sermon in 1609 to
encourage colonization, expressed well this dual image:
The report goeth that in Virginia the people are 
savage and incredibly rude, they worship the devil, 
offer their young children in sacrifice unto him, 
wander up and down like beasts, and in manners and 
conditions differ very little from beasts . . . yet by 
nature loving and gentle, and desirous to embrace a 
better condition.17
Wanting the Native Americans to provide land, labor, and
trade, the English devised theories to achieve these ends,
whether or not the natives wanted to embrace English ways.
Acquiring land was of primary importance to the 
colonists, who failed— or refused— to understand the native 
inhabitants' conceptions of land ownership. What the English 
saw were huge tracts of unoccupied, or at most under-used,
16 Fausz, "Patterns of Anglo-Indian Aggression," 235.
17 Gray, A Good Speed to Virginia, unpaged text.
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territory, and they believed they had the right to seize or at 
least share it with the natives.18 If the natives did not 
seem inclined to accept the intrusion, the English determined 
that because they were barbarians, the natives had no rights
to the land. In his 1609 sermon, the Reverend Robert Gray
asked rhetorically: "By what right or warrant we can enter 
into the land of these savages, take away their rightful
inheritance from them, and plant ourselves in their places, 
being unwronged and unprovoked by them?" He then answered 
that "a Christian king may lawfully make war upon barbarous 
and savage people . . . and may make a conquest of them."19
In the age of its burgeoning empire, England never recognized 
the sovereign rights of native peoples to their land. If the 
English afforded the natives any land rights at all, it was 
only to use the land at the discretion of the colonial
power.20
Equally important as land in the minds of the 
colonizers was the problem of finding an adequate labor force 
to work it. Here again, the European image of the "Indians" 
augured well for a solution. The idea of the heathen, yet 
simple-minded, malleable natives, encouraged the Europeans to 
believe that, given the opportunity, the natives would flock
18 Nash, "The Image of the Indian in the Southern Colonial 
Mind," 209; Berkhofer, The White Man/s Indian. 120; Craven, 
"Indian Policy," 66.
19 Gray, A Good Speed to Virginia, unpaged text.
20 Robinson, "The Legal Status of the Indian," 248; 
Robinson, Virginia Treaties, xxi.
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to work for them, receiving in return the benefits of European 
civilization.21 Awareness of the Spanish colonists'
experience in the New World and their success in utilizing 
native labor spurred the English to think that they could do 
likewise.22 When the natives proved recalcitrant to become 
the English people's laborers, the image of the "savage 
Indians" provided the justification for the colonists to force 
the natives to work and to enslave them if necessary. The 
Europeans considered the natives' refusal to exploit their 
land and its resources and their practice to use only what was 
necessary for survival a sure sign of indolence, which was 
viewed as sinful. Therefore, with self-serving logic, the 
Europeans concluded that they could enslave the natives in 
order to save them from the devil.23 While the English 
castigated the Spanish for their cruelty to the indigenous 
people, historian Edmund Morgan maintains that they certainly 
undertook their own colonization efforts buoyed by the 
"Spanish experience" which "had shown that Europeans could 
thrive in the New World without undue effort by exploiting the 
natives."24 The colonists' profitable use of native labor, 
whether through slavery or other means, served as a functional 
restraint upon the colonizers' use of more destructive methods
21 Morgan, American Slavery. American Freedom. 22-24.
22 Morgan, "The Labor Problem At Jamestown," 597-99.
23 Morgan, American Slavery. American Freedom. 24.
24 Morgan, "The Labor Problem at Jamestown," 598-99.
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to overcome any obstacles the indigenous peoples might pose to 
English domination. In the North American colonies, the 
English found that the natives would not solve the colony's 
labor needs. The functional restraint was then lifted, and 
the English turned to other, more lethal means to win control.
The desire for trade provided another impprtant impetus 
for the colonization of the Americas. Professing a belief in 
the inherent right of "civilized" nations to establish trade 
with the "uncivilized," the English concluded that trade would 
not only be profitable for the colonizers but would also be 
beneficial for the natives. Seeing the "Indians" as tractable 
savages who would be willing to embrace English ways, the 
English saw trade as a way to establish friendly relations. 
Once again, however, the English were ready with alternative 
plans in case the native peoples proved unwilling partners. 
In his "Pamphlet for the Virginia Enterprise," written in 
1585, the elder Richard Hakluyt posed four essential dilemmas 
which the English faced in their attempt to set up trade with 
the New World natives. The first problem would arise if the 
natives felt content as they were and did not desire any of 
the goods the English had to offer. In that case, he proposed 
that their "nature" may need to be "altered, as by conquest 
and other good means." The second problem, to which he 
offered no solution, was that trade could be precluded if the 
native peoples desired the commodities England had to offer 
but produced these things themselves. Yet a third problem 
would occur if the natives wanted English goods but had
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nothing themselves to trade. Here a solution was readily 
available, according to Hakluyt: the colonizers should conquer 
the new land and use it to produce goods desired by the mother 
country. Uncooperative natives might cause the fourth 
problem. "If they [the natives] will not suffer us to have 
any commodities of theirs without conquest," Hakluyt wrote, 
then the English, being the "lords of navigation" could defend 
themselves and "annoy" the natives "in many places." 
Proposing that the English could take advantage of inter­
tribal fighting as a way to obtain revenge against the 
natives, Hakluyt concluded that the English would then be able 
to "conquer, fortify, and plant. . . . And in the end to bring 
them all [the Native Americans] to subjugation or civility."25 
Whenever the natives did prove to be profitable trading 
partners, this served as another functional restraint on the 
colonists' killing of the native people.
In all three objectives which the English hoped to 
achieve in colonizing the Americas— land, labor, and trade—  
the dual image of the indigenous peoples served the colonizers 
well. The "innocent savages" beckoned the English to come by 
promising to share willingly their land and to become toilers 
for English planters and traders for English goods. If the 
"savages" proved "brutal" instead, therein lay the 
justification for the English to force them into submission.
25 Nash, "The Image of the Indian in the Southern Colonial 
Mind," 204; Craven, "Indian Policy," 66; Taylor, The Original 
Writings and Correspondence of the Two Richard Hakluyts. 342, 
332-34, 329-30.
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When the natives proved unwilling or unable to contribute to 
the colonies' profitability, the English could also feel free 
to exert control by deadly means. As historian Robert 
Berkhofer has explained, "If the primitivistic version of 
Indian goodness promised easy fulfillment of European desires, 
the image of the bad Indian proved the absolute necessity ... 
of forcing the Native Americans from 'savage' to European ways 
through the exploitation of their physical bodies, spiritual 
souls, and tribal lands."26
Another rationale for colonization figured prominently 
in the writings of Europeans in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, and that was the duty to "Christianize" the native 
inhabitants. The Spanish and the French, Roman Catholics, 
took the duty seriously, and members of the religious orders 
worked assiduously to bring the "heathen savages" to the one 
true God. Curiously, the Protestant English, while
emphasizing in their writings the necessity of converting the 
natives, never expended much effort in actually doing so.27 
Even in their writings, converting the natives to the Church 
of England seemed to be less a matter of saving souls as a 
part of the larger scheme to convert them to the English way 
of life, and thus to secure their cooperation with the 
colonizers' endeavors. In his instructions to the first 
Virginia colonists, King James ordered them to treat the
26 Berkhofer, The White Man's Indian. 119.
27 Chalk and Jonassohn, The History and Sociology of 
Genocide, 175.
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natives well "whereby they may be the sooner drawn to the true 
knowledge of God, and the obedience of us" (emphasis added),28 
The Virginia Company echoed these sentiments in its 1609 
instructions to the Jamestown settlers. Claiming that 
converting the natives to Christianity was "the most pious and 
noble end of this plantation," the Company emphasized that the 
only hope was with the younger generation and told the 
colonists that if they "entreat well and educate those which 
are younger . . .  in your manners and religion, their people 
will easily obey you and become in time civil and 
Christian."29 Berkhofer refers to this use of religious
conversion to achieve the more profitable goals of 
colonization as the "fusion of secular and religious ends" 
which "can be viewed not only as bringing the Indian more 
fully under White law and jurisdiction but also making them 
more amendable to White economic exploitation."30 Perhaps the 
fact that English-Native American relationships soured early 
explains the dearth of concerted effort to proselytize the 
Christian faith among the native inhabitants. Native 
resistance to English goals quickly obliterated the image of 
the "amiable savages" in the English mind, with the result 
that the image of the "brutal barbarians" became dominant. 
Once this happened, the English felt justified in resorting to
28 Morgan, American Slavery. American Freedom. 46.
29 Robinson, Virginia Treaties. 6-8.
30 Berkhofer, The White Man's Indian. 133.
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force rather than conversion to achieve what they wanted.
The image of native peoples as "alien others" which 
persisted in the European mind is an important requirement in 
the determination of whether the Europeans carried out 
genocide. Understanding how that image contributed to the 
pursuit of English goals demonstrates how seeing people as 
savage rather than human enables a genocidal process to begin. 
In the case of the English colonists in North America, this 
discussion of image and expectations also reveals the presence 
of two important factors in the study of genocide: 
motive/intent and the knowledge of wrong-doing. In 1585, the 
elder Richard Hakluyt clearly spelled out the goals of the 
voyages to Virginia: "(1) to plant Christian religion; (2) to 
traffic; (3) to conquer; or to do all three." He then 
acknowledged: "To plant Christian religion without conquest
will be hard. Traffic easily follows conquest: conquest is 
not easy. Traffic without conquest seems possible, and not 
uneasy." After considering "what is to be done," Hakluyt 
expressed his belief that peaceful means would be the best 
course for all concerned. Nevertheless, he concluded that 
should the natives offer any resistance, then the colonists 
could justly use force to conquer them.31 This is the common 
theme of English colonization. From the beginning, the 
English colonists went to Virginia, where they knew that the 
native inhabitants might not welcome them, with the motivation
31 Taylor, The Original Writings and Correspondence of the 
Two Richard Hakluvts. 329-334.
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to settle and to trade no matter what the natives' response 
would be. If the natives chose to cooperate with the settlers 
and to adopt English ways, then all would be peaceful. If the 
natives did not cooperate, however, the English fully intended 
to use force to obtain compliance no matter what the human 
cost would be. Furthermore, the English knew about and 
condemned the Spanish for their treatment of the native 
peoples of New Spain. Yet, they admitted before they had 
arrived in their first colony that they too might be driven to 
force the natives into submission. They were thus ready and 
willing to do what they had already professed was wrong and 
cruel.
For the Native Americans, the result of colonization—  
whether accomplished through their coerced compliance with En­
glish ways or through the English use of force against them—  
was the same: a staggering death toll and survivors who lost 
their traditional way of life. In the establishment of their 
colonial domain, the English denied the natives the right to 
exist— spiritually, culturally, economically, and frequently 
even physically.32
32 Berkhofer, The White Man's Indian. 113-14.
CHAPTER IV
SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY VIRGINIA: A CASE STUDY
The Native Peoples of Virginia 
At the Time of Contact. With the English
In the beginning of the seventeenth century, one of the 
largest, most intricately organized, and powerful Native 
American societies in North America occupied the land that is 
now Virginia. A short time before the English arrival, 
Wahunsonacock (called Powhatan by the English), the strong and 
ambitious weroance (chief) of the Pamunkeys, had consolidated 
about thirty Algonguian-speaking tribes under his dominion. 
These tribes lived in an estimated 161 villages spread over 
approximately six thousand square miles of Virginia's coastal 
plain, from the Potomac River on the north to the Great Dismal 
Swamp on the south and from the Atlantic Ocean on the east to 
the fall line on the west. In the late sixteenth century, 
Wahunsonacock had begun expanding his rule when he inherited 
six tribes. By 1608, he subjugated the other tribes through 
conquest or intimidation. The majority of the Virginia tribes 
were Algonquians, and Wahunsonacock now ruled all those living 
on the coastal plain except the Chickahominies.1
The degree of Wahunsonacock's control varied, however, 
with those tribes living farthest from him enjoying the
1 Rountree, Pocahontas's People. 10.
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greatest freedom. The English referred to this grouping of 
thirty tribes as the Powhatans. Although historians have 
commonly called the Powhatans a "confederacy11 and occasionally 
an "empire," ethnohistorian Helen Rountree persuasively argues 
that both are misnomers. The tribes on the fringe were too 
loosely connected to be a confederacy and Wahunsonacock did 
not exert enough "coercive force" over his tribes to equal a 
"monarchical state." Rountree adopts the name "paramount 
chiefdom" as the most accurate term to refer to the thirty- 
tribe grouping, the Powhatans.2 When the English invaded 
Virginia in 1607, Wahunsonacock was still in the process of 
consolidating power in his attempt to forge a new ethnic group 
out of the various Algonquian tribes.3
West of the fall line, in the piedmont region of 
Virginia, lived two allied Siouan-speaking tribal groupings, 
the Monacans and the Manahuacs, who were the Powhatan's worst 
enemies. Two Iroquoian-speaking tribes occupied territory on 
the coastal plain south of the James River. Estimates of the 
total number of Native Americans living in Virginia in 1607 
vary. The most recent figures indicate that the total native 
population was approximately 20,000 to 25,000. Of these, 
approximately 14,000 were Algonquians of which about 12,000 to
2 The term "paramount chiefdom" is used in this paper as 
the most accurate descriptive label for the thirty tribes 
linked by Wahunsonacock's rule. The name Powhatan is also 
used to refer to this thirty-tribe grouping.
3 Rountree, Pocahontas's People. 11, 12-13.
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13,000 were in the Powhatan paramount chiefdom.4 Quite 
possibly,, the population had already declined precipitously 
due to the advent of European diseases fifty to one-hundred 
years earlier.5
Anthropologists and historians have not been able to 
conclusively determine the extent to which European diseases 
had struck the Powhatan tribes prior to 1607 largely because 
no archaeological evidence of plagues has as yet been 
unearthed. Knowledge of the broad sweep of European diseases 
through the continents of North and South America beginning 
with the advent of native-European contact, coupled with an 
albeit sparse historical record, lends credence to the theory 
that the Powhatans had suffered considerable loss of life from 
these diseases in the late sixteenth to early seventeenth 
centuries.6 A leading authority on New World epidemics, 
Alfred Crosby, has shown how fast and far diseases spread by 
documenting the first outbreak of smallpox in the Spanish 
colonies in 1518, which rapidly spread from the Caribbean to 
Mexico and then through Central and South America.7 Accounts 
of Hernando DeSoto's expedition in 1539 to 1543 through 
territory which is now the southeastern United States indicate
4 Thornton, American Indian Holocaust. 68; Rountree, 
Pocahontas/s People. 3; Fitzhugh, "Commentary," 188.
5 Rountree, Pocahontas/s People. 3.
6 Rountree, Pocahontas's People. 25; Dobyns, Their Number 
Became Thinned. 276; Smith, M. , Archaeology of Aboriginal 
Culture Change. 58.
7 Crosby, The Columbian Exchange. 39.
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that epidemic diseases had already struck the native peoples
in the area, perhaps ignited by contact with an earlier group
of explorers under Ponce de Leon who reached Florida in 1513.8
Sir Francis Drake's landing in St. Augustine, Florida, in 1585
apparently was the source of another epidemic, probably of
typhus, which struck the area.9 In his account of the colony
of Roanoke which existed briefly in the 1580s, Thomas Hariot
graphically depicted how European diseases devastated the
native inhabitants physically and spiritually:
[W] ithin a few days after our departure from every 
such town, the people began to die very fast, and many 
in short space; in some towns about twenty, in some 
forty, in some sixty, and more six score, which in 
truth was very many in respect of their numbers. . . .The 
disease also was so strange, that they neither knew 
what it was, nor how to cure it. . . . [T]hey were 
persuaded that it was the work of our God through our 
means, and that we by him might kill and slay whom we 
could without weapons and not come near them.
This marvelous accident in all the country wrought so 
strange opinions of us, that some people could not 
tell whether to think us gods or men, and the rather 
because that all the space of their sickness, there 
was no man of ours known to die....10
Accounts of the Spanish Jesuit mission in Virginia in 
1570 to 1571 indicate that the Powhatans had suffered many 
years of "famine and death," which could indicate the presence 
of epidemic diseases.11 In 1608, John Smith had two
8 Smith, M. , Archaeology of Aboriginal Culture Change.
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9 Crosby, Columbian Exchange. 40; Smith, M., Archaeology 
of Aboriginal Culture Change. 56.
10 Quinn, The Roanoke Voyages. 1584-1590. 378-79.
11 Dobyns, Their Number Became Thinned. 276.
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experiences which also could be evidence of earlier epidemics 
among the Powhatans. On a trip to the Eastern Shore, a local 
weroance told him about the deaths of two children which 
precipitated "a great part of his people" dying. Later 
Wahunsonacock told Smith that he had "seen the death of all my 
people thrice," although it is not clear from this remark 
whether the deaths resulted from warfare or disease.12 
Concrete evidence exists that native people contracted 
European diseases wherever they experienced initial contact 
with Europeans and that these diseases spread rapidly from 
intra-native contact. The fact that the Powhatans had an 
early encounter with the Spanish missionaries and were also in 
relative proximity to areas where plagues occurred points to 
a conclusion that the Powhatans had themselves suffered from 
epidemics prior to 1607.
The tribes within the Powhatan chiefdom lived, as 
historian Wesley Frank Craven has described, in a "highly 
organized communal enterprise."13 Primarily a sedentary 
people, they resided for most of the year in their villages. 
Each village was small, composed of a maximum of one-hundred 
homes, and was always built near water. Some of the villages 
were palisaded completely, but in some of the larger villages, 
a palisade surrounded only the more important buildings. The 
people were farmers, growing corn, peas, pumpkins, beans,
12 Barbour, The Complete Works of Captain John Smith. 224- 
25, 247.
13 Craven, White. Red, and Black, 49.
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sunflowers, gourds, and tobacco. Lacking fertilizer, the 
Powhatans used the slash and burn technique of agriculture, in 
which they left fields fallow after a few years to replenish 
while they moved on to new ground. This style of farming 
required that free land be always available. The Native 
Americans' concept of land ownership was based on community 
and thus differed from the European idea of individual 
ownership. While the paramount chief was the holder of the 
lands in his domain, he may have been more of a "steward" than 
a landowner in the European sense. The paramount chief 
granted tracts of land to the separate tribes who paid him 
tribute in return, and then the local weroances parcelled out 
tracts of land to individual families within the tribe in 
exchange for their tribute. Ownership of fields was based on 
usufruct, and any uncultivated land was considered communal 
property.14
Hunting, fishing, and gathering provided food as well. 
The native people ate fish, deer, bear, wild turkey, and other 
game and wild fruits such as berries. Hunting and fishing 
were the job of the Powhatan men, who also cleared the fields 
in preparation for planting. The women did all the rest of 
the farming and prepared the food for eating. This division 
of labor in the procurement of food baffled the English. 
While in reality, the role of women as farmers enhanced their
14 Rountree, Pocahontas's People. 5-6; Rountree, The 
Powhatan Indians of Virginia. 40, 46, 57, 114-15, 124; Wright, 
the Only Land They Knew. 18.
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status in the tribe, the English could not comprehend a 
society whose women ranked higher and had more control over 
their lives than did English women. Instead, Englishmen 
dismissed the native men as lazy, and this notion furthered 
the image of the natives as "alien others."15 Another 
promoter of colonization, Samuel Purchas, in a diatribe 
against the native peoples, castigated them for "having little 
of humanity but shape" and for being "wild and unmanly . . .
captivated to Satan's tyranny in . . . wicked idleness."16
Powhatan society was matrilineal: tribal chiefs
inherited their power through the mother's side of the family. 
Each of the thirty tribes in this confederacy was ruled by a 
weroance (male) or weroansaua (female), who was responsible to 
Wahunsonacock either directly or through another, intermediate 
weroance. Chiefs wielded considerable power over tribal 
members and administered harsh and swift punishments for 
wrongdoing, including disobedience. Chief Wahunsonacock was 
the strong ruler over all the people in the paramount 
chiefdom, but he was still trying to consolidate his hold over 
the fringe tribes when the English arrived. Each
weroance/weroansqua required tribute payments from their 
tribes' people, and Wahunsonacock collected tribute in corn, 
animal skins, copper, beads, pearls, turkeys, deer, and other 
wild animals from each of his subject tribes. Although
15 Rountree, Pocahontas's People. 5, 8.
16 Berkhofer, The White Man's Indian. 21.
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religion evidently played an important role in Powhatan life, 
a variety of gods and religious beliefs existed. The people 
believed that priests had special abilities, such as healing 
the sick and foretelling the future. They exerted a powerful 
influence in secular affairs because of these skills and their 
religious authority. Thus, the colonists were particularly 
alarmed when the priests became virulent opponents of English 
settlement.17 Powhatan men were fierce warriors, and inter­
tribal warfare was common. Although they sometimes fought in 
open areas en masse, more often warriors engaged in small- 
scale, surprise attacks carried out from undercover. Weaponry 
consisted of bows and arrows and clubs.
Wahunsonacock and some of the Powhatan tribes may have 
had their first contact with Europeans in the years between 
1559 and 1561 when the Spanish sent an exploratory party 
through their territory. In 1570, led by a native captive 
whose Christian name was Don Luis de Velasco, Spanish Jesuits 
set up a short-lived mission on the York River. Less than six 
months after their arrival, Don Luis, who had since returned 
to his tribe, and a group of warriors killed the eight Jesuits 
and captured a novice. In 1572 the Spanish sent a force to 
retaliate and retrieve the novice; they killed twenty natives 
in combat and hanged another fourteen. According to later 
accounts about this incident which the Chickahominies gave the 
English, the natives felt an indelible hatred for the
17 Rountree, Pocahontas/s People. 11.
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Spaniards for this ruthless revenge.18
In the 157 0s and 1580s, English and Spanish expeditions 
to the Chesapeake resulted in more contact between Europeans 
and the indigenous peoples, including the tribes of the 
Powhatan. It is not known, however, whether the Powhatans 
knew of the experience of the native peoples with the Roanoke 
settlers. By 1607, the sum total of their knowledge of 
Europeans surely made the native peoples at best apprehensive 
about future contacts. As two ethnohistorians, Helen Rountree 
and J. Frederick Fausz have concluded, the threat of European 
invasion probably gave impetus to Wahunsonacock's efforts to 
build his paramount chiefdom, hoping that by consolidating 
power, the tribes would best be able to hold firm. Rountree 
sees two other factors contributing to Wahunsonacock's drive 
to power: the increasing threat of war from enemy tribes and 
the "social disruption" caused by the epidemics of European 
diseases.19 Threats from within and without to the Powhatans' 
social order likely did impel Wahunsonacock's campaign for 
unification as the best means to hold firm against disaster.
When the English arrived in Virginia and began to build 
a settlement, Wahunsonacock must have realized that his domain 
was at a critical juncture. Disease may already have ravaged 
his people, and they now faced not only known enemies (the
18 Rountree, Pocahontas's People. 15-18; Fitzhugh, 
"Commentary," 189; Fausz, "Patterns of Anglo-Indian 
Aggression," 236.
19 Rountree, Pocahontas's People. 10; Fausz, "Patterns of 
Anglo-Indian Aggression," 236.
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Monacans and the Manahuacs) from the west, but a new, 
potential enemy from the east. Having been unable to 
subjugate totally the fringe tribes of his chiefdom, he may 
have feared that they might break away and form dangerous 
alliances with the enemy tribes or the colonists. Although he 
was quick to exterminate the Chesapeake tribe, who he believed 
threatened his rule around the same time as the English 
arrival, Wahunsonacock chose not to order a massive attack to 
drive out the new settlers despite having overwhelming 
numerical superiority.20 Instead, Wahunsonacock decided to 
try to use the English to his advantage, apparently hoping 
that he could form an alliance with them and obtain weapons 
which would help him strengthen his hold on the tribes in his 
chiefdom and protect it from enemies.21 Anthropologist Nancy 
O. Lurie believes that, although suspicious of the English 
from the outset, the Powhatans in 1607 believed themselves 
strong enough to handle any possible threat from the English 
colonizers. Similarly, J. Frederick Fausz maintains that the 
Powhatans were overconfident about their military 
capabilities.22 This may have been the case. It is also 
possible, however, that Wahunsonacock acted out of a perceived 
position of weakness, rather than strength. Plagues of
20 Rountree, Pocahontas's People. 25-28.
21 Lurie, "Indian Cultural Adjustment," 43-44; Rountree, 
Pocahontas's People. 12-13.
22 Lurie, "Indian Cultural Adjustment, " 37-38; Fausz, "The 
Invasion of Virginia," 145.
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European diseases probably had already ravaged and demoralized 
his people. Furthermore, he was well-aware that Europeans 
could act treacherously and that their firearms were superior 
to his people's weaponry. Within days of the English arrival, 
some Powhatans attacked the colonists but were repulsed by 
musket fire.23 With tribal enemies to the west and a 
potentially more lethal enemy to the east, Wahunsonacock may 
have felt unable to mount a defense, let alone an offense, on 
two fronts. He opted for a political gamble: an attempt to 
use, rather than fight, the English. It was a gamble that 
failed.
The Seizure of Virginia
The English experience in Virginia in the seventeenth 
century illustrates well how colonization can set in motion a 
genocidal process for which ultimate responsibility must lie 
with the officials of the colonizing nation-state. While 
genocide does not require state involvement, in the genocides 
of indigenous peoples which occurred during European 
colonization, a key element is the role of the nation-state, 
which provided the underlying motive, the authority, and 
frequently the means to carry out the genocides and, 
therefore, must bear the responsibility for what occurred.
Although the Virginia Company of London, which 
organized the Virginia venture, was a private corporation, it 
received its charter from the Crown, which therefore held the
23 Fausz, "Patterns of Anglo-Indian Aggression," 237.
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final authority. From 1607 to 1609, the king imposed direct 
royal control of the colony's government, but from 1609 to 
1624, he granted the Virginia Company greater autonomy. In 
1624, however, the King revoked the Virginia Company's charter 
and turned Virginia into a royal colony. The governing body 
within the colony evolved during these years. Initially, the 
Virginia Company appointed a council and president, but in 
1609 it established the position of a strong governor who 
would work with the council. In 1619 the colony initiated its 
first elected legislature, the House of Burgesses, which sat 
with the governor and council in the Grand Assembly. After 
1624, the king appointed the governor and council. Among its 
responsibilities, the Grand Assembly determined the colony's 
policy with the native peoples.24
The colonists who arrived in Virginia on April 16, 1607 
had several expectations, first and foremost of which was that 
they anticipated finding the means to enrich themselves and 
the Company. The second was that they did not plan to do the 
menial work required to sustain a colony. As stated earlier, 
they expected to find the "Indians," and with the experience 
of Roanoke behind them, plus an overt warning, they surely did 
not anticipate that these "Indians" would welcome them. This 
was no deterrent, however, for the English believed in their 
own inherent right to the land and in their rights to force
24 Robinson, Southern Colonial Frontier. 1, 7; Robinson, 
Virginia Treaties, xxii-xxiii; Morgan, American Slavery. 
American Freedom. 79.
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trade and expropriate native labor. Knowing that the Spanish 
had built a successful and wealth-producing colony on the 
backs of native peoples, the English could have expected no 
less for themselves.25 If converting the natives to 
Christianity figured prominently in the plans written for the 
colony in London, conversion did not seem to loom large in the 
minds of the settlers. The colonists, however, did not arrive 
with the intention of annihilating the native peoples but 
rather of using them in the furtherance of English gain and 
glory.
From the beginning, a mutual wariness existed between 
the colonists and the native peoples. For the first two 
months, Wahunsonacock apparently decided to allow the 
individual tribes of his chiefdom to act as they pleased 
towards the newcomers. Helen Rountree believes this was a way 
for Wahunsonacock to test the English. If this is so, he 
might not have decided on his plan to try to ally with these 
Europeans and was trying instead to determine whether he could 
successfully expel them from his land. The first encounter 
between natives and the English did not bode well for either 
side: Native warriors attacked the first arrivals at Cape
Henry, proving to the colonists that they were not welcome, 
and the English turned their guns on the warriors, proving to 
the natives the superiority of English firearms. Initially, 
the English tired to convince the natives that they were only
25 Morgan, "The Labor Problem at Jamestown," generally; 
Morgan, American Slavery. American Freedom. 83-88.
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visiting; however, their construction of a fort at Jamestown 
belied their words and convinced the Powhatans that they 
planned to stay. From April to June, the relationship between 
natives and English teetered back and forth between welcoming 
gestures on the part of the natives and violent skirmishes in 
which natives frequently fell victim to English gunfire. 
Although the Powhatans had great numerical superiority over 
the colonists at this point, their experiences facing English 
firearms apparently daunted them to such an extent that they 
could not take advantage of their numbers. Repeatedly, 
Englishmen writing of their experiences in the colony tell of 
the terror which the use of their firearms induced in the 
native people. Although the view of the natives as inferior 
beings could well have influenced these accounts, it is 
reasonable to believe that the sight and sound of firearms and 
the dreadful injuries they could inflict would arouse such 
fear in people who fell victim to them for the first time. 
Firearms offered the English not only a technological 
advantage but a psychological edge as well. Perhaps it was 
this direct experience with the power of English weapons which 
convinced Wahunsonacock that he might not succeed in war 
against them, but that he could benefit from an alliance with 
them. On June 15, 1607, he ordered his tribes to cease
hostilities26.
26 Rountree, Pocahontas's People. 29, 31, 34; Barbour,
Complete Works of Captain John Smith. Vol. 1, 227, 230, 248, 
250, 252; Barbour, Jamestown Voyages. Vol. 1, 91, 95; Sheehan, 
Savaqism and Civility. 162-64.
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For the remainder of the year, an uneasy truce
prevailed. The first group of 105 settlers was preoccupied
with trying to stay alive. Quickly exhausting the provisions
they had brought with them, they contracted typhoid,
dysentery, and salt poisoning from drinking the water of the
James River. To make the situation worse, the natives' corn
ripened later than usual, which deprived the English, as well
as the natives, of a food source. Watching the weakened
settlers, who were either too ignorant or too lazy to take the
steps necessary for survival, may have increased
Wahunsonacock's confidence that he would be able to deal with
them on his own terms. When the natives did harvest their
corn in September, they brought gifts of food to Jamestown,
but the colonists remained unable to recognize the humanity in
their saviors. As George Percy, one of the settlers wrote:
If it had not please[d] God to have put a terror in 
the savages' hearts, we had all perished by these wild 
and cruel pagans. . . .  It pleased God, after awhile, 
to send those people which were our mortal enemies to 
relieve us with victuals, as bread, corn, fish, and 
flesh in great plenty, which was the setting up of our 
feeble men, otherwise we had all perished. Also we 
were frequented by diverse kings in the country, 
bringing us store of provision to our great comfort.27
The redoubtable John Smith ascended quickly to a 
position of power in Jamestown. Brash and arrogant, Smith 
viewed the native peoples as nothing more than treacherous 
savages whom the English could quickly conquer and force into
27 Rountree, Pocahontas's People. 34-35; Robinson, The 
Southern Colonial Frontier. 8-9.
servitude.28 Seizing the initiative in the failing colony, 
Smith decided in the autumn of 1607 to embark on a campaign to 
obtain food from the natives by any means necessary. Gary 
Nash maintains that from this point on, "it was John Smith 
who, more than any other figure, wrought the most significant 
change in English attitudes and policy toward Powhatan." It 
was also Smith who did more than anyone else to keep alive the 
Jamestown settlers, who remained peculiarly unwilling to 
work.29 The colonists were thus completely dependent on 
whatever corn Smith could cajole or force from the natives, 
who because of the poor harvest, had little surplus available 
for trade. For a short while, trade went well for Smith, 
especially with the Chickahominies, but the dwindling corn 
supply, coupled with Smith's insatiable desire for it, soon 
soured his relationship with the tribe. In December, the 
natives attacked a group of Smith's men who were on a trading 
mission on the Chickahominy River and took Smith hostage. 
Helen Rountree maintains that Smith was not mistreated during 
his captivity and that Chief Wahunsonacock believed that he 
had made Smith an ally by the time he was released a few weeks 
later. Afterwards Smith wrote that he had falsely promised 
Wahunsonacock that the English would make themselves sub­
servient to the paramount weroance in return for his care.30
28 Morgan, American Slavery. American Freedom. 77.
29 Nash, "The Image of the Indian in the Southern Colonial 
Mind," 213.
30 Rountree, Pocahontas's People. 36, 38-39.
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For the next ten months, the Powhatans continued to 
supply the Jamestown settlers with food, but the relationship 
between the English and the native peoples remained tense. 
Since distrust underlay the English attempts at diplomacy, 
their actions inevitably sparked distrust in the natives as 
well. Violent flare-ups caused by both sides were the result.
One of the seminal events in the early relationship 
between the English colonists and the native peoples came in 
the fall of 1609. Captain Christopher Newport, recently 
returned to the colony from England, set out to stage a 
coronation of Wahunsonacock, which in English eyes would mean 
that Wahunsonacock had placed himself under the domain of the 
English king. According to this scheme, the colonists 
believed that once the Powhatans had "accepted" English rule, 
they would certainly be more willing to trade. If 
Wahunsonacock had acquiesced as the English had anticipated, 
colonization could have proceeded mainly by ethnocide, with 
the remaking of the natives into appropriate royal subjects 
who would supply the needs of the colony for labor and food. 
Wahunsonacock proved unwilling to go along with the plan, 
however. Sensing that his idea of relating to the English as 
allies was not shared by the English, Wahunsonacock balked at 
their attempt to make him subservient. Asserting that he 
himself was a king and the English were on his land, he 
rejected a summons to a meeting with Newport and made Newport 
come to him instead. Then he refused to kneel and accept the 
crown. As John Smith, a witness to the incident, retold it:
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"But a foul trouble there was to make him kneel to receive his 
crown. . . . A t  last, by leaning hard on his shoulders, he a
little stooped, and Newport put the Crown on his head." 
Although the English tried to claim that, once crowned, 
Wahunsonacock "had acknowledged King James' dominion over 
Virginia," his recalcitrance surely made them recognize that 
the natives were not going to succumb readily to English 
control. At his point, Wahunsonacock probably realized that 
he would have to resist actively to save his people from ruin. 
A few months later, in January 1609, Wahunsonacock told Smith 
that he now believed that the English intended "to invade my 
people and possess my country."31
The tactic Wahunsonacock adopted was to refuse more 
trade with the colonists, who from the time of the so-called 
"coronation" of Wahunsonacock through the summer of 1610 were 
literally starving to death. Relationships between the 
natives and the settlers disintegrated rapidly once the 
functional restraint which trade with the natives provided was 
gone. The English resorted to the force of arms to obtain the 
Powhatans' corn. John Smith set out in late December 1608 to 
capture Wahunsonacock and seize his people's corn; after a 
violent encounter, Smith failed and Wahunsonacock decided to 
move his headquarters farther away from the English colony. 
Only by holding a gun to the chest of Opechancanough,
31 Robinson, Virginia Treatiess 5; Rountree, Pocahontas's 
People. 47; Fausz, "An 'Abundance of Blood Shed on Both 
Sides,'" 19.
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Wahunsonacock's half-brother and powerful weroance of the 
Pamunkeys, was Smith able to obtain any corn at all. This 
incident, which humiliated Opechancanough in front of his 
people, demonstrated not only Smith's disdain for the powerful 
weroance but also the way in which the English effectively 
used their firearms to overcome native resistance through the 
terror which their weapons evoked. Smith later wrote how he 
"led the trembling king (near dead with fear)." After the 
summer of 1609 brought another poor harvest, Smith decided to 
move some of the colonists out of Jamestown. The Nansemonds, 
Arrohatecks, and the Powhatans living near the falls of the 
James River met this expansion into their homelands with 
immediate violent resistance.32
In October 1609, John Smith severely injured himself in 
an accident and returned to England, and the ensuing winter in 
the colony was the nadir of its "starving time." The natives 
continued to resist trade. Wahunsonacock executed the leader 
of a trading party, and another trading group of Englishmen 
obtained corn only after using "some harsh and cruel 
dealing[s] by cutting off two of the savages' heads and other 
extremities." This corn did not go far to alleviate the 
hunger in Jamestown, and the settlers were reduced "to do 
those things which seem incredible as to dig up dead corpses 
out of graves and to eat them and some have licked up the
32 Rountree, Pocahontas's People. 48-52; Barbour, Complete 
Works of Captain John Smith. 252.
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blood which hath fallen from their weak fellows.1*33 Probably 
believing that the settlement was finally about to collapse 
and that they would soon be rid of the colonists, the natives 
kept the pressure on by refusing relief and by frequently 
ambushing stragglers who left the fortress to forage for food.
By May 1610, more than half the settlers in the colony 
had died, but the situation changed for the English and the 
Native Americans when Sir Thomas Gates and Lord De la Warr 
arrived from England, not only with long-awaited provisions 
but with some three hundred new settlers. Having heard 
reports of the colony's troubles, the Virginia Company in 
London had decided that a more authoritarian form of 
government was necessary and had received a new charter from 
the king which allowed them to tighten controls. The 
company's first appointed governor was Lord De la Warr and his 
deputy was Gates. These men were determined to rule the 
colonists with an iron fist and to subjugate the native people 
ruthlessly.34 They brought with them express instructions 
from the Virginia Council in London which detailed how the 
colony should deal with the natives and which were, in effect, 
an aggressive plan for ethnocide. After proclaiming that 
"your enemies can be but of two kinds— strangers and natives'* 
and that the colonists could in "no way trust" Wahunsonacock, 
the Council reasserted its claim that "the most pious and
33 Percy, "'A Trewe Relacyon,'" 266, 267.
34 Morgan, American Slavery. American Freedom, 79-81.
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noble end of this plantation” was to convert the natives to 
Christianity. To do so, the Council authorized the settlers 
to "procure . . . some convenient number of [native] children 
to be brought up in your language and manner.” Removing young 
people from their homes and educating them in the ways of
s
English people were the only hope the colony had to bring the 
Native Americans under its control. The Council went on to 
recommend that the settlers imprison and, if necessary, kill 
the native priests since they exercised great power over the 
people.35
The Council then put forward two new tenets of policy. 
The first was to declare that if the colonists did not take 
Wahunsonacock prisoner, they must make him and all the 
weroances their tributaries. This usurpation of the natives' 
economic structure is another common element of genocidal 
practices. Tributary status for the Powhatan tribes would 
benefit the colony in many ways. It would force the weroances 
to "acknowledge no other Lord but King James" and allow the 
colony to enrich itself without much effort since the tribes 
would supply it with corn, furs, other desirable goods, and a 
continual supply of laborers. Furthermore, the company 
believed that by weakening Wahunsonacock's hold on his tribes 
and by making the tribes dependent on the colony for 
protection, tributary status would make the natives accept the 
colony's control. Only through forcing the functional
35 Robinson, Virginia Treaties. 6-8.
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restraints of labor and trade upon the native peoples would 
they be allowed to "enjoy their houses" and other "blessings" 
which the colonists might choose to bestow. The second new 
policy was a reversal of what the company had originally set 
out to do. No longer considering it viable to ally with the 
tribes closest to them against their enemy tribes, the company 
declared that now the colonists must "make enemies unto those 
among whom you dwell" and if "friendship" was to be made at 
all, it should be done with "those that are farthest from 
you."36 Apparently the company believed that alliances with 
the tribes farthest away would help to keep the tributary 
tribes in subjugation by means of intimidation. The 
threatened use of force against the Powhatans was thus 
implicit in the colonists' actions and is another element of 
the genocidal process.
By the time these instructions arrived in Virginia, 
however, the colonists had determined for themselves that 
violence was the only means to subdue the Native Americans. 
As Edmund Morgan has explained, the failure of the colonists 
to sustain themselves while they not only watched the native 
people thrive but were forced to rely on them, their 
inferiors, for food, presented a "challenge" to their "image 
of themselves, to their self-esteem, to their conviction of 
their own superiority over foreigners, and especially over 
barbarous foreigners." As frequently occurs in cases of
36 Ibid., 6-8.
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genocide, when the perpetrator group believes that its well­
being is threatened by a group it believes is alien, the 
colonists answered this challenge by deciding to torture and 
kill native people and burn their villages and cornfields.37 
De la Warr and Gates adapted the company's instructions to 
accommodate the violent zeal of the colonists. Nothing less 
than a series of genocidal massacres ensued.
Gates went with a party of men to Kecoughtan to take 
revenge on the natives there who he heard had killed some 
English traders. Luring the natives to them by music and 
dance, Gates and his men then attacked, killing many. Once 
the remaining natives had fled, Gates claimed possession of 
their town. In July 1610, when Wahunsonacock refused Lord De 
la Warr's command to return some captives and stolen arms, De 
la Warr cut off the hand of a native captive and sent the man 
back to Wahunsonacock with the message to comply or face the 
destruction of all the Powhatan villages in the vicinity. 
When Wahunsonacock still did not yield, De la Warr sent George 
Percy with a group of over seventy men "to take revenge" upon 
the Paspaheghs, a Powhatan tribe. Coming upon a village, 
Percy and his men "put some fifteen or sixteen to the sword 
and almost all the rest to flight," and then burnt the houses 
and destroyed the corn. Angry that four prisoners had been 
taken alive, Percy beheaded one of them, leaving only the 
tribal queen and her children as survivors. On the way back
37 Morgan, American Slavery. American Freedom. 89-90.
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to Jamestown, the Englishmen threw the children overboard and 
shot out their brains. The queen was executed upon arrival at 
the settlement. This brutal attack wreaked such havoc on the 
Paspaheghs that they never recovered, and the genocide of this 
tribe was soon completed. After the English killed their
chief in another fight in February 1611, the tribe 
disappeared, its survivors apparently joining other tribes.38
The Native Americans resisted the English onslaught, 
but they were no match for the colonists who possessed 
superior weaponry. By the end of 1611, the English had gained 
control of the James River and declared that Wahunsonacock was 
no longer a threat. The Powhatans found themselves ravaged 
not only by the bloodshed but by a spiritual and cultural 
crisis brought on by the realization that their gods, priests, 
and weroances could not protect them from the new diseases and 
firepower of the colonists. Still the Powhatans refused to 
capitulate; the English continued the fight, and in April 1613 
boldly captured Wahunsonacock's favorite daughter, Pocahontas. 
With the Powhatans nearing the end of their ability to resist, 
the English delivered the last punishing blow against the once 
strong Pamunkeys, destroying their villages near what is now 
West Point, Virginia.39
38 Percy, "'A Trewe Relacyon,'" 270; Rountree, 
Pocahontas/s People. 54-5; Percy, H/A Trewe Relacyon,'" 271- 
73 .
39 Fausz, "An 'Abundance of Blood Shed on Both Sides,'" 
40-41; Fausz, "Fighting 'Fire' With Firearms," 39-40; Fausz, 
"Patterns of Anglo-Indian Aggression," 241, 243.
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The April 1614 marriage of Pocahontas to the Englishman 
John Rolfe brought with it a peace agreement between the 
colonists and the Powhatan tribes, which were now effectively 
reduced to tributary status. The Chickahominies, recognizing 
the superior force of the English, quickly followed the tribes 
of the Powhatan in making peace with the colonists. To do so, 
the Chickahominies had at least to appear to agree to their 
own ethnocide by giving up their tribal identity and being 
called Englishmen and women. They also consented to be 
subjects of the Crown and to submit to the authority of the 
colonists in return for which the English allowed them to 
maintain their own laws and government. In addition, the 
Chickahominies had to agree to send three hundred warriors 
whenever the English needed help against their enemies. 
Lastly, every bowman had to pay tribute at harvest time of two 
bushels of corn, in return for which they would receive two 
hatchets.40
J. Frederick Fausz characterizes the hostilities 
between the Powhatans and the English between 1609 and 1614 as 
the "First Anglo-Powhatan War." While in doing so he fulfills 
his apparent and worthy goal of reinvigorating the role of the 
Native Americans in their own history, the characterization 
proves faulty. An Anglo-Powhatan war implies a more balanced 
equation, at least in terms of responsibility for the fighting 
and perhaps even in fighting capabilities; furthermore, in
40 Fausz, "Fighting 'Fire' With Firearms," 39-40; 
Robinson, The Southern Colonial Frontier. 25.
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war, military casualties are the permissible and inevitable 
result. The Powhatans did resist, sometimes violently, the 
incursions of the English, but such acts do not constitute 
war. The English were well able to overcome the natives' 
numerical superiority with their firearms and their tactics. 
Even Fausz describes the English actions as "unprovoked" and 
"ruthless," and indicts them for the "use of deception, 
ambush, and surprise, the random slaughter of both sexes and 
all ages, the calculated murder of innocent captives, and 
destruction of entire villages." He makes no like case— nor 
can one be made— against the Native Americans. This was no 
Anglo-Powhatan War but an officially-sanctioned series of 
genocidal massacres aimed at subjugating or destroying, if 
necessary, the Native Americans of coastal Virginia. To use 
the term "Anglo-Powhatan War" is to fall into the trap which 
the Native American writer Michael Dorris warns against. 
Emphasizing the natives' combativeness, Dorris says, 
"reinforce[s] the myth of Indian aggressiveness and 
bellicosity and further suggests that they got what they 
deserved."41 This is not to suggest that the native peoples 
were the helpless victims of English aggressiveness. Rather 
a combination of factors constrained the Powhatans' ability to 
effectively defend themselves. First, European diseases had 
already reduced their numbers— and thus their fighting force—  
and probably created a spiritual crisis as well which would
41 Fausz, "An 'Abundance of Blood Shed on Both Sides,'" 
32-33; Dorris, "Indians on the Shelf," 101.
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also have undermined their strength. Second, the natives' 
weaponry was no match for English firearms. In addition, when 
the English first arrived, Wahunsonacock made a strategic 
choice which in hindsight proved to be wrong. By not taking 
immediate and decisive action to drive the English away (which 
might have succeeded), the Powhatans allowed the English to 
establish themselves and take advantage of the divisions among 
the native tribes. Furthermore, to conclude that native 
peoples did become the victims of a colonial power's genocide 
does not denigrate them. The fault for genocide, as with any 
crime, lies with the perpetrator and not the victim.
In the aftermath of the 1614 peace accord, the 
colonists' violence against the natives subsided. Weakened by 
age and defeat, Wahunsonacock's hold on his tribes declined, 
and by 1616 his half-brother Opechancanough had emerged as the 
dominant weroance. When Wahunsonacock died in 1618, his title 
officially passed to another brother, Opitchapam. In a short 
time, Opitchapam proved ineffective, and Opechancanough took 
over.42 He apparently used his deep feelings of resentment 
and animosity toward the English to build up his power among 
the Powhatan tribes. His success indicates that the Native 
Americans were struggling to revive and still committed to 
resist the colonists' encroachments on their land and way of 
life. In trying to build up their capabilities to defend 
themselves, the native people faced another debilitating
42 Rountree, Pocahontas's People. 62, 66.
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obstacle over which they had no control: European diseases
continued to devastate them, with virulent epidemics striking 
at least twice, in 1617 and 1619.43
These years of relative peace did not mean that the 
English had come to trust the native peoples, but rather that 
they felt that they had succeeded in putting the natives in 
their place. Any sign that the native people were stepping 
out of that place was met by English force. In 1616, when the 
Chickahominies refused to pay their tribute, George Yeardley, 
then deputy governor, took "one hundred of his best shot" to 
deal with them. In the ensuing encounter, Yeardley ordered 
his men to open fire, which they did, killing twelve members 
of the tribe and wounding more. Twelve of the surviving 
natives were taken prisoner. In this way, the colonists 
obtained their corn, for the Chickahominies brought them one 
hundred bushels as ransom for the prisoners. Several members 
of the tribe were not released, however, and were held in 
servitude to Yeardley and some of the other men on the 
expedition. The colonists applauded this retaliatory strike, 
believing that it had so frightened the native peoples that 
they would not cause any trouble again. In reality, however, 
the Chickahominies agreed to join forces with 
Opechancanough.44
43 Fausz, "Patterns of Anglo-Indian Aggression," 243; 
Kingsbury, Records of the Virginia Company. Vol. 1, 310; Vol. 
3, 92, 220.
44 Robinson, Virginia Treaties. 23-4; Kingsbury, Records 
of the Virginia Company. Vol. 3, 93.
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Two years later, a group of Chickahominies killed some 
traders and some English children. Seeking to prevent a 
retaliatory attack, Opechancanough sent word to Governor 
Argali promising to capture those responsible, which he 
apparently failed to do. Although Opechancanough declared 
that he would not break the peace, such a promise did not 
assuage the governor, who issued a proclamation forbidding 
trade and "familiarity" with the "perfidious savages" "lest 
they discover our weakness."45 Whether in response to the 
same incident or another one, the Council of Virginia issued 
a letter to Governor Yeardley in June 1619 ordering that the 
colonists take "sharp revenge" on the Chickahominies for the 
"outrage" by "not only . . . the personal destruction of the
murderers, but the removing that people further off from our 
territories.1,46
Iii 1617 another event of far-reaching importance 
occurred in the colony. The first cargo of John Rolfe's 
improved tobacco plant was shipped to England where it netted 
a good price. Suddenly, the colonists found the source of 
riches they had been looking for during the last ten years, 
and they began to cultivate it in earnest.47 This produced 
two interrelated results, neither of which boded well for the
45 Robinson, Virginia Treaties. 25; Kingsbury, Records of 
the Virginia Company. Vol. 3, 93.
46 Kingsbury, Records of the Virginia Company. Vol. 3,
147.
47 Morgan, American Slavery. American Freedom, 90.
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native peoples. The first was that settlers wanted more and 
more land on which to grow tobacco, a land-hungry crop which 
depletes the soil and requires planters to move continually to 
fresh fields. The second was a large increase in the number 
of English people arriving in the colony, producing even 
greater pressure for more land. In the spring of 1618, about 
four hundred settlers lived in the colony; in the next four 
years, more than ten times that number arrived. The mortality 
rate from disease remained high, however, so that only 1,240 
colonists were alive in the colony in 1622.48
As an incentive to promote colonization, the Virginia 
Company in 1618 established a headright system, awarding fifty 
acres of land to anyone who paid his own way to Virginia or
paid for the passage of someone else. By 1622, Virginia
Company officials in London ruled that "no other but the
Company here and that in a Quarter Court . . . had power to
dispose of land" in the colony. Furthermore, these officials 
held that "to compound" for the land with Opechancanough was 
"dishonorable and prejudicial to the company" as it would 
falsely imply "a sovereignty in that heathen infidel" and 
infringe on the Company's tithes.49 The threefold growth in 
the number of colonists was enough to cause a significant loss 
of land to the natives, land which they needed for their crops
48 Robinson, The Southern Colonial Frontier. 23; Craven, 
The Southern Colonies. 138, 137; Morgan, American Slavery.
American Freedom. 101.
49 Robinson, Virginia Treaties. 27-28.
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and for foraging. Another result of the growth of the colony 
was a decrease in the supply of game which the natives hunted. 
Able to produce less food for themselves, the natives faced an 
added burden, since the colonists continued to expect the 
natives to supply them with corn. Intent on profiting from 
tobacco, the settlers neglected to grow their own corn, 
despite laws to do so.50 This continual and growing squeeze 
on the natives' livelihood, which obviously would lead to 
their demise, resulted from the deliberate actions of the 
colonists, who were motivated by their desire to control and 
profit from Virginia's land and resources. Thus, the 
colonists must bear responsibility for the results of their 
actions: the near-extinction of Native Americans.
At the same time that the colonists were seeking the 
means to wealth through tobacco, the Virginia Company in 
London renewed its efforts to anglicize the natives and thus 
accomplish ethnocide by taking their children into colonists' 
homes where they would be educated and converted to 
Christianity. Not yet relinquishing their belief that the 
natives should do the colony's labor, the settlers considered 
that native children would be their servants while learning 
English ways.51 A new charter in 1618 set aside ten thousand 
acres at Henrico "for the building and planting of a college 
for the training of the children of those infidels in true
50 Morgan, "First American Boom," 181.
51 Kingsbury, Records of the Virginia Company, Vol. 3,
147.
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religion, moral virtue, and civility and for other godly 
uses."52 Both efforts— to bring native children into the 
colony and to build a- school for them— floundered. The 
colonists were chagrined when they found that, as Governor 
Yeardley wrote, "the Indians [were] very loathe upon any terms 
to part with their children." Yeardley promised to do his 
best "to purchase some children," and he suggested that 
perhaps he could convince Opechancanough to send entire 
families to the colony as a way to give the colonists "the 
opportunity to instruct their children.1,53 In 1620, the 
Virginia Company appointed George Thorpe to take charge of the 
college effort. Thorpe was a sincere advocate of the non- 
violent assimilation of the natives, whom he believed were "of 
a peaceable and virtuous disposition.1,54 He thought he had 
established a good relationship with Opechancanough, for whom 
he built an English-style house. Given that Opechancanough 
was plotting native resistance, it is most probable he 
realized that the conversion-assimilation attempts were as 
much a threat to the survival of his people as the colonists' 
land-grabbing and guns.
Over the years, the settlers came to feel that the 
native peoples no longer posed any real threat to the security 
of the colony. They had found themselves well able to put
52 Craven, The Southern Colonies. 132.
53 Kingsbury, Records of the Virginia Company. Vol. 3, 
128-29.
54 Ibid. , 446.
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down occasional flare-ups, and they refused to comprehend that 
their impingement on the natives' land and culture would 
produce deepening resentment. The English people's beliefs in 
their own superiority and the inferior "otherness” of the 
natives contributed to their attitude of invincibility; but 
they also needed these beliefs if their plans were to succeed. 
While the colonists wanted the natives' land, they also relied 
on the natives to produce food for the colony, and they still 
had hopes to use native labor. As long as the English felt 
they had the natives under control, their best plan was to 
take over the land they needed but to keep the natives alive 
as a food and labor source.
During these same years, however, indignation over the 
domination of the colonists was growing among the Native 
Americans. It is not known for how long Opechancanough was 
planning a rebellion, but given how well coordinated it was, 
it surely had been in the making for some time. Apparently 
harboring a desire for revenge, Opechancanough managed to 
deceive the colonists by an outward show of obeisance. Even 
the week prior to the rebellion, Opechancanough assured 
Governor Francis Wyatt that he wanted to keep the peace 
despite the recent killing by the colonists of a prominent 
warrior.
On Good Friday, March 22, 1622, the rebellion began.
Led by Opechancanough, the Native Americans rose up with fury 
in a series of surprise raids on individual homes which were 
dispersed throughout the colony. Caught off-guard, the
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settlers were slow to organize any defense. Although they did 
not destroy the colony, the native warriors avenged themselves 
with a terrifying vindictiveness, sparing no one. A unigue 
feature of the attack was that the natives veered from their 
usual practice of not killing women and children. Altogether 
347 settlers died, a number which is more significant in 
relative terms: almost one-third of the colonists were wiped 
out. Undoubtedly, casualties would have been greater had not 
two Christianized natives alerted Jamestown and a few other 
settlements to the impending attack in time for them to 
repulse it. Given how well-planned and thorough the Powhatans 
were in carrying out their uprising and the fact that they 
abandoned their usual restraints against killing women and 
children, it is possible that Opechancanough and his people 
had themselves attempted to carry out a genocide of the 
English colonists. If this is so, the rebellion illustrates 
another danger wrought by the injustices of colonialism: the 
oppressed themselves may attempt genocide against those who 
try to destroy them as a last resort to save themselves from 
extinction.
Initially, the colonists were too shocked by the 
rebellion to plan either a defense or offense. It took over 
twenty days for the survivors to pull themselves together into 
fewer and more centralized settlements in which they were 
better able to protect themselves from further attack. 
Finding they only had 180 able-bodied men to mount a counter­
attack, a number deemed insufficient for the task, they
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abandoned any plans to strike back. To compound their
predicament, the settlers found themselves faced with the 
possibility of starvation because they were too terrified to 
go out to the fields to plant corn.
The rebellion of March 22nd destroyed once and for all
any beliefs which the English settlers had that they could
tame the "savages." Once over the initial shock, the
colonists and the Virginia Company in England adopted a policy
to pursue the outright extinction of all the native peoples.
Edward Waterhouse, a secretary to the Virginia Company in
London, wrote a lengthy account of the uprising and
recommended the action the colonists needed to take. Calling
the natives "savages," "beasts," "miscreants," "more foul than
lions and dragons," and "wicked infidels," Waterhouse declared
that they could never be trusted. He coldly determined,
however, that the "massacre" would actually benefit the colony
because now it could justifiably conquer the natives by any
means necessary:
[0]ur hands which before were tied . . . are now set 
at liberty . . .  so that we . . . may now by right of 
war, and laws of nations, invade the country, and 
destroy them who sought to destroy us: whereby we
shall enjoy their cultivated places. . . . Now their
cleared grounds in all their villages shall be 
inhabited by us.
Advocating total warfare, Waterhouse concluded:
[T]he way of conquering them is much more easy than of 
civilizing them by fair means. . . . [V]ictory of them 
may be gained many ways; by force, by surprise, by
famine in burning their corn, by destroying and
burning their boats, canoes, and houses, by breaking 
their fishing weares, by assailing them in their 
huntings, whereby they get the greatest part of their
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sustenance in winter, by pursuing and chasing them 
with our horses, and blood-hounds to draw after them, 
and mastives to tear them, which take this naked, 
tanned, deformed savages for no other than wild 
beasts.55
In what was effectively an official declaration of war
against the Native Americans, the Virginia Company in London
sent a letter to the governor and Council of Virginia in
August 1622, in which it directed the course of action the
colonists should pursue against the natives:
We must advise vou to root out rthe natives 1 from 
being anv longer a people, so cursed a nation, 
ungrateful to all benefits, and uncapable of all 
goodness: at least to the removal of them so far from 
you, as you may not only be out of danger, but out of 
fear of them, of whose faith and good meaning you can 
never be secure: Wherefore as they have merited let 
them have a perpetual war without peace or truce.
. . . And because there is a necessity not only in the 
thing itself, but in the speediness of effecting it, 
we think it fit that besides that certain way of 
famishing (whereunto we doubt not but you have ere 
this given a good beginning by the burning of their 
corn, or the reaping it to your own benefit) you add 
and put in execution all other ways and means of their 
destruction. (emphasis added)
These "ways and means" included provoking the natives to fight
each other by offering rewards for "the bringing in of their
heads" and always maintaining groups of colonists "that may
from time to time . . . pursue and follow [the natives]
surprising them in their habitations, intercepting them in
their hunting, burning their towns, demolishing their temples,
destroying their canoes, plucking up their weares, carrying
away their corn, and depriving them of whatsoever may yield
55 Kingsbury, Records of the Virginia Company. Vol. 3, 
556-58, 541-64, passim.
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them succor or relief." The company's instructions also 
contained two provisions for obtaining native servants and 
slaves. One was the advice to the colonists to spare the 
young people, "whose bodies may, by labor and service, become 
profitable" and who could be anglicized in the process. These 
young servants were to be given to the colony's soldiers as a 
reward. Second, the company proposed that the sale of native 
slaves could help finance the colony's defense.56 In addition 
to setting forth the conduct of the war, in the same set of 
instructions, the Virginia Company in London also made clear 
that the colony's mission to Christianize the native peoples 
was over. The need for revenge necessitated "the condemnation 
of their [the natives'] bodies," rather than any continued 
effort to save their souls. Demonstrating that company 
members had no intention of trying to resolve the underlying 
tension with the native peoples caused by the expansion of the 
colony unto more and more of the natives' lands, the company 
announced plans to send many hundreds more settlers to 
Virginia.57
The warfare decreed by the company meets every criteria 
of genocide: it was deliberate, total, and targeted all Native 
Americans on the basis that they were "Indians," all of whom 
the English perceived to be enemies and aliens. The tactics 
prescribed resulted in the deaths of women, children, and
56 Robinson, Virginia Treaties. 43-44.
57 Ibid. , 41, 43.
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elderly men as well as warriors, and the colonizers' express 
purpose was to terminate the natives existence as a people. 
Although the company claimed that removal could sufficiently 
protect the colony, it is clear from their mandated means to 
prosecute the war that mass destruction of the native peoples 
would result. If any natives survived, they could be placed 
on land too far from the colony to pose any threat, but saving 
them was not the company's goal. Rather, revenge and security 
for the colony were the ends to be achieved by any means.
For the next decade, the colonists followed the 
company's orders for war. Even when the company lost control 
of the colony to the Crown in 1624, warfare continued unabated 
and unrestricted by any royal decrees. Shortly after 
receiving the August instructions, the Council in Virginia 
sent a letter back to London, reporting on the progress of the 
war. "We have anticipated your desires by setting upon the 
Indians in all places," the Council stated, and "by 
computation and confession of the Indians themselves we have 
slain more of them this year than hath been slain before since 
the beginning of the colony." Although the natives proved 
difficult to destroy "with the sword by reason of their 
swiftness of foot," the Council promised to "constantly pursue 
their extirpation" "by the way of starving and all other means 
that we can possibly devise."58
After this first year had passed, the colony settled
58 Ibid., 46.
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into a pattern of officially declared campaigns conducted two 
or three times a year. The General Assembly levied taxes to 
pay for these campaigns and provided that any colonists 
wounded or disabled would be cared for at the public's 
expense. For the colonists, combining the tactics of force of 
arms with starvation served a dual purpose: They obliterated 
their enemy and seized the natives' corn to satisfy their own 
hunger. Consistently, the governor and Council issued orders 
which show not only how alien the native peoples had become in 
their own land, but also how important it was for the 
authorities to maintain the enmity between the individual 
colonists and the native people. In May 162 3, Governor Wyatt 
issued a "Proclamation to be careful of the savages' 
treachery" in which he outlawed any private "parley" between 
settler and native and authorized commanders to "shoot or kill 
by any means" any native who shall "stand out." Five years 
later, in January 1628, the governor and Council, fearing that 
the colonists had become too lax in their defense, nullified 
a five-month old peace treaty with the Native Americans and 
ordered that a state of "enmity and wars with all the Indians" 
be maintained. They then reiterated the prohibition against 
conversing with any native and decreed that the colonists 
should kill all natives on sight. In 1631 an act of the Grand 
Assembly declared the "Indians" to be the "irreconcilable
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enemies" of the colony.59
While expressing fear of the natives' "treachery," the 
colonists did not hesitate to act treacherously themselves. 
In April 1623, the Council ostensibly accepted a peace accord 
offered by a group of natives who promised to return English 
prisoners in exchange for peace so they could plant some badly 
needed corn. In a letter to London, however, the Council 
declared that it had no intention of honoring the peace. 
Rather, it saw the accord as a chance to learn where the 
natives planted their corn so that once the natives had grown 
"secure upon the treaty, we shall have the better advantage 
both to surprise them, and to cut down their corn." Again in 
1628, the Council agreed to make another false peace accord in 
order to obtain the release of prisoners.60
The colonists considered no tactic too ruthless to 
utilize in their campaign of extermination. On May 12, 1623, 
Captain William Tucker, acting under authority of the 
governor, met with a group of Pamunkeys supposedly to 
"conclude a peace." When the tribe agreed to a treaty, Tucker 
passed around deliberately poisoned wine and two hundred 
native people dropped dead. On the return trip, Tucker and 
his men killed another fifty natives, including two kings, 
this time with weapons, and "brought home part of their
59 Robinson, Virginia Treaties. 49; Mcllwaine, Minutes of 
the Council. 184-85; Hening, The Statutes at Large. Vol. 1, 
176.
60 Robinson, Virginia Treaties. 48, 54.
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heads.11 An incident which demonstrates the extent to which 
the colonists placed all "Indians" outside the "universe of 
obligation" occurred in October 1627 when a Captain Sampson 
arrived in Virginia with a group of natives from the Caribbean 
Islands. Perhaps planning to sell them into slavery, Sampson 
found himself faced with a colony which wanted no more 
"Indians" in its midst. He then turned them over to the Court 
"to dispose of them as [it] shall please." Reporting that 
members had heard rumors that these Caribbean natives were 
running away and attempting to join the Virginia tribes and 
that some of them had stolen goods and "attempted to kill some 
of our people," the Court expressed fear that they "may 
hereafter be a means to overthrow the whole colony." To solve 
the dilemma, the Court ordered that these Caribbean natives be 
seized immediately and "hanged til they be dead."61
The colonists extended their loathing and mistrust to 
all Native Americans, no matter what their tribal affiliation. 
While occasionally they appeared to form an alliance with some 
of the fringe tribes of the Powhatan group, this was a tactic 
to attempt to use inter-tribal tensions to the colony's 
advantage by joining forces with the fringe to fight the core. 
For instance, in 1625, the colonists heard that the 
Patawomecks were resisting Opechancanough's rule and tried to 
get them to fight on the English side. Although the 
Patawomecks and a force from the colony joined to fight a
61 Fein, "Scenarios of Genocide," 4; Robinson, Virginia 
Treaties, 50; Mcllwaine, Minutes of the Council. 155.
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northern tribe to obtain corn, the Patawomecks insisted on 
remaining neutral towards Opechancanough. Finally, colonial 
forces turned on the Patawomecks, killing some of them and 
taking as prisoners the weroance, his son, and some others. 
The only exception the colonists made to their policy to 
"wholly extirpate" the native population was to accept into 
the colony any individual native who "desired[d] our 
friendship and protection, the first step to their 
conversion." These were natives who, at least in English 
eyes, were essentially abandoning their "Indianness" and could 
be brought into English ways, thus effecting a cultural 
genocide. The "Indians" would disappear as a people even 
though individuals would live on, "remade" into English men 
and women. How many natives actually entered the colony in 
this way is not known; however, those who did probably became 
servants while they were being "anglicized.1,62
Despite the waging of war, the colony was experiencing 
economic success with a tobacco boom which was at its height 
between 1623 and 163 0. The potential for wealth sparked greed 
and a credo among the successful planters, who generally held 
political as well as economic power in the colony, that 
allowed for the exploitation of servants to a degree which 
would have been intolerable in England.63 In 1626 William
62 Rountree, Pocahontas's People. 75-6; Robinson, Virginia 
Treaties, 53, xxii.
63 Morgan, "First American Boom," 177, 193; Morgan,
American Slavery. American Freedom. 123, 127, 129.
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Claiburn approached colonial officials with an "invention" 
which would be "an assured way and means . . . for safekeeping 
of any Indians, which he shall undertake to keep for guides 
always ready to be employed." Claiburn added that he hoped 
"to make them [the natives] serviceable for many other 
services for the good of the whole colony." The officials 
awarded him exclusive rights to his invention plus a native 
man with whom to begin.64
Surviving records provide no details on the nature of 
his "invention" or its success, but apparently the hope of 
forcing the native population to work had waned by this time, 
and the records do show that the colony's primary labor source 
in this decade were poor whites who came as indentured 
servants. While the need for native labor had served at times 
as a functional restraint on the colonists' desire to 
physically eliminate the native people, this restraint 
disappeared at the same time as economic success spurred the 
colonists' drive for more land and resources, encouraging them 
to take what they wanted from the natives no matter what the 
human cost. Furthermore, the promise of wealth and the need 
for laborers continued to bring more English into Virginia, 
putting an additional squeeze on the natives. By 1625, the 
colony had recouped its losses from the Powhatan rebellion, 
having reached a population of 1,3 00. Just four years later, 
the population had doubled to about 2,600, and in 1632 the
64 Mcllwaine, Minutes of the Council. 111.
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colony numbered about 3,200 settlers.65 In a portent of a 
problem that would continue to plague the colony for the next 
fifty years and only find solution in the institution of Black 
slavery which replaced the need for White indentured servants, 
the governor and Council, meeting in January 1626, discussed 
how to handle the many servants and tenants who would be freed 
during the year, expecting to have their own land to settle. 
The Council decided to give these former servants and tenants 
leases for plots of the "common lands as yet untaken up by any 
adventurers or planters."66
For the big planters, the tobacco boom produced an 
insatiable need for more land— for themselves and for their 
servants whom they would eventually have to set free. These 
men knew that without land to promise, it would be much harder 
to acquire the laborers they needed and that, furthermore, if 
these servants became the landless poor after serving their 
indenture, the colony could face turmoil.67 Economic success 
and the colony's security depended on the acquisition of 
native land. Thus, the tobacco boom helped to fuel the war of 
extermination against the native peoples. As the colony 
looked to produce enough to make itself self-sustaining and as 
the White poor from England filled the need for laborers after
65 Morgan, American Slavery. American Freedom. 13 6; 
Rountree, Pocahontas's People. 78.
66 Mcllwaine, Minutes of the Council. 135-36.
67 Morgan, American Slavery. American Freedom. 237-40; 
381-83.
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the natives had been found wanting, the colonists had no
reason to want the natives alive and every reason to
exterminate those who stood in their way. Once rid of the
Native Americans, land and security would be theirs. As
Governor Wyatt pronounced, it was "infinitely better to have 
no heathen among us, who at best were as thorns in our sides, 
than to be at peace or league with them."68
In 1629, the Assembly finally authorized action on a 
plan which had been discussed for at least five years to clear 
the native people out of the lower peninsula. Fifty acres of 
land was provided for any many who would settle at a point on 
the York River known as Cheskiack. In 1632, the offer was 
extended to land about halfway up the peninsula at a point 
called Middle Plantation (later the site of Williamsburg). 
The Assembly took the last step to secure the area by an act 
passed in 163 3 which established a labor levy of one man in 
every forty living on the peninsula below Middle Plantation in 
order to build the necessary fortifications. By 1634, the 
English had succeeded in driving the native peoples out of the 
area and so claimed an additional 300,000 acres as their own. 
Twelve years later they seized the rest of the peninsula as 
well.69 The forced appropriation of land without payment 
occurred frequently in colonial Virginia, although land
68 Wyatt, "Letter of Sir Francis Wyatt," 118.
69 Craven, The Southern Colonies. 163, 173-74; Hening, The 
Statutes at Large. Vol. 1, 208-09.
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purchases also took place.70
The Powhatan tribes tried forcefully to resist the 
colonists, but their fighting strength diminished quickly, and 
they waged few offensive forays after 1624.71 Success in war 
and in the acquisition of the lower peninsula made the 
Virginia colonists feel more secure. Finally, in September 
1632, the colony agreed to a peace treaty with the Pamunkeys 
and Chickahominies, which brought an end to the decade of 
warfare. The Virginia authorities continued to warn the 
settlers, however, not to trust the natives.72
In the ten years from the rebellion in 1622 until the 
peace accord in 1632, the Native Americans had suffered great 
losses in life and land at the hands of the colonists. There 
is no record of the exact death toll, but the indigenous 
population was continually in drastic decline due to the 
colonists/ attacks and destruction of crops and the spread of 
European diseases. The psychological stress of the English 
invasion which the natives had experienced in the earlier 
years must have intensified, wrought by physical and spiritual 
crises as unknown diseases and superior firepower cut down 
their people and their gods and priests seemed unable to 
protect them. The relentless advance of the colonists meant 
that the native peoples could no longer pursue their
70 Robinson, Virginia Treaties, xxi-xxii.
71 Rountree, Pocahontas's People. 80.
72 Mcllwaine, Minutes of the Council. 480.
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traditional way of farming, hunting, and gathering on their 
homelands, causing not only a loss of livelihood but a 
cultural decline as well. Psychological, spiritual, and 
cultural strain probably contributed to the natives' inability 
to fight against the English advance.73
As was true of the peace of 1614, the peace of 1632 did 
not reduce the enmity between Native Americans and the English 
colonists. In the records of the Council and the General 
Court, the colonists still referred to the natives as "our 
irreconcilable enemies." In 1635, some of the colony's most 
powerful men revolted against Governor John Harvey, partly out 
of their anger that he had made a "dangerous peace" with the 
native tribes against the advice of Council. They accused 
Harvey of ulterior motives for making the peace, claiming that 
he and some "Marylanders" had a monopoly on the profitable 
corn trade.74
Frederick Fausz has incorrectly assessed the 1622 to 
1632 war and its aftermath. He believes that the English 
never intended to annihilate the Native Americans during the 
war but sought to contain the tribes which threatened them 
while building advantageous relationships with others. He 
then maintains that the postwar period ushered in a "pragmatic 
era of intercultural relations." Supporting his arguments by
73 Crosby, The Columbian Exchange. 45, 56.
74 Mcllwaine, Minutes of the Council. 484; Robinson, 
Virginia Treaties. 60; Morgan, American Slavery. American 
Freedom, 145.
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citing the fur trade and the colonists' attempts to take 
advantage of the enmity between certain native tribes, Fausz 
fails to understand that these instances are examples of 
functional restraints on genocidal practices rather than any 
indication of practical, intercultural relationships. Without 
acknowledging that he is contradicting himself, Fausz accepts 
that the English eventually decided to eliminate the native 
tribes who lived closest to them, yet he implies that the fact 
that certain colonists were profiting from the fur trade with 
other native tribes shows some sort of intercultural respect. 
In doing so, he ignores the pattern of the colonists to use 
the natives whenever it was profitable and to destroy them 
when it was not.75
For the next twelve years, the colony continued to grow 
in population and in territory. It was during these years 
that the number of White settlers surpassed the number of 
native people. In 1634, there were approximately 5,200 
colonists, and by 1640 there were about 8,100. In the 
meantime, it is estimated that the native population had 
declined to fewer than 5,000.76 The combination of increasing 
numbers and the ongoing requirement of fresh land for tobacco 
drove the expansion of the colony, which proceeded to take 
control of the rest of the James River area and then pushed 
north. By 1643, planters had claimed land as far north as the
75 Fausz, "Patterns of Anglo-Indian Aggression," 246-7, 
226, 249, 252.
76 Rountree, Pocahontas's People. 78-9.
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Potomac River, although most did not actually begin settlement 
of the Rappahannock-Potomac area until a few years later. The 
Eastern Shore also began to fall rapidly into English hands. 
Colonial officials encouraged the spread of settlements by 
granting tracts of land for which the owners would pay 
quitrents. The fact that they were giving away the homelands 
of the indigenous people did not matter to the English as they 
refused to recognize the natives' sovereign right to the land; 
they offered compensation to the natives for only some of the 
land they took.77 Envisioning the need for even greater 
expansion, in 164 3 the Assembly authorized exploration of land 
southwest of the Appomattox River.78
An aging Opechancanough watched in dismay the 
colonists' advance, which had already resulted in the 
disappearance of several of the Powhatan tribes. Once again 
while appearing to acquiesce, the last great weroance of the 
Powhatans was actually refusing to surrender. Among the 
surviving tribes of the Powhatan, Opechancanough found 
simmering resentment and a will to resist, which he used to 
organize a final mass rebellion.79 On April 18, 1644, the
Native Americans rose up with fury for a second time. 
Although few records about the rebellion exist, it appears to 
have been short in duration but extensive in casualties.
77 Ibid. , 81-3.
78 Robinson, Southern Colonial Frontier. 55.
79 Lurie, "Indian Cultural Adjustment," 51.
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Native warriors killed approximately four hundred colonists 
and seized many prisoners. For whatever reason, however, they 
did not sustain their revolt. It is not clear whether 
Opechancanough intended genocide in this attack or whether he 
hoped to use a massacre to terrorize the English into leaving 
or at least stemming their advance. Although the number of 
English casualties was higher in actual number than in 1622, 
they were less proportionately, and a stronger colony was 
better able to withstand the attack.80
Unlike 1622, this time the colony responded quickly. 
On June 1, 1644, the General Assembly issued a declaration of 
war, stating that the colony would "forever abandon all forms 
of peace and familiarity with the whole Nation and will to the 
utmost of our power pursue and root out those which have 
anyway had their hands in the shedding of our blood and 
‘massacring of our people." Adopting starvation as a tactic, 
the Assembly ordered that "we use our utmost endeavors to cut 
down the Indians corn generally this summer in all places 
subject to Opechancanough." Demonstrating again that all 
native people were the enemy, the order added that, in 
addition to the Powhatan, the war "be persecuted as far as our 
abilities and ammunition shall enable us thereunto.1,81 
Furthermore, the decision to starve the native peoples meant 
that the colonists were not engaged in traditional warfare
80 Rountree, Pocahontas's People. 84; Robinson, Virginia 
Treaties. 30.
81 Robinson, Virginia Treaties. 63.
which is limited to combatants. Rather, starvation was a sure 
means to annihilate an entire people— men, women, and 
children.
By late summer, the colonists' offensive was in full 
force with a march against the Pamunkeys and Chickahominies. 
Assaults on other tribes followed.82 Also that summer the 
Assembly dispatched Governor William Berkeley to England to 
seek assistance for the prosecution of the war. In the winter 
of 1645, the Assembly initiated a program of building along 
the frontier. Since the colony lacked the finances to sustain 
these forts, the Assembly granted the forts and adjoining 
lands to individuals who agreed to operate them and maintain 
ready fighting forces.83 The forts made it easier to carry 
out the many-faceted assault against the native peoples, as 
indicated by the Act calling for the erection of Fort Henry at 
the falls of the Appomattox. The presence of this fort, the 
Assembly said, would prevent "the great relief and subsistence 
to the savages by fishing" and also make possible "the cutting
down their corn or performing any other service upon them."84
Since England was preoccupied with problems at home, 
Governor Berkeley returned to the colony in June 1645 without 
the assistance he had sought. Shortly thereafter, Opechan­
canough sent word to the governor and Council that he desired
82 Rountree, Pocahontas's People. 84-85.
83 Robinson, Southern Colonial Frontier. 49; Neill,
Virginia Carolorum. 187.
84 Hening, The Statutes at Large. Vol. 1, 315.
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to negotiate a peace. Although the Council reported that it 
accepted the offer, apparently no peace conference took 
place.85 Instead, Governor Berkeley took command of an
expedition against the natives "with considerable success, 
taking many prisoners; all of whom, over eleven years of age, 
it was decided . . .  to send, in Sir William's ship to the 
Western Island."86 Other expeditions against the natives
followed. In March 1646, the Grand Assembly determined that 
since the natives were now "dispersed and driven from their 
towns and habitations, lurking up and down the woods in small 
numbers" so that "further revenge" was "almost" impossible, it 
would be to the best interests of the colony to make peace 
with Opechancanough. They armed and sent out a group of sixty 
men led by Governor Berkeley to carry out "any occasional war" 
for the purpose of bringing Opechancanough to a peace
conference.87 Apparently believing that their campaign to 
destroy the Native Americans was successful, the House of
I
Burgesses concluded that "the savage king . . . is so n
abandoned by his people, and they so routed and dispersed, 
that they are no longer a nation, and we now suffer only from | 
robbery of a few starved outlaws whom by God's assistance, we 
doubt not to root out in another year" (emphasis added) .88
85 Neill, Virginia Carolorum. 188-89.
86 Mcllwaine, Minutes of the Council. 564.
87 Hening, The Statutes at Large. Vol. 1, 317-19.
88 Neill, Virginia Carolorum. 191-92.
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Unyielding to the end, Opechancanough refused to accept the 
governor's plan, and so Berkeley took him prisoner. Old and 
physically weak, Opechancanough must have realized that his 
people were defeated and the once-powerful Powhatan paramount 
chiefdom was destroyed, but he would not capitulate. While 
imprisoned in Jamestown, Opechancanough was killed by a 
vengeful English guard.
The colonists concluded a peace treaty in October 1646 
with Opechancanough's successor, Necotowance. This treaty was 
a milestone in Native-White relations in English North America 
as it established several important precedents. The Powhatan 
paramount chiefdom was broken, and the individual tribes 
reduced to tributary status. The natives agreed to give 
allegiance to the English king and to allow the appointment of 
their future chiefs by the Virginia governor. In return for 
yearly tribute of twenty beaver skins, the colonists agreed to 
provide protection for the natives. With this provision, the 
colony decided to forego its earlier plan to make alliances 
with the tribes farthest away. The treaty, furthermore, 
established a boundary line^ demarcating land for the Native 
Americans from the colonists' territory, a system which set 
the stage for the later development of reservations and
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recognized the natives' right to use the land, although not to 
own it. The Native Americans were to reside north of the York 
River, but the governor and Council could authorize English 
settlements in part of that area as long as they notified 
Necotowance in advance. No native was permitted to enter the
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land between the York and James Rivers, from the falls to 
Kequotan, and it was lawful "for any person to kill" any 
"Indians" who "do repair to or make any abode upon the said 
tract of land." If it was necessary for a native messenger to 
travel through that territory, he would have to wear a striped 
coat which he could acquire at one of the forts. Necotowance 
agreed to return all English prisoners, "negroes and guns," 
and all native servants who ran away to their tribes. The 
colonists once again provided for any native child under the 
age of twelve to come to live with them, but mandated the 
death penalty for any English person who "entertained" or 
"concealed" any other natives. The English paid no 
compensation to the native tribes for the land they 
acquired.89
The treaty of 1646 marked the end of the union of 
tribes in the Powhatan paramount chiefdom. As Helen Rountree 
writes, "The Powhatans were soon isolated on ever-shrinking 
islands of tribal territory, their supratribal organization 
all but extinct." In the following years, loss of 
independence broke several individual tribes as well.90 By 
bringing the natives increasingly under colonial domination, 
the treaty worked insidiously to undermine their ability to 
resist the usurpation of their resources and the decimation of 
their way of life. Beholden to colonial officials for their
89 Robinson, Virginia Treaties. 68-70.
90 Rountree, Pocahontas's People. 89.
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positions of leadership, tribal chiefs had to act within the
bounds of conduct proscribed by the English or risk removal.
Even if a weroance/weroansqua could work within the English
system to gain something for his or her people, over time such
strategies would result only in greater dependence on the
colonizers. Historian Steve Stern's analysis of what happened
to the natives of Peru under Spanish colonial rule is
applicable also to what happened to the natives in Virginia.
As Stern writes:
A strategy of defense which depended upon colonial 
institutions to resist exploitation tied the natives 
more effectively than ever to Hispanic power. . . .
Indians who won limited but important victories by 
securing the favor of colonials and their institutions 
held a certain interest in avoiding wholesale 
challenges of authority which invited punishment or 
revocation of their achievements.
[T]o the extent that reliance on a juridical system 
becomes a dominant strategy of protection for an 
oppressed class or social group, it may undermine the 
possibility of organizing a more ambitious assault 
aimed at toppling the exploitative structure itself.
When this happens, a functioning system of justice 
contributes to the hegemony of a ruling class.91
Ten years after the treaty, Cockacoeske became the weroansqua
of the Pamunkeys, and she tried assiduously to re-establish
the Powhatan tribal union by working within the colonial legal
establishment. Although historian Martha McCartney may be
right that Cockacoeske was a leader of "considerable influence
and political acumen," there is no evidence to support
McCartney's contention that this weroansqua succeeded in
"turn[ing] the English political system to her own people's
91 Stern, Peru's Indian Peoples. 135, 137.
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advantage."92 Rather the native people continued to decline, 
and no tribal union took place. Working within the colonial 
system doomed Cockacoeske's intentions from the start because 
by so doing she was implicitly legitimizing English rule and 
because the system would never tolerate the renewal of native 
strength. Such was the stranglehold of the treaty, however, 
that should Cockacoeske have chosen to resist the English, she 
probably would have wrought her own doom.
For almost the next two decades, the colonists 
manifested their confidence that they had succeeded in 
subjugating at least the Native Americans in and near the 
occupied territory by passing several legislative acts which 
contained provisions ostensibly to protect the natives and to 
entice them to adopt English ways.93 As at other times when 
they did not feel physically threatened by the Native 
Americans, the colonists relaxed their efforts to physically 
annihilate the natives and turned more to anglicization as a 
non-lethal means to terminate the natives' existence as a 
people.
At the same time, despite mandating a boundary line 
between the land the natives could live on and the land for 
English settlement, the treaty in reality became a license for 
the unbridled expansion of the colony. In this way, it set 
the pattern of treaty abrogation by Whites which continued for
92 McCartney, "Cockacoeske,” 173, 176.
93 Craven, The Southern Colonies. 364-69.
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the next several centuries. The great irony of the treaty was 
that while it purported to reserve land for use by the native 
inhabitants it instead resulted in the near end of native 
homelands in Virginia. As Wesley Frank Craven stated, "The 
peace of 1646 had been made on the eve of one of the most 
important periods of expansion in Virginia's history."94
The treaty's prohibition of settlement by the English 
on the north side of the York River was doomed to be short­
lived. Ever hungry for more land on which to grow tobacco, 
settlers soon pushed into the area between the Rappahannock 
and the Potomac Rivers, winning the approval of the House of 
Burgesses and governor, who in 1648 repealed the restrictions 
on settlement in the area and established Northumberland 
County. Soon the House of Burgesses and Governor Berkeley 
bowed to the demands for an end to the York River restriction 
as well by formally revoking the boundary line on September 1, 
1649.95 Within three years, so many English had established 
themselves in the area that the colony formed three new 
counties: Gloucester, Lancaster, and Westmoreland.96 By
1653, the colony's White population was about 14,3 00, and the 
rate of growth was accelerating. In 1699, fewer than fifty 
years later,, the White population had more than quadrupled to
94 Rountree, Pocahontas's People. 88; Craven, The Southern 
Colonies, 363.
95 Hening, The Statutes at Large. Vol. 1, 352-54.
96 Craven, The Southern Colonies. 364.
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The steady northward advance of settlement and the 
continuing decline of the native population in the area caused 
a shift in the locus of the fur trade from the upper 
Chesapeake to the western and southern frontiers of the 
colony. In 1650, Abraham Wood, a major figure in the fur 
trade, led an expedition from Fort Henry, on the site of 
present-day Petersburg, southwest to the falls of the Roanoke 
River. The fur trade thrived in areas beyond settlements, so 
the Englishmen involved in it relied on Native Americans who 
were not yet in the way of the land-hungry planters. Since 
the traders needed the Native Americans who supplied the furs 
and since some of the traders were powerful men in the colony, 
the tribes involved in the trade received some protection from 
abuse. Trade provided another functional restraint on the
colonists' drive to physically destroy the native peoples. As 
long as they felt that the colony's security would not be 
threatened, the English were ready to profit from the natives 
when they could. When economic tensions destabilized the
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colonial society later in the century, however, this 
functional restraint, and the concomitant protections for the 
natives involved in the trade, disappeared.98
In general, between 1646 and 1663^official policy in
_.. . X, II-M   ^
the colony offered protection from flagrant violence and
97 Morgan, American Slavery. American Freedom. 404.
98 Robinson, Southern Colonial Frontier. 55; Craven, The 
Southern Colonies. 362, 369.
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unfair practices to all Native Americans in the colony, not 
just those involved in the fur trade. Laws passed by the
w .        , ,if i  ........^
Grand Assembly reflected the colonists' confidence that the 
^Native Americans no longer were able to threaten their well- 
"being and advancement and their belief that a policy of 
pacification and anglicization was the best means to assure 
the colony's continued security. These were tactical 
decisions, as underlying English attitudes towards the native 
people had not changed: The colonists continued to refer to
them as "the common enemy."99
During the legislative session which lasted from March 
1655 to December 1656, the Grand Assembly passed several acts 
concerning Native Americans which set the stage for a series 
of similar enactments over the next eight years. The Assembly 
prefaced many of these acts with an acknowledgement that the 
settlers' constant pressure on the natives, "taking away their 
land and forcing them into such narrow straights and places 
that they cannot subsist either by planting or hunting," had 
provoked some of the natives to violence and threatened the 
peace and prosperity of the colony. The first act in this 
series, passed in March 1656, set forth a plan which would put 
the natives to work for the benefit of the colony, while 
providing them with the means to adopt an English way of life. 
Every time a native brought in eight wolves' heads, the 
English agreed to give his chief a cow, "a step to civilizing
99 Hening, The Statutes at Large. Vol. 1, 401.
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them and making them Christians."100
In this same act, the legislators tried to induce } 
Native American parents to turn their children over to the 
English to be brought up "in Christianity, civility and the ^
i
knowledge of necessary trades" by allowing the parents to 
choose the English person to whom they would entrust their 
children and by mandating that the children not be used as 
slaves. A short time later another act stipulated that native 
children given over to the English would be servants "for such 
a term as shall be agreed on by the said parent and master."
In the legislative session two years later, the Assembly 
established that native children serving in English households 
should be set free at age twenty-five years.101
As still another means to make the natives adopt 
English ways, the Assembly sitting in 1657-58 mandated that 
the Native Americans be granted land in a manner similar to 
the English settlers: the colony was to give each bowman fifty 
acres of land in a pattern which would form "towns" of Native 
Americans.102 The paradox of this act, by which the colonists 
were "giving" the natives land which was theirs to begin with, 
was apparently lost on the English, but for native peoples it 
marked the loss of their independence. Deepening the crisis
100 Hening, The Statutes at Large. Vol. 1, 467-68, 393-94.
101 Hening, The Statutes at Large. Vol. 1, 396, 410, 455-
56.
102 Hening, The Statutes at Large. Vol. 1, 456-57.
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of survival of the native people was the problem that private 
ownership of tracts of land was a foreign idea to them and 
corrupted their tribal way of life.
At the same time that the colony was passing laws to 
coerce the natives into the English mode, it authorized the 
killing of any native who took part in any "mischief'* on land 
claimed by the colonists. Thus, the colonists preserved their
„  _____  ... ^ - ^ . a j w t i s w j n e w w w i w s t w K i s w * * * * * ^ ^
right to physically eliminate any native who appeared 
unwilling to accept the way the English wanted him or her to 
be. Within a year, however, settlers had killed so many 
natives "though never so innocent" that the Assembly believed 
the colony faced the threat of native rebellions, "whereby we 
may probably be involved in a war for us and our posterity." 
The Assembly repealed the law and enacted a new one which
-v*f SB ■ '.JTT ■ <*»'’* * * . < - • •» ■** v, . .-I. *j!v w. .ij,
permitted the killing of native people only when they were
. ■> *■ 1 *--* .•*%*?'■ ’&&!*.-I —■■ ^>*5 • t .Kt-W ff . ••  ^ ' >,» rf-**.. .
found by the testimony of two sworn witnesses to have 
committed a felony. In another act a year later, the Grand 
Assembly prohibited settlers from kidnapping Native Americans 
for the purpose of selling them into servitude. Native 
American servitude itself was never prohibited, although in 
the legislative session of 1661-62, the Assembly limited the 
length of time that a native could be held in service to the 
same number of years that an English person served.103
In other legislative acts, the Assembly authorized 
measures ostensibly to protect the lands of the native peoples
103 Hening, The Statutes at Large. Vol. 1, 410, 415, 481- 
82; Vol. 2, 143.
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from further encroachment by settlers. First, the Assembly 
prohibited Native Americans from selling their land to 
individual colonists without the assent of the Assembly and 
later ruled that Native Americans could only sell land at 
quarter courts. In 1657-58 the Assembly stated that "all the 
Indians of this colony shall and may hold and keep those seats 
of land which they now have," adding a proviso, however, which 
allowed for English settlement on the natives' land if 
approved by the governor and Council or the commissioners. A 
few years later, in the legislative session of 1661-62, the 
Assembly passed another act which reiterated these laws 
regarding native lands because the English settlers had been 
ignoring them.104 While on the surface these laws appear to 
be for the benefit of the Native Americans, the Assembly was 
motivated more by the desire to consolidate its power- in the 
colony and to maximize its profits from land grants. All the 
laws did was to place in the government the sole authority to 
obtain land from the natives and to redistribute this land to 
English settlers. By so doing, the government assured that it 
could collect quitrents on the land which it could not do on 
land which settlers had purchased directly from the native 
inhabitants.105 The way Lancaster County officials carried 
out a 1653 act which had set aside land for the native 
inhabitants indicates that the legislature was not motivated
104 Hening, The Statutes at Large. Vol. 1, 396, 468, 467; 
Vol. 2, 138-39.
105 Rountree, Pocahontas's People. 82.
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by concern for the welfare of the native peoples. The 
Lancaster County Court ordered a force of men, "well and 
sufficiently armed with a formidable gun, powder, and shot, 
with either a sword or a pistol," to "settle" the natives into 
their allotted space.106 Despite the appearance of the laws, 
the colonists continued to use violence to push the Native 
Americans onto tracts of land to which they were unwilling to 
go. In other legislation based on the desire to control 
wealth, centralize power, and maintain security, the Assembly 
acted in 1660-61 to restrict the fur trade to those traders 
who received a commission from the governor. Stating that the 
act was necessary because unscrupulous Englishmen were 
illegally trading firearms for furs, the Assembly took control 
of the lucrative trade, giving the governor personal control 
over an important source of wealth in the colony. In still 
another way, the Grand Assembly asserted its control over 
native-White relations by forbidding contact between 
individual settlers and native people without permission from 
the proper authorities.107 The existence of this provision, 
which specifically forbade settlers from "entertaining" and 
"harboring" any natives, suggests that such activity was going 
on within the colony and that the Assembly felt the need to 
preempt it in order to maintain enmity between the two groups.
106 Robinson, Virginia Treaties. 71; Stanard, "Extracts 
From the County Records," 173-74.
107 Hening, The Statutes at Large. Vol. 2, 20; Vol. 1, 410; 
Vol. 2, 143.
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The Assembly must have feared what might happen if the natives 
became human in English eyes or if a sense of unity developed 
between the two peoples, realizing that it is easier to abuse 
or destroy a people viewed as an enemy "other" rather than as 
fellow human beings.
In other ways as well colonial officials ensured that 
the Native Americans would continue to be aliens in their own 
country. As part of the same act which forbade killing 
natives on sight for "trespass or harm," the Grand Assembly 
decreed that any native who ventured into the area of the 
colonists' plantations must carry a ticket obtainable from a 
designated settler. The "Act Concerning Indians" passed by 
the Grand Assembly in 1661-62 required native people to obtain 
a license from two county justices in order to "oyster or 
gather wild fruit," food necessary for their subsistence 
during much of the year. In this same act, the Assembly 
sought to prevent "free intercourse" between the English and 
the natives which they feared would occur due to the proximity 
of English and native settlements. Using fear as a tactic to 
keep the two peoples apart, the Assembly asserted that such 
"free intercourse" would inevitably result in "the Indians 
coming and pilfering." Supposedly to prevent this potential 
problem, the Assembly decreed that silver and copper plated 
badges "with the name of the town engraved upon them, be given 
to all the adjacent kings" and that any native who came 
"within the English bounds" must wear one of the badges or be 
with someone else who wore one. In 1662, the Crown authorized
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the establishment of special courts to hear the cases of Black 
slaves and Native Americans accused of capital crimes. These 
courts of oyer and terminer, which also heard all cases of 
treason and piracy, conducted trials in the counties rather 
than in the colonial capital and thus operated more quickly 
and cheaply. Since the colonists believed that any crimes by 
natives or slaves threatened the security of the colony, they 
wanted speedy resolution of these cases.108
The colonists realized a distinct advantage for 
themselves in keeping alive the tributary natives and enacted 
legislation to enforce it. A provision in the "Act Concerning 
Indians" of 1661-62 ordered the tributary tribes to act as 
intelligence agents for the colony by demanding the kings to 
notify the colony's militia whenever they had "the least 
notice of any march by any strange Indians near our quarters." 
The Assembly also reasoned that by offering military 
assistance to the tribes to move against these "strange 
Indians," the tributary tribes and the colony would establish 
"an equal interest in each others preservation" for the better 
security of the colony.109 When the colonists believed they 
would benefit from using some of the Native Americans against 
others, they did so; thus, at times security also acted as a 
functional restraint on their genocidal practices.
Despite these laws establishing parameters for Native
108 Hening, The Statutes at Large. Vol. 1, 415; Vol. 2, 
140-42; Robinson, "Legal Status," 251-52.
109 Hening, The Statutes at Large. Vol. 2, 142-43.
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American-White relations in Virginia in a time of relative 
peace, the colonists were quick to put down any sign of 
possible trouble from the native peoples. As the growth of 
the colony pushed the native peoples away from the rivers and 
land which provided them with food, the Rappahannocks in 
Lancaster, Northumberland, and Westmoreland counties 
apparently resisted. In 1654 the Assembly ordered a force of 
170 armed men to march against this tribe to obtain 
retribution and stipulated that the governor should then 
determine whether to declare war. In 1656 the Assembly, 
hearing reports that six-to-seven hundred "western and inland 
Indians" had settled near the falls of the James River, feared 
that "great danger might ensue to this colony." The Assembly 
resolved immediately to remove, by force if necessary, "these 
newcomer Indians" who must not be "suffered to seat themselves 
there, or any place near us, it having cost so much blood to 
expel and extirpate these perfidious and treacherous Indians 
which were there formerly." The Assembly authorized Edward 
Hill to lead a force of at least one-hundred Englishmen and 
ordered the tributary tribes to assist him in expelling the 
newcomers. Although the instructions said that Hill should 
first attempt to remove the natives "without making war," a 
bloody battle took place in which many of the tributary 
natives were killed, including the chief. Although the 
Assembly criticized Hill for his handling of the situation, it 
allowed him to stay in command. Finally, in April 1657, the 
colonial militia succeeded in ousting the natives. As another
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way to maintain control and force submission of the native 
people, the colony also severely punished individual natives 
for alleged transgressions. In 1660 the Assembly ordered that 
if some natives failed to compensate a settler for "wrongs 
done to him," these natives should be sold into slavery in a 
foreign country, with the profits of the sale going to the 
settler.110
In 1662 the Assembly acted to counter a perceived 
threat to the security and economy of the Virginia colony from 
the "Susquehannock and other northern Indians." Problems with 
these northern tribes were leading to an end to the relatively 
peaceful interlude in Native American-White relations. At 
this point, however, the Assembly tried to prevent any 
"dangerous consequence" and interference with the colony's 
trade with its "neighboring and tributary Indians" by 
prohibiting "all Marylanders, English and Indians" and "all 
other Indians to the northward of Maryland from trucking, 
trading, bartering, or dealing with any English or Indians to 
the southward of that place." By September 1663, the tensions 
between the colonists and the northern Native Americans had 
not only increased but spread to the Patawomecks, a tributary 
tribe and one-time member of the former Powhatan paramount 
chiefdom. Claiming that the Patawomecks and other northern 
tribes had given some "cause of jealousy to the English," the
110 Craven, The Southern Colonies. 364; Robinson, Virginia 
Treaties, 72; Hening, The Statutes at Large. Vol. 1, 402-03; 
Neill, Virginia Carolorum, 245; Rountree, Pocahontas's People. 
93; Hening, The Statutes at Large. Vol. 2, 15-16.
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Assembly demanded that the tribes "deliver such hostages of 
their children or others as shall be required." If the tribes 
refused to turn over these hostages, the colony would declare 
them enemies and treat them accordingly.111
In the same act, the Assembly mandated that in the 
event of any injury or death to an English person at the hands 
of a native from one of the northern tribes, the tribe nearest 
the site of the crime would be held responsible for turning 
over the "criminal," and if it did not, the colony would hold 
the entire tribe responsible. This notion that all Native 
Americans could be held responsible for the alleged 
transgression of one individual served two purposes: one was 
to continue the colonists' view of Native Americans as a group 
rather than as individuals, and the second was to help the 
colonists control the natives through threats of retaliation 
and the fostering of disunity and mistrust among the native 
people. Furthermore, the Assembly instigated dissension among 
the native inhabitants by ordering these tribes to pursue 
aggressively any "strange Indians" who might enter their land 
and specifically instructing the Patawomacks and other tribes 
to track down the Doegs, who had confessed to killing some 
settlers, and turn them over to the English. These acts 
apparently did nothing to stop the problems along the 
frontiers of the colony, and may have spurred the natives to 
increasingly resist, as the Assembly recorded in September
111 Hening, The Statutes at Large. Vol. 2, 153, 193.
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1664 that natives had committed several murders of settlers on 
the frontier plantations. In response, a new act required 
that four able-bodied and armed settlers would be necessary to 
plant any new frontier settlement.112
Economic woes in the colony which began in the 1660s 
and were brought on by lower tobacco prices and stricter trade 
laws increased the unease and tension among the settlers. As 
societies often do during times of decline, the colonists 
sought a scapegoat for their troubles. Since the downturn 
coincided with more frequent incursions into the colony by 
"foreign" native tribes, which added to the colonists' sense 
of insecurity, the Native Americans easily became this 
scapegoat. Focusing their anger first at the "foreign" 
tribes, the colonists gradually targeted all Native Americans- 
-friendly and foreign— for revenge.113
By 1665, the growing hostility of the English settlers 
manifested itself in a stringent "Act Concerning Indians." In 
this legislation, the Assembly extended to all Native 
Americans its 1663 law holding that among the northern tribes 
the nearest Native American tribe was responsible for any 
crimes of violence committed against an English person. 
Furthermore, the act now specifically stated that "if any 
Englishman is murdered, the next town shall be answerable for 
it with their lives or liberties to the use of the public."
112 Hening, The Statutes at Large. Vol. 2, 193-94, 209.
113 Rountree, Pocahontas's People. 94-96.
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The Assembly then took away the right of the native tribes to 
select their own weroances, mandating instead that the 
colony's governor "shall constitute and authorize such person 
in whose fidelity [he] may find greatest cause to repose a 
confidence to be the commander of the respective towns." 
Chastising the settlers for their carelessness in going 
unarmed into "churches, courts, and other public meeting," the 
Assembly authorized the militia "to take care to prevent the 
same." Lastly, the Assembly reiterated the ban on harboring, 
entertaining, or employing any native person.114
By 1666, the English once again began to express the
desire to exterminate the Native Americans. A key development
in the deteriorating relations between Native Americans and
Whites occurred that year when Governor Berkeley, in a letter
to General Robert Smith, wrote:
I think it is necessary to destroy all these Northern 
Indians— for they must needs be conscious of the 
coming of these other Indians. Twill be a great 
terror and example and instruction to all other 
Indians. If you the Council near you and the Council 
of war be of this opinion it may be done without 
charge for the women and children will defray it.115
Although it is not clear from the records, Berkeley was
probably targeting the "northern Indians" referred to in the
1665 laws, which included tributary and heretofore "friendly"
tribes such as the Patawomecks, in order to prevent their
114 Hening, The Statutes at Large. Vol. 2, 218.
115 Sweeney, "Some References to Indians," 591; Rountree, 
Pocahontas's People. 95; Mcllwaine, Minutes of the Council. 
510, 488-89.
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alliance with the troublesome Doegs. Regardless of the 
specific, tribes which were the subject of the governor's 
letter, it contains three critical points: (1) a call by the
highest colonial official to annihilate a group of Native 
Americans; (2) a plan to use this annihilation to terrorize 
other natives into submission; and (3) a proposition to sell 
native women and children into slavery to finance the military 
campaign. Berkeley received an enthusiastic response to his 
letter. The justices of Rappahannock County stated that the 
Doegs and other northern tribes in conjunction with "our 
neighbor Indians above" were responsible for various 
"execrable murders" and that the county now planned "to 
destroy and eradicate [these tribes] without further 
encouragement than the spoils of our enemies." A month later 
in July 1666, the governor and his Council declared "a war of 
extermination" against several of the northern tribes to 
revenge several killings of settlers and to prevent "future 
mischiefs." The Council targeted the towns of the Nansemonds 
and Portobaccos and the "whole nation" of the Doegs and 
Patawomecks for "utter destruction if possible" and called for 
the native women and children "to be disposed of" according to 
the governor's instructions. Quite possibly, the colonists 
succeeded in obliterating the Patawomecks as they disappeared 
from the historical record after that date.116
116 Sweeney, "Some References to Indians," 591; Rountree, 
Pocahontas's People. 95; Mcllwaine, Minutes of the Council. 
510, 488-89.
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A few months later, in October 1666, the Assembly 
admitted that its prior act holding native towns responsible 
for murders committed near them was "too full of severity" to 
carry out without at least some basis for guilt, but declared 
that other measures were necessary to prevent "like 
insolencies and murders." It then resurrected the old proviso 
of the 1646 treaty permitting any settler to kill on the spot 
any native caught in territory claimed by the colony who was 
not serving as a messenger or in some other form of public 
employment permitted by the governor. This act authorized 
such killings in the frontier county of Henrico but stipulated 
that, if successful, the Assembly could extend the law to 
other places. Furthermore, the act called for the governor to 
forcibly "reduce" to a "conformable obedience" any 
"refractory" natives.117
By the late 1660s, the colony's repressive measures had 
effectively reduced Native American incursions into English 
settlements.118 In 1671 the Assembly felt secure enough to 
repeal the act of 1666 which had authorized the killing of 
natives caught "trespassing" in Henrico County, and in 1674, 
passed another act designed to protect the lands assigned to 
Native Americans from further encroachments by English 
settlers. This act not only reiterated the prohibition 
against natives selling their land to individual settlers, but
117 Hening, The Statutes at Large. Vol. 2, 237-38.
118 Rountree, Pocahontas's People. 96.
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also specifically barred colonists from leasing land from the 
native inhabitants. Yet during this brief reprieve in the war 
of extermination, the Assembly, in October 1670, approved a 
statute which underscored the ongoing relegation of the Native 
Americans to alien and inferior status. Although in practice 
Native Americans had already been forced into slavery, for the 
first time, the law of the colony established that non- 
Christian native people "imported into this colony by shipping 
shall be slaves for their lives" (emphasis added). Other 
natives who came to the colony by land could be held in 
servitude until thirty years of age, if obtained as children, 
and for a limit of twelve years, if obtained as adults.119
During the years since the 164 6 treaty, the Native 
American population had continued its precipitous decline; by 
1669 there were an estimated 2,900 people left in the tribes 
which had once formed the Powhatan paramount chiefdom. 
Violent attacks by the English and continuing epidemics of 
European diseases contributed to the decline. Since even the 
records left by the English testify to the fact that the 
native population had lost significant sources of food due to 
their shrinking territory and the ecological impact of 
colonial plantations, it is probable that starvation also 
increased the death rate.120 As had happened in the earlier
119 Hening, The Statutes at Large. Vol. 2, 289; Mcllwaine, 
Minutes of the Council. 370-71; Hening, The Statutes at Large. 
Vol. 2, 283; Robinson, "Legal Status of the Indian," 254-55.
120 Hening, The Statutes at Large. Vol. 1, 4 67.
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years of colonization, the ceaseless assault on the natives' 
way of life, carried out by the colonists' deliberate actions, 
continued to weaken the natives' morale and their will to 
survive, which hastened their decline.121
Although active resistance by Native Americans had 
abated by the late 1660s and they no longer had the numbers or 
the strength to pose a threat to Virginia's security, the 
economic and political woes of the colony intensified. 
Tobacco prices were still depressed, which caused particular 
hardship for the small planter. To preserve the mercantile 
interests of the mother country, England fought two wars with 
the Dutch, in 1664-67 and 1672-74, to prevent them from 
trading with the colonists, thus depriving Virginia of one of 
its markets. During these same years, weather frequently 
ravaged the tobacco and food crops, and in 1673 disease 
destroyed many of the settlers' cattle. To add to their 
economic hardships, the colonists faced an increasing tax 
burden. In the midst of this downturn in the colonists' 
fortunes, their careless acquisition and ruthless exploitation 
of cheap White laborers came back to haunt them. These 
laborers were mostly men who in England were impoverished and 
unemployed, and some were convicted criminals. They had been 
shipped to Virginia, often against their wills, to serve the 
upper class of planters who were interested only in maximizing 
their profits. The conditions of servitude were extremely
121 Rountree, Pocahontas's People. 96. Thornton, 
American Indian Holocaust and Survival. 69.
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harsh, further hardening an already tough group. Increasingly, 
when the time of freedom came, these servants found themselves 
without the means to obtain land for themselves. By the late 
1660s, a growing class of landless poor so threatened the 
colony's security that in 1670 the Assembly voted to 
disenfranchise them in a wrongheaded attempt to weaken their 
impact.122
While the English in Virginia were contending with 
their own internal pressures, inter-tribal hostilities among 
the Native Americans of Virginia and Maryland were creating 
problems which would soon reverberate in the English 
settlements. Maryland betrayed its allies the Susquehannocks 
by making peace with their long-standing enemy, the Senecas. 
The Senecas proceeded to push the Susquehannocks back to the 
Potomac River where their numbers, added to other Native 
American tribes in the area, created a food shortage. Trying 
to avoid starvation, some of the natives in the area began 
raiding nearby English plantations.123 This renewed raiding 
along the frontier rattled the nerves of an already tense 
colony, but more significantly, provided the colonists with an 
outside target to bear the brunt of their internal 
frustrations. Writing less than thirty years after these 
events, Robert Beverley accurately portrayed what happened. 
"Vent[ing] all their resentment against the poor Indians," he
122 Morgan, American Slavery. American Freedom. 236-47.
123 Craven, The Southern Colonies. 373.
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wrote, made the settlers feel that they had an easy way out of 
all their problems.124 Once again the Native Americans became 
the scapegoats for the colony. Already perceived as "alien 
others" by the English, the native peoples were ready targets 
on whom colonists could vent their anger during this time of 
economic insecurity and political unrest. In this way, 
Bacon's rebellion represents a chilling precursor to some of 
the most flagrant genocides of the twentieth century, those 
carried out by the Nazis and by the Turks against the 
Armenians, in which the victims became the scapegoats for a 
country's woes.125
The trouble which shortly would lead to Bacon's 
Rebellion erupted in July 1675, in the Potomac River 
Valley.126 Claiming that a wealthy planter had reneged on a 
debt, some members of the Doeg tribe tried to steal some of 
his hogs as compensation, which set off a chain reaction of 
escalating violence. First, the planters in the area 
retaliated by killing several of the alleged thieves, and then 
the Doegs, seeking their own revenge, killed a herdsman on one 
of the plantations. Spurred to action by fury and fear, a 
thirty-man militia pursued the Doegs into Maryland. Coming
124 Washburn, Governor and the Rebel, 154.
125 Melson, "Provocation or Nationalism," 80-81.
126 The account of Bacon's Rebellion and the events 
leading up to it relies largely on the following sources: 
Craven, The Southern Colonies. 362-393; Morgan, American 
Slavery, American Freedom. 251-70; Robinson/ Southern Colonial 
Frontier. 61-66; and Washburn, The Governor and the Rebel,
generally.
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upon a cabin of Doegs, one group of the militia lured the 
chief out under the pretext that it wanted to parley. 
Although the chief denied that these Doegs had anything to do 
with the recent killings, the militia shot him anyway. During 
the fight which followed, the militia killed ten more Doegs 
and captured the chief's son. Meanwhile, another group of 
militia encountered a group of friendly Susquehannocks. 
Mistaking them for Doegs, the militia killed fourteen of them 
before realizing their error. Although Maryland officials 
complained to Governor Berkeley about the botched incursion 
into their colony, Berkeley and the Grand Assembly did nothing 
to censure the militia for the murder of the innocent 
Susquehannocks, nor did they offer any compensation to the 
"friendly" tribe for the wrong done to it. The Native 
Americans in the Potomac Valley were left to seek their own 
justice for the killing of their men, and over the next month, 
they conducted several raids on English settlements in both 
Virginia and Maryland.
On August 31, Berkeley ordered Colonel John Washington 
and Major Isaac Allerton to go with other militia officers to 
investigate the source of the raids and to demand satisfaction 
from the Native Americans found to be responsible. If no 
satisfaction were forthcoming, the militia officers could 
organize an attack. Washington and Allerton ignored the 
specifics of Berkeley's instructions and summoned a militia 
force of one thousand, which included 150 men from Maryland, 
now aggravated enough by the Native Americans' attacks to act
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to repress them. Foregoing the "investigation” part of their 
mission, and thus indicating that they regarded all Native 
Americans as one enemy group, the militia surrounded a fort of 
about one hundred Susquehannock men, women, and children on 
September 2 6th. The five chiefs who responded to the summons 
to parley attested to their friendship with the English and 
denied responsibility for any of the raids. Once again,
claims of innocence fell on deaf ears, and the militia 
executed the five chiefs. Although Maryland authorities 
reprimanded the commander of its militia for this action, the 
Virginia authorities took no action against Washington and 
Allerton. Indeed, the militia continued to lay siege to the 
fort, pushing the Susquehannocks to the point of starvation 
until the natives were able to carry out a clever escape 
during which they killed ten militia guardsmen.
Outraged by the injustices done to them by the same 
English who had promised them friendship and protection, the 
Susquehannocks raided English settlements along Virginia's 
northern frontier, killing thirty-six settlers during January 
1676. Agitated and distraught, colonists all over Virginia, 
but particularly those along the frontiers, pressed their 
leaders to squash the native peoples and to restore the 
colony's security. Governor Berkeley responded by ordering 
Sir Henry Chicheley to lead a force to overcome the natives. 
For reasons that are subject only to conjecture, the governor 
rescinded this order before the expedition began. Berkeley 
was now an old man, who had asked to be retired as he no
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longer felt strong enough for the job. He may have feared 
that the English militia would not be able to find the 
Susquehannocks, who were adept in conducting their raids as 
they roved in small bands through wooded areas. Dire reports 
about King Philip's War, which was currently raging in New 
England, may also have convinced Berkeley that a raid by 
Chicheley would provoke the tributary natives to join forces 
with the "enemies," setting off a general war in Virginia that 
could ruin the colony.
Certainly Berkeley did not call off the expedition 
because he wanted to better relations with the Native 
Americans because at about the same time as he recalled 
Chicheley, Berkeley refused an appeal from the Susquehannocks 
to negotiate a peace. Rejecting both peace and a strong 
offense, Berkeley had apparently decided that the best way to 
put down the rebellious natives and preserve the colony was to 
build and man more forts along the frontier, which would make 
it easier to carry out attacks against the "foreign" native 
tribes. At the same time, Berkeley wanted the aid of the 
tributary natives to provide intelligence. In this way, 
Berkeley believed the colony could make good use of the 
tributary tribes, who alone posed no threat to the colony, and 
prevent them from joining forces with the "enemy" tribes, 
which he feared could prove fatal to the colony.
In March 167 6, the Grand Assembly adopted Berkeley's 
plan and declared war against the Native Americans involved in 
the "murders, rapins, and depredations" against the English
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and any others who refused to deliver "hostages or other 
security for their fidelity and good affection to the English 
as shall be required" or who "shall refuse to be aiding and 
assisting us in discovering, pursuing, and destroying those 
our enemies." In this act, the Assembly ordered the erection 
of several forts along the frontiers and the formation of a 
force of five hundred men to patrol them. Appointed 
commissioners were "to use Indians in the war and require and 
receive hostages from them." As an incentive for these 
tributary natives to serve the colony's interests, the 
Assembly established that natives who brought in prisoners or 
the heads of any natives they killed would receive an award of 
matchcoats. In order to ensure that the tributary natives 
could pose no threat, the Assembly authorized the death 
penalty for any English persons caught supplying any firearms 
to them. As a further measure to control trade, the Assembly 
decided to limit the number of traders to no more than five 
per county to be appointed by the county courts.127 In order 
to pay for the garrisons and the forces, additional taxes were 
imposed on the colonists, whose ongoing financial problems 
were now exacerbated by bad weather which ruined much of the 
year's tobacco crop.
The burden of additional taxes to pay for a campaign 
against the Native Americans which most Virginians considered 
inadequate spurred greater unrest in the colony. Seizing on
127 Hening, The Statutes at Large. Vol. 2, 326.
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Berkeley's own profitable involvement in the fur trade, many 
in the colony began to charge that he was disregarding the 
safety of the English colonists in order to protect those 
Native Americans who were the source of his furs. The 
Assembly's limits imposed on the traders gave credence to 
these charges against the governor by appearing to be a way 
for him to monopolize the trade.
Within a month of the Assembly's declaration of war, a
rumor (which later proved unfounded) that a massive force of
Native Americans, some from hundreds of miles away, was poised
for an attack on the colony, provoked the settlers in the
outlying areas to take matters into their own hands. These
colonists believed that the only sure way to achieve security
was to annihilate all Native Americans without distinction.
As a royal commission later wrote, to these colonists, "it
matters not whether they be friends or foes so they be
Indians." Writing about the rebellion, ethnohistorian Wilcomb
Washburn has explained:
In their excited condition, the planters turned their 
eyes to the most convenient targets for their wrath: 
the several villages of subject Indians within the 
colony. Here were ideal sacrificial victims: the
color of their skin exactly matched that of the 
frontier marauders, they fitted nicely into the role 
of "traitors in our midst" if not by overt acts, by 
secret intentions, and there were few of them.128
Furthermore, in turning on the native peoples who were most
easily within their reach even though they were not the tribes
128 Craven, The Southern Colonies. 381; Andrews,
Narratives of the Insurrections. 123; Washburn, Governor and 
the Rebel. 33-34.
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involved in any raids or the feared mass attack, the settlers 
were following the example of prior colonial legislation which 
had authorized the colony to hold whole tribes responsible for 
crimes committed near them, even if these crimes had been 
committed by others.129
The residents of Charles City decided to move against 
the Native Americans supposedly grouping on the upper James 
and asked Governor Berkeley for permission to raise a 
volunteer force and to choose their own officers to lead it. 
When Berkeley rejected their appeal and instructed them to 
wait for the regular militia which was on its way, these men 
decided to carry out their plans anyway. They found their 
leader in Nathaniel Bacon, a wealthy planter and member of the 
Council who had just been cut out of the fur trade by the 
Assembly's act. Most importantly, Bacon hated all Native 
Americans and saw no way and no reason to distinguish "friend" 
and "foe" among them. Bacon was not troubled by an dichotomy 
of images of Native Americans— to him they were all savages 
whom the colony must destroy. By choosing Bacon as their 
leader, the settlers made clear that they wanted the 
extermination of all the native inhabitants.
Bacon first sought authorization from Berkeley to 
assume command, promising that he would follow the Assembly's 
orders to spare the tributary tribes. Whether Bacon would 
have adhered to this promise is doubtful since his "appeal of
129 Hening, The Statutes at Large. Vol. 2, 193.
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the volunteers to all well-minded and charitable people" 
stated the need to wipe out the "friendly" natives as well as 
the enemies. No matter what Bacon would have done with a 
commission, when the governor refused it, the rebellion was 
on, and Bacon and his volunteer troops became self-appointed 
crusaders carrying out what Fausz has called a "true race 
war." They turned immediately on the Pamunkeys, the tributary 
tribe whose weroansqua, Cockacoeske, was trying to abide by 
English laws. Terrorized by the rebels, the Pamunkeys fled 
the area.130
What followed was basically a power struggle coupled 
with a dispute over tactics between the governor and the 
rebels, led by Nathanial Bacon. The debate was never over 
fairness to the Native Americans, but whether the colony could 
best be saved from further trouble by exterminating all of 
them or by using the tributary tribes to assist the colonists 
in the war. Berkeley, in fact, declared his willingness to 
destroy the tributary tribes if they caused any trouble. In 
mid-May, hearing reports (later proved false) that some of the 
tributary natives had engaged in hostile acts, he instructed 
Colonel Thomas Goodrich "to spare none that has the name of an 
Indian for they are now all our enemies."131 Governor 
Berkeley and his supporters were determined, however, to
130 Washburn, Governor and the Rebel. 36; Fausz, "An 
'Abundance of Blood Shed on Both Sides,'" 52; McCartney, 
"Cockacoeske," generally.
131 Washburn, Governor and the Rebel. 42, 47.
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maintain control over policy and over the colony's militia. 
Bacon and his followers, all men who lived or owned land on 
the frontier, believed that the governor's greedy interests in 
the fur trade dictated his policies to the detriment of their 
own security, and so they determined to take it upon 
themselves to eliminate all Native Americans once and for all.
As it turned out, Bacon and his men succeeded only in
two vicious attached on friendly tribes. The first occurred
in May 1676 after the Occaneechees warned Bacon of a planned
attack by the Susquehannocks and then, on Bacon's behalf,
carried out a raid on this tribe. When the Occaneechees
refused to turn over the captive Susquehannocks to Bacon, who
wanted them as slaves, and also refused to give Bacon beaver
skins, the rebels launched a savage and indiscriminate attack
on the entire tribe, including women and children. The
ferocity of the assault is best stated in the words of one of
Bacon's men, who claimed that in the stand-off one of the
Occaneechees fired first, and then:
We quickly repaid them, firing in at all their men, 
ports holes, and other places so thick that the groans 
of men, women, and children were so loud.
Immediately we fell upon the men, women, and children 
without . . . and destroyed them all, and the king's 
forts where all his treasure, his wife and children 
and ammunition, with a strong guard of men, women, and 
children were, stook [sic] close to the portholes, 
fired and destroyed them, a great number of men, 
women, and children, whose groans were heard, but they 
all burnt, except three or four men, who, hoping to 
escape, broke out, and had a welcome by a liberal 
volley of shot, from our men . .. few or none of them 
escaped, but were shot behind trees as they stood.
The rebels killed the king of the Occaneechees and took his
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daughter prisoner. The narrator concluded that they "could 
have brought more [prisoners] , but in the heat of the fight we 
regarded not the advantage of the prisoners, nor any plunder, 
but burnt and destroyed all." Bacon, reiterating that all 
Native Americans were the enemy, praised the fight: "We
destroyed about one hundred men and two of their kings, 
besides women and children. This victory was the
greatest. "l32
Proving his disregard for the welfare of the friendly 
tribes, Berkeley promised to forgive the rebels for their 
actions if they would agree to stop their rebellion against 
his authority. Making good on this promise in early June, 
Berkeley pardoned Bacon, restored him to the Council, and 
promised him a legal commission to continue his fight against 
the Native Americans. For the rest of the month, the power 
struggle between Berkeley and Bacon see-sawed. When Bacon 
demanded to be made general not only of the volunteers but of 
all the forces in Virginia, Berkeley apparently felt this 
would be yielding too much to the rebellious Bacon, and so he 
reneged on his promise. Bacon went home where he aroused his 
supporters to follow him back to Jamestown and to clamor for 
the commission. When Bacon threatened to have his soldiers 
shoot the members of the House of Burgesses, the Assembly 
succumbed and persuaded Berkeley to give Bacon the commission 
he wanted. In ensuing legislation, the Assembly also
132 "Bacon's Rebellion," 1-9.
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appointed Bacon commander-in-chief of all the forces raised to 
fight the Native Americans.
In the meantime, the Grand Assembly had again declared
war "against the barbarous Indians," now defined to include
not only the "enemy" tribes but also any among the tributary
and friendly tribes who:
have, or hereafter shall forsake their usual and 
accustomed dwelling towns without license obtained 
. . . as also all such Indians as shall refuse upon
demand to deliver up into the hands of the English all 
such arms and ammunition of what kind or nature soever 
(bows and arrows only excepted) and also to deliver 
such hostages as shall from time to time be required 
of them . . .  or that refuse or neglect to send such 
of their Indians with the English as shall be required 
of them . . . all such Indians as at present are our 
reputed friends who shall receive and entertain into 
their towns, cabins, or forts, any Indian or Indians 
our present enemies, or Indians that shall hereafter 
become our enemies, or any strange Indian who do not 
properly belong to their said towns, and shall not 
immediately upon their said coming in amongst them 
seize the said Indians, and deliver them up to the 
English, or kill or destroy them . . . and also all
such Indians who shall be known directly or indirectly 
to hold commerce or conversation with out known 
enemies . . . and the Indians of any town who shall
refuse to give an account, or that shall not give a 
true and just account by name and number . . . shall 
be held and prosecuted as enemies as aforesaid.
To fight the war, the Assembly called for the formation of a
force of one thousand men, apportioned by county. To help
defray the costs of the war, the Assembly seized all the land
which had been granted the native tribes at the time of the
1646 treaty but which was not presently occupied in order that
it could sell it. In a measure which demonstrated how this
war against "Indians" was different from wars among White
Europeans, the Assembly ordered that all Native Americans
153
taken prisoner during the war "be held and accounted slaves
during life." As Edmund Morgan has pointed out:
Englishmen did not think of enslaving prisoners in 
European wars. And it is inconceivable that a raid, 
say by the Dutch, would have resulted in authorization 
to seize a suitable number of Dutch men, women, or 
children for sale into slavery. There was something 
different about the Indians. Whatever the particular 
nation or tribe or group they belonged to, they were 
not civil, not Christian, perhaps not quite human in 
the way that white Christian Europeans were. 133
On June 26, a triumphant Bacon led his forces out of 
Jamestown to fight the Native Americans. For reasons that are 
not altogether clear, Governor Berkeley, within a few weeks of 
Bacon's departure, decided to revoke Bacon's commission and to 
declare him once again a rebel. Perhaps complaints he 
received from Gloucester County about the conduct of Bacon's 
troops gave the governor pause to consider that he may have 
ceded too much power to Bacon. Berkeley tried to regain his 
authority by going to Gloucester to raise his own forces to 
lead against the natives. He was unsuccessful, however, 
because too many men favored Bacon and were thus unwilling to 
fight with the governor. At this point, the majority of the 
colonists supported Bacon's cause for a confluence of reasons 
centered around their desire to squelch the "Indian problem" 
which had become the focus of their anxieties. Furthermore, 
Bacon rallied supporters by turning a tactical dispute into 
charges that Berkeley cared more about protecting his profits 
in the fur trade than he did about protecting the colonists.
133 Hening, The Statutes at Large. Vol. 2, 341-43, 346,
349, 3 51-2; Morgan, American Slavery. American Freedom, 2 33.
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Bacon's July 30th "Declaration of the People" is an indictment 
of Berkeley for "assuming the monopoly of the beaver trade" 
and "having in that unjust gain bartered and sold his 
majesty's country and the lives of his loyal subjects to the 
barbarous heathen." In his "Manifesto," Bacon proclaimed his 
own tactical priorities by stating "our open and manifest 
aversion to all, not only the foreign but the protected and 
darling Indians" and by declaring his intent "to ruin and 
extirpate all Indians in general."134
During the first week of August, Bacon led his second, 
and last, campaign against Native Americans, once more 
choosing to target a friendly, tributary tribe, the Pamunkeys. 
When his troops confronted a Pamunkey encampment, Cocka­
coeske 's instructions to her people not to resist were to no 
avail, as Bacon ordered an attack anyway, killing eight and 
capturing forty-five members of the tribe. After this, 
Bacon's energies were diverted from his vow to exterminate all 
Native Americans to his power struggle with the governor. The 
result was that the English were fighting each other rather 
than the native tribes. Whether Bacon would have had the 
tenacity to continue his pursuit of native peoples and attack 
those tribes which were not on "friendly" terms with the 
colony is not clear. He may have been the kind of leader who 
builds his/her political career by pandering to the worst 
instincts of people, and thus Bacon may have believed that he
134 "proclamations of Nathaniel Bacon," 58, 57.
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was assuring himself success and popularity by attacking those 
tribes least likely to fight back. What is clear is that the 
disagreement between Bacon and his rebels and the governor 
hinged on questions of authority and tactics, rather than on 
the goal of removing any possible threat to the security and 
economic expansion of the colony which the native people might 
pose. Both governor and rebels would not shirk from the 
extermination of all natives if they felt it would benefit the 
colony.
After Bacon's death of natural causes in October, the 
rebellion sputtered, and Governor Berkeley, acting decisively 
and ruthlessly, reasserted his control over the colony. The 
Crown sent a commission to Virginia to investigate the 
rebellion and appointed a new governor who took over from 
Berkeley in May 1677. The royal commissioners acknowledged 
that the rebels had shamefully mistreated the friendly native 
tribes, and on May 29, 1677, the colonists, under their new 
governor Herbert Jeffries, concluded another peace treaty with 
what was left of the tributary tribes.
In this treaty, the natives once against acknowledged 
that they would "have their immediate dependency on, and own 
all subjection to the Great King of England" and agreed to 
yearly payments of tribute to the governor. In return, the 
treaty renewed old pledges to protect the natives' lands from 
further encroachments by settlers and outlawed the further 
sale of native people as slaves, limiting terms of servitude 
to the same number of years as English servants. The natives
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could obtain certificates from public magistrates to enter 
into colonial territory in order to fish and forage as long as 
they limited themselves to things "not useful to the English." 
As further service to the colony, the Native Americans were to 
continue to supply intelligence about the movements of any 
"strange Indians" and to provide military assistance to the 
English "upon any march against the enemy." While the treaty 
recognized Cockacoeske as having authority over several tribes 
and some of the treaty's provisions could appear to assert 
friendship and fair treatment, the reality is that the 
tributary tribes were now so reduced in numbers and strength 
and so totally subjugated to the English that the colonists 
could afford the terms of the treaty. They knew that these 
natives could never again threaten the colony's security or 
the colony's continued growth.135
Six years before the outbreak of Bacon's rebellion, the 
population of the tributary tribes had declined to an 
estimated 2,900. Although there are no records indicating the 
population in 1677, by 1697, a survey by the Virginia governor 
estimated that the number had plummeted by another fifty 
percent to 1,450. In that year, there were only nineteen 
tributary tribes left in the colony, and some of them were not 
from the original Powhatan union. More than twenty of the 
Powhatan tribes had become extinct. By 1700, the total number 
of all Native Americans in Virginia, tributary and non-
135 Robinson, Virginia Treaties. 82-87.
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tributary, was about two thousand.136 Furthermore, since the 
founding of Jamestown, the colonists had never hesitated to 
abrogate the terms of any agreement they had made with the 
native peoples and now, with the tribes in such weakened 
condition, it would be easier to do so. The treaty of 1677 
would prove to be as full of empty promises as had all the 
others. With its demeaning terms of subjugation and tribute 
and its requirements for the natives to obtain certificates in 
order to search for food, this treaty emphasized once again 
that the Native Americans had been made aliens in their own 
country. For as Edmund Morgan has indicated, the English 
believed that "it was no good trying to give [the natives] a 
stake in society— they stood outside society."137 As 
"outsiders," the Native Americans would always be targets for 
English greed and vengeance.
136 Robinson, "Tributary Indians," 57, 59; Rountree,
Pocahontas's People. 104; Thornton, American Indian Holocaust 
and Survival. 70.
137 Morgan, American Slavery. American Freedom. 2 33.
CONCLUSION
From 1607 to 1677 a genocidal process took place in 
Virginia during which the English colonists decimated the 
indigenous peoples, reducing them in number by at least ninety 
percent, eliminating many tribes altogether, and causing 
profound cultural and spiritual changes. As in other 
genocides which occurred during colonization, this one was 
fueled by the colonizers' debased image of their victim group 
and by their desire for economic growth, two factors which 
became inextricably intertwined.
In the seventy years covered herein, the English 
colonists acted in ways which fulfilled all the criteria for 
genocide. First, the actions of the colonists were purposeful 
and organized. Second, the victims (Native Americans) were a 
group which was defined— albeit wrongly— by the perpetrator of 
the genocide. European colonizers incorporated under one 
name, "Indians," a wide range of ethnic and cultural groups in 
which race was the unifying factor. Believing these "Indians" 
to be inferior to themselves, "savages," and not quite human, 
the English pushed them outside their own moral universe and 
targeted them as this group of "Indians" rather than as 
individuals. Third, destruction of the group, the Native 
Americans, took place and occurred in many ways, from mass
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killings to ethnocide.
In the case of the English in Virginia, the genocidal 
actions of the colonists were often carried out for the direct 
purpose of destruction and at other times were carried out for 
another stated objective but with reckless disregard of the 
consequences. While the motive for continually pushing the 
native people into more remote and smaller tracts of land was 
to expand the colony's territory, the colonists did so 
purposely, without regard for the drastic consequences to the 
natives which were obvious outcomes. One of the most 
significant outcomes was the reduction in the natives' food 
supply, since they lost land on which to grow crops and on 
which to forage and hunt. In addition, the increasing English 
population and number of settlements drove the game the 
natives hunted out of the area. The effects of an inadequate 
diet is difficult to measure from this distance of time; 
however, it quite possibly weakened the natives enough to make 
them more susceptible to the devastating plagues of European 
diseases and could also have interfered with their ability to 
reproduce. Although there is no evidence that the English in 
Virginia deliberately spread their diseases among the native 
peoples, if hunger, a direct result of English policies, made 
the natives less resistant to the diseases, then the English 
must bear some of the blame for the deaths which occurred. 
Furthermore, the colonists continued their land-grabbing 
policies even after they knew that the result was insufficient 
food for the native population.
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The principal underlying motivations for colonization 
have always been economics and power, and colonization has 
often resulted in genocide because the colonizers want for 
themselves the economic resources which the native peoples 
possess. In the case of Virginia, the primary resource was 
land, and the English were determined not to allow the 
indigenous people to prevent them from taking it. Although 
the English often declared that they acted to secure the 
colony from the natives' assaults, this was a specious 
rationale, because it was the English who were the interlopers 
and the natives who needed to secure their lives and land from 
encroachment. Neither should history absolve the English by 
any claim that they did not believe they were doing anything 
wrong. As the writings of the Richard Hakluyts show, the 
English were highly critical of the mistreatment of the 
indigenous peoples by the Spanish in the New World, yet they 
went on to act in similar ways in their own colonies.
Colonization turns genocidal because the indigenous 
peoples become expendable in the view of the colonizers, and 
this is what happened in Virginia. When the English felt that 
they could make advantageous use of the native people, they 
did not conduct wars of extermination against them. At 
various times, the English desire for native labor, their need 
to have the natives produce the colony's food or obtain furs 
for trade, and their plans to use the tributary tribes to help 
maintain the colony's defenses served as functional restraints 
on the genocide. However, when these plans went awry or when
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the colonists' desire for more land became paramount, the 
English readily adopted policies to annihilate the tribes 
which stood in the way of the colony's "progress.11 Neither 
did the colonists care if Native American deaths resulted from 
any other policy they pursued. As expendable people, the 
Native Americans were to be used or eliminated, depending on 
which best served the needs of the colonizer.
Colonization has not always resulted in genocide, and 
no attempt is made here to definitively analyze the history of 
colonization and genocide. Nevertheless, ths story of 
seventeenth-century Virginia illustrates why colonization 
always has the potential to turn genocidal. The paramount 
drive of colonizers for power and wealth has propelled them to 
do whatever has been necessary to achieve these ends. When 
indigenous peoples can play a role which benefits the colony, 
for example, as traders, laborers, or food suppliers, the 
colonizers have tolerated their presence. When indigenous 
peoples have seemed to be an obstacle, however, the 
colonizers' image of them as alien "others" has served to 
remove any compunction to destroy them. What took place in 
Virginia also demonstrates another genocidal potential of 
colonization: In a desperate struggle for survival, the
victim group can themselves turn genocidal against its 
oppressor, as was seen in the Powhatan uprising of 1622. 
Although not a factor in Virginia, what has become chillingly 
clear in the twentieth century is that colonization can have 
long-term genocidal consequences years after the colonial
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power has abdicated, by setting in motion internal conflicts 
among the different colonized groups.
The genocide of Native Americans in English North 
America contains another element common to genocides, which is 
that the perpetrators— and, in this case, their descendants—  
deny that genocide took place. Roger Smith has written that 
"denial is usually the last stage of genocide," as the common 
response of the perpetrator is "denial of the facts, of 
responsibility, of the applicability of the concept of 
genocide to the crimes in question." For both the victims and 
society at large, denial has profound implications. Writing 
about the Armenians, Smith has probed the impact of denial in 
ways which can be applied to the case of Native Americans as 
well. "Denial has deeply entangled psychological and 
political dimensions," Smith states. "On a moral and cultural 
level, denial continues the genocide, suggesting as it were, 
that [the victims] deserved their fate." He goes on to 
recount how evidence indicates that "faced with a world that 
no longer remembered or cared, Armenians internalized their 
rage along with a sense of defeat. Frustration, a sense of 
helplessness, and, not uncommonly, depression set it." Robert 
Jay Lifton provides additional evidence of the effects of 
denial from his study of the survivors of genocide. Survivors 
can experience "sustained psychic numbing," Lifton writes. 
They need acknowledgement of the genocide and punishment of 
the perpetrators "in order to reestablish at least the 
semblance of a moral universe." Although not backed by
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research, certainly the proposal can be made that Native 
Americans from colonial days to the present have exhibited the 
same kinds of malaise, the "psychic numbing" that Smith and 
Lifton write about. High rates of alcoholism and suicide 
continue to plague reservations. In another interesting 
parallel, the acts of terrorism carried out by some Armenian 
extremists succeeded in publicizing their case and spurred a 
resurgence of Armenian activism and cultural cohesion. The 
defiant acts of Native American activists during the 1960s and 
1970s produced similar results, forcing the United States 
public to face its shameful treatment of native peoples and 
giving many Native Americans a renewed interest in the 
regeneration of their cultural and spiritual life.1
If society at large allows the denial or forgetting of 
genocides, it is "in effect, rewarding those who have managed 
successfully to use genocide as an instrument of state 
policy." Condoning genocide makes it more likely that 
genocides will occur again. Furthermore, by allowing the 
state to deny or forget genocide, society joins in the 
perpetration of the crime, impedes fundamental justice for the 
victims, and prohibits a healing process— for the victims and 
the community— from beginning. Again addressing the Armenian 
case, Smith makes another point applicable to the case of 
Native Americans: "Finding a way, through or around the . . .
1 Smith, "Genocide and Denial," 5, 10, 2, 26; Lifton,
"Witnessing Survival," 2 63, 2 66; Smith, "Genocide and Denial," 
27.
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denial of genocide . . '. has deep significance for those
concerned with the dangers inherent in the manipulation of 
history by government, and for those who seek to understand 
better the crime of genocide and, through understanding, 
prevent new acts of mass slaughter.” This concern is echoed 
by historian Richard G. Hovannisian, who has written about the 
problems posed by nation-states which deny genocide in the 
pursuit of self-interest at the expense of truth and justice.2
In the case of Native Americans, historians must not
allow the United States, in Christopher Vecsey's words, to
"forget the grisly truth about ourselves and our past." The
genocide of Native Americans must be acknowledged and steps
taken, however belatedly, to achieve truth, healing, and
justice. Vecsey sees hope, if this can be accomplished:
Our national pride must be tempered with critical 
self-knowledge. Our faith in ourselves must 
incorporate doubt into itself if it is to be a 
lasting, effective faith. The study of our contact 
with Indians, the envisioning of our dark American 
selves, can instill such a strengthening doubt.3
2 Smith, "Genocide and Denial," 24, 29, 3; Hovannisian, 
"The Armenian Genocide," 101-02.
3 Vecsey, "Envision Ourselves Darkly," 122; Smith 
"Genocide and Denial," 32; Vecsey, "Envision Ourselves 
Darkly," 126.
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